



















University of Helsinki 










Arto Luukkanen, University of Helsinki 

















Abstract: This research explores the way in which the Russian-speaking community 
of Narva, Estonia perceives their identity and sense of belongingness in relation to Estonia and 
Russia through self-reflection. Sixteen interviews with residents of Narva reveal perceptions of 
discrimination and integration and the surrounding discourses on inclusion and exclusion 
which define and influence how Russian-speaking Estonians balance their relationship with 
Russian and Estonian societies. The theoretical framework is composed of psychological and 
sociological theories which examine the individual and social aspects involved in the 
relationships the interviewees describe. The research underlines the value in having a deeper 
understanding of minority populations along critical borders to develop appropriate and 
effective national-level policies which affect the community, country of residence and country 
of origin of the minority community. This research aims to add to the existing literature focused 
on the study of minority communities along critical borders in general and Russian-speaking 
communities spread across the Post-Soviet Space in particular as well as describe the factors 
that influence their mobilization and transnationalism.  
 
Abstrakti: Tämän tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää millä tavalla venäjää puhuva yhteisö 
Narvassa, Virossa kokee identiteettinsä ja kuulumisensa Viroon ja Venäjään. Identiteettiä ja 
kuulumisen tunnetta tarkastellaan itsereflektioissa. Kuudentoista Narvassa asuvan ihmisen 
haastatteluiden kautta paljastetaan havaintoja heidän syrjinnästään ja integraatiostaan sekä 
haastatteluita ympäröiviä diskursseja sisällyttämisestä ja syrjäytymisestä, jotka vaikuttavat 
siihen, miten venäjänkieliset ihmiset tasapainottavat suhdettaan sekä Venäjän että Viron 
yhteiskuntaan.  Teoreettisena viitekehyksenä on psykologisia ja sosiologisia teorioita, jotka 
tutkivat haastateltavien kuvaamia henkilökohtaisia ja sosiaalisia vaikutuksia suhteissansa. 
Tutkimus korostaa sitä, miten hyödyllistä on ymmärtää syvästi vähemmistöjä jotka asuvat 
kriittisillä rajoilla, jotta olisi mahdollista kehittää sopivaa ja tehokasta politiikkaa 
kansallisella tasolla, mikä vaikuttaa vähemmistöihin, heidän asuttamassaan maassa ja heidän 
alkuperäisessä kotimaassaan. Tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on lisätä tietoja tutkimuksen kenttiin, 
jotka käsittelevät vähemmistöyhteisöä kriittisillä rajoilla ja erityisesti venäjänkielisten 
yhteisöä, joka on levinnyt entisen Neuvostoliiton läpi sekä kuvailla tekijöitä jotka vaikuttavat 
heidän mobilisaatioonsa ja transnationalismia.
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Section 1. Introduction 
 
Border conflicts are not a new or uncommon issue, particularly when discussing the 
Russian Empire, the Soviet Union or present-day Russia. Where Russia stops and another 
county begins has remained a dynamic question. Along Russia’s European borders alone, 
recent examples of such controversies include the 2003 dispute of the Tuzla island between 
Russia and Ukraine, the Georgian invasion into South Ossetia in August 2008 with the 
subsequent recognition of Abkhazia as a “Russian occupied territory” by Georgia, and the 2014 
Euromaidan controversy and Ukrainian revolution which led to the annexation of Crimea and 
Russia’s present-day involvement in the Donbass region of Ukraine. Given this context, 
Russia’s recent actions; expanding the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), conducting the 2017 
West (Запад) large-scale military exercise or launching environmental expeditions into the 
Artic have raised concern that Russia is in search of its next border incursion. Which of the 14 
land-bordering countries (not to mention the additional 7 countries that share a sea border) will 
find itself in Russia’s crosshairs next?  
While many factors contributed to the above-mentioned disputes, two constants and 
strong indicators for future disputes are: the existence of a large population of ethnic Russians 
on the non-Russian side of the border and the border-country’s openness towards the European 
Union (EU) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, ethnic Russians abroad, particularly those claiming they require protection from an 
oppressive host country, have given Russia cause to invoke its self-proclaimed mandate to 
strengthen ties with and protect ethnic Russians across the Post-Soviet Space (PSS).1 This 
compatriot policy is Russia’s way of exerting influence in the former Soviet states’ domestic 
affairs and thus ensuring control over the region. With regards to Europe-oriented countries, 
even before the creation of the Soviet Union, Europe has threatened the security of the Russian 
Empire’s borders and challenged the idea of Russianness. In Iver Neumann’s book, Russia and 
the Idea of Europe he underscores the long-standing idea that Russia and Europe have been 
considered incompatible, summarizing the perspective of the late-1800’s leading natural 
scientist and author of the book Россия и Эвропа, Nikolay Danilevskiy: “Since Russia and 
Europe are two different cultural-historical types, it is impossible to adapt European models to 
                                                             
1 For an example citing Russia’s right to defend compatriots abroad is during President Putin’s speech 
addressing Crimea’s vote for separation from Ukraine. See the Washington Post article “Putin says Russia will 
protect the rights of Russians Abroad” published 18 March 2014.  
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Russian conditions” (1996, 57). The creation and expansion of NATO in 1949 further 
exacerbated the divide between Russia and Europe by arming Russia’s cultural and historical 
opponent with a unified military defense apparatus. One researcher, drawing support from 
Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry’s article “The Unravelling of the Cold War Settlement”, 
explains that NATO has increasingly become a greater threat to Russia over the past twenty 
years because “NATO was perceived by Moscow to have changed its nature from a collective 
defence organization to a more aggressive and expansionist alliance as it latterly fought wars 
in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan” (Bowker 2011, 205). The border of Russia and 
Europe remains a particularly contentious meeting point because the lines drawn on maps or 
the spheres of influence exerted by Europe and Russia over time have not only divided but also 
overlapped the people caught in between – a people that share culture, traditions and history 
with Russia but are viewed as Europeans.  
 
1.1 Why Study Russian/Estonian Relations 
When returning to the question of which country might find itself facing a border 
dispute with Russia next, it is not surprising that many researchers, journalists and pundits have 
suggested that Estonia might be a likely candidate since the country borders Russia and is home 
to the EU’s third largest Russian-speaking population behind Germany and Latvia according 
to recent statistics compiled by the CIA World Fact Book (2017, 1). A large concentration of 
these ethnic Russians who moved to the present-day territory of Estonia live in and around the 
city of Narva, in the county of Ida-Virumaa on the north-eastern border of Estonia. This high 
percentage is due to Soviet-era migration and industry development policies. According to the 
Aleksanteri Institute’s Network Director of the Russian and Eastern European studies Master’s 
program, Tapani Kaakkuriniemi, ethnic Russians were moved beginning in the late-50s from 
Russia, Ukraine and Belorussia to large all-soviet factories and ports in the Baltic states and by 
the early 1990s they constituted 28% of Estonia’s population (2002, 133). Today, 25% of the 
Estonian population identifies as Russian according to official census data, with the highest 
concentration of them living along the border with Russia in Ida Virumaa county - between 53-
73% of the Ida Virumaa and Narva population are Russian according to the Statistics Estonia 
2011 and 2015 census database information (Eesti statistika online statistics 2011 and Loode 
and Poder 2015).  
This high percentage suggests that if the Estonian region of Ida-Virumaa were to 
mobilize to support Russia it could provide significant impetus to Russia’s compatriot policy 
claims, perhaps resulting in a situation similar to the recent 2014 self-annexation of Crimea. 
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Some academics suggest that possible motivations for such a mobilization include the 
perception or actual occurrence of ethnic discrimination against Russian-speaking Estonians or 
an awakening of the Russian-speaking populations’ sense of allegiance or belonginess to 
Russia based on their historical past, cultural similarities and shared language. From an 
Estonian perspective a community that has greater allegiance to Russia would constitute a 
formidable internal threat to its national sovereignty. The question the two governments 
continue to ask: Are the Russian-speaking Estonians supporters of Russia or Estonia? To 
discover this answer and evaluate if the Russian-speaking community does in fact play such a 
critical role requires an understanding of the opinions, desires and aspirations of the Russian-
speaking population in Estonia, leading us to the questions of this research: Do the Russian-
speaking Estonians self-identify more as a member of Estonian society or a compatriot of 
Russia? 2) Do Russian-speaking Estonians have a clear preference for one country over 
another? It is only after understanding who the Russian-Speaking Estonians consider 
themselves to be and their proclaimed country preference that we can draw conclusions on their 
potential to mobilize in support of either an Estonian or Russian national objective.  
Understanding the identity and the motivations of the Russian-speaking Estonian community 
not only serves to aid those who seek to anticipate potential conflict between Russia and 
Estonia, but also provides insight into questions of identity formation, cross-cultural ties and 
political mobilization for Russian-speaking diasporas across the PSS.  
 
1.2 Applicable Fields of Research 
The approach to this research is multidisciplinary and ultimately seeks to shed light on 
current and relevant foreign policy discussions concerning majority/minority relations and 
border conflicts. This is not an in-depth review of Estonian or Russian foreign policy, rather 
this thesis seeks to analyze a critical component of both countries’ national policies – the 
Russian-speaking Estonian community – through the lens of the complex-interdependence 
theory. In short, this theory evolved when traditional theories of realism and liberalism could 
not accurately explain the influence nonstate-actors or organizations could have on an entire 
country’s foreign policy. Realism is a state-centric theory where international relations is 
defined as a struggle for power in which each state can only truly depend on itself for help and 
survival and concludes that states derive their power from their political, economic and military 
capabilities, which improve through the maximization of available resources (Clark 1999, 4; 
150; 226). Conversely, liberalism extends the definition of key players beyond state actors to 
include individuals and organizations but emphasizes that the state’s focus is cooperation 
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through interdependence, not through constant power struggle. This interdependence is 
achieved through politics and security as well as through cultural and economic cooperation 
carried out by commercial firms, organizations or individuals (Clark 1999, 31; 142-143). 
The complex interdependence theory, developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, 
is similar to the realism perspective in that it still admits to a competition that exists between 
states that centers around power (i.e. current discussions of Russian spheres of influence vs. 
Estonian independence) (Rana 2015, 290). The theory however, also draws from the liberalism 
perspective in admitting that in some situations where countries have become interdependent, 
direct competition is less likely and it is rather cooperation that the two states seek to achieve 
to improve their individual positions: an example would be Russia using Estonia’s transit 
capacities for exporting Russian goods to the EU while Estonia sells mechanical engineering 
and food industries products in the Russian market (Nevskaya 2015, 37). Most importantly, 
complex interdependence declares that other actors aside from the state-actors affect these 
international relations (Rana 2015, 290-291). Therefore, the complex interdependence theory 
refutes previous concepts that predictions about state actions could be based solely on the 
priority of a state-declared domestic or international issue, since an issue’s status can be 
affected by outside actors such as the Russian-speaking Estonian community (Ibid., 290). 
Therefore, in attempting to understand who the Russian-speaking Estonian’s consider 
themselves and their sense of belongingness we may also be able to shed light on how this 
community might affect Estonian and Russian foreign policy.  
With the starting point of this research dealing with a tomb of the Unknown Soldier2 
and research about Estonian/Russian nationalism and belongingness to a community, it is clear 
that this thesis also handles prominent and ongoing discussions within the field of Intercultural 
Encounters. Key among intercultural discussions is Benedict Anderson’s idea of imagined 
communities which depict “a nation as a socially constructed community, imagined by the 
people who perceive themselves as part of that group” (Anderson 2006, 6-7). This research 
will contribute to the study of Intercultural Encounters and expand beyond Anderson’s original 
concept of imagined communities as it seeks to understand the self-perception that the Russian-
speaking community develops when the members are unable to clearly include themselves in 
either the Russian or the Estonian communities. In other words, they do not belong to an 
                                                             
2 Anderson explains that the Unknown Soldier tombs are strong symbols of nationalism because they are “either 
deliberately empty or no one knows who lies inside them” but the people of each nation claim these soldiers as 
their own and place them into their “imagined community”, no matter the actual origins of the Unknown Soldier 
(Anderson 2006, 9). 
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imagined community which aligns with only one nation-state. Although this research will take 
on a multi-disciplinary approach and include theories and research from other fields including 
geography, history, policy, border-studies, minority-studies, identity-studies and 
belongingness, the primary focus of analyzing how the interaction of two cultures influences 
the identity of a minority is deeply rooted in the field of Intercultural Encounters. Moreover, 
this research will seek to offer conclusions about how the study of this community could offer 
valuable information for developing, shaping and influencing national-level policies which is 
the ultimate goal of an interculturalist: seek understanding through intercultural studies and 
provide solutions for identified problems.  
 
1.3 Previous Research 
The starting point for much of the research conducted to understand the allegiances and 
identity of this minority began in 2007 when the Estonian government decided to relocate a 
prominent Soviet-era statue, sparking heated debates and demonstrations in Estonia and 
Russia. This tall bronze statue, originally named “The Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn” 
(Монумент освободителям Таллина) during the Soviet period, was erected in 1947 in a 
central square of Tallinn as an addition to a previously established burial site for former soviet 
soldiers (Brüggemann and Kasekamp 2008, 433). Although the word “Liberators” was dropped 
after Estonia’s independence and the monument was eventually considered only a 
remembrance for those that fell in the war – a sort of tomb of the unknown soldier – the location 
still served as the central point of celebration each year on 9 May: Victory Day (Ibid., 433). Its 
relocation in 2007 was interpreted as a confrontation between Estonia’s soviet past and its 
aspirations to align itself more with the EU - at the time, Estonia had only been an EU member 
for three years. In his article published in the Journal of Baltic studies, David Smith underlines 
that the Estonian government’s actions were strongly tied to their efforts to recreate the 
Estonian national identity: “The project of nation-building in the restored Estonian Republic 
has been first and foremost about rejecting the Soviet past, reclaiming the historic homeland 
for the titular nationality and reconnecting with the ‘Western World’ following five decades of 
enforced isolation.” (2008, 421). The Russian government perspective however, voiced that 
moving the statue was a deliberate effort to erase Estonia’s soviet history fought by Estonians 
and Russians alike, forgetting the sacrifices that saved Estonia from German occupation during 
the Great Patriotic War and thus consequently expressing sympathy for fascism (Ibid., 425). 
Offering a third perspective, author of “Bronze Soldier goes Transnational”, Olga Davydova 
quotes a letter written by a teacher at Tallinn university to express a Russian-speaking 
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Estonians’ perspective: “It was clear that for many Russian speakers the Bronze soldier was 
the most important symbol of their self-identification in Estonia…. The removal of the 
monument meant their symbolic exclusion from the society” (2008 ,405). Despite the 
controversy, the monument was transferred within a 48-hour period to its new location and 
after a few weeks, the most intense discussions, criticisms and conflicts ended.  3 The event 
however, brought to the forefront a struggle that had begun with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union: Estonia’s efforts to integrate its ethnic Estonian and ethnic Russian society and Russia’s 
efforts to wield influence over the minority outside of its borders.  
This relocation of the Bronze statue and the subsequent protests, demonstrations and 
claims of oppressed identities generated considerable academic interest in researching Estonian 
identity, particularly Russian-speaking Estonians.  Researchers were keen to determine the 
potential for future conflict between the citizens of Estonia as well as between the nations of 
Estonia and Russia. However, for the national objectives mentioned above, both Estonia and 
Russia have exerted significant efforts to influence the discourse on the minority population in 
hopes of achieving their national objectives: a mobilized and supportive diaspora for Russia 
and an integrated society for Estonia. As a result, many researchers underline the difficulty in 
distinguishing the opinions of the Russian-speaking minority from opinions generated by the 
Russian government through manipulation of key groups or individuals in the name of the 
minority.4 Likewise, various Estonian surveys and programs appear similarly state-generated 
and elusive in describing who a Russian-Speaking Estonian is as they discuss the topic of their 
integration but, focus primarily on language acquisition, social status and cultural assimilation 
to evaluate their social integration without addressing or ascertaining the community’s self-
perception or sense of belongingness to either Estonia or Russia. Much of the Estonian national 
level research analyzes the population from a socio-economic perspective in an effort to 
evaluate the level of discrimination that exists between ethnic Russians and ethic Estonians, 
                                                             
3 For more information on the events of the Bronze Soldier incident see:  “Never-Ending Second World War: 
Public Performances of National Dignity and the Drama of the Bronze Soldier” (2008) by Marko Lehti, Matti 
Jutila and Markku Jokisipilä; “Making Sense of Nashi’s Political Style: The Bronze Soldier and the Counter-
Orange Community” (2011) by Jussi Lassila; and “The Bronze Soldier: Identity Threat and Maintenance in 
Estonia” (2009) by Martin Ehala. 
4 To see a more in-depth discussion of Russian influence in the reporting, representation, and assessment of the 
Bronze Soldier incident, see:  “Bronze Soldier goes Transnational: Mediascapes and the Formation of Identities 
in Internet Discussions” (2008) by Olga Davydova; “‘Woe from Stones’: Commemoration, Identity Politics and 
Estonia’s ‘War of Monuments’” (2008) by David Smith; and “The Politics of History and the ‘War of 
Monuments’ in Estonia” (2008) by Karsten Brüggemann and Andres Kasekamp.  
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discussing job opportunities, social mobility and quality-of-life satisfaction.5 These studies 
provide data about significant indicators that influence the minority’s sense of belonginess, but 
they do not capture the personal feelings, self-declared identities or cultural connections that 
also affect an individual’s self-perception and sense of belonging. It is however, the 
combination of these statistics and direct interviews with members of the community who share 
their personal thoughts and feelings about how they understand their identity which will allow 
this research to offer greater understanding of the modern-day Russian-speaking Estonian and 
their sense of belongingness.  
A few researchers have recently focused specifically on the Russian-speaking minority 
and this thesis will expand on their discoveries and conclusions. In particular I will reference 
the research of Dr. Madli Maruste who discusses how the Russian-speaking youth’s “…ethnic 
and national identity is inﬂuenced and shaped by the stories told to them by their parents, 
grandparents, teachers and last but not least the politicians” (2014, 419). I will build upon 
anthropologist Francisco Martinez’ 2016 doctoral research titled “Wasted Legacies? Material 
Culture in Contemporary Estonia” in which he discusses how “Narva plays a crucial role as a 
mediator and juncture between distinct worlds” (2016, 57). Two studies focused specifically 
on identity construction and belongingness, drawing conclusions based on the combination of 
statistics and interviews with Russian-speakers living outside of Russia: Ammon Cheskin’s 
research titled, “Exploring Russian-Speaking Identity from Below: The Case of Latvia” and 
Kristina Kallas’ article “Claiming the diaspora: Russia’s compatriot policy and its reception by 
Estonian-Russian population”.  While the population and historical context in Latvia differs 
from that in Estonia, the concepts of cross border influences, struggles of integration and 
personal perceptions of belongingness are relatable. Cheskin uses narratives of place to 
evaluate how Russian speakers can relate to both their country of residence and historical 
homeland. Similarly, my research seeks to understand the Narva-based Russian-speakers’ 
dilemma between country of residence and ‘historical homeland’ and evaluate its impact on 
their self-identification. Relating how this self-determined sense of belonging is placed in 
context with political influences from both the Russian and Latvian governments in Cheskin’s 
work align with my efforts to demonstrate how Estonian and Russian policies relate to identity 
construction and belongingness. 
                                                             
5 For a list of Estonian-generated reports related to statistics about the Russian-Speaking minority see 
publications: Statistical Yearbook of Estonia (2015), Estonian Human Development Reports (2006-2017) and 
Statistics Estonia: Poverty in Estonia (2010). 
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Political scientist Kristina Kallas, current director of Tartu University Narva College, 
wrote on “[…] the perceptions of the Russophones themselves and their attitudes and 
expectations towards Russia” (2016, 3). In particular, she focuses on “[…] attention to the civic 
and cultural allegiances, territorial identification and behavioral strategies of Estonian 
Russophones vis-à-vis Russia as the historical homeland” (Ibid., 3). Kristina Kallas’ 
combination of statistics and focus group interviews reveal the complexity of the Russian-
speaking Estonians’ identity and sense of belongingness. Similarly, this research will expand 
on the concept of complexity, but will focus only on Russian-speaking Estonians that live 
within Ida-Virumaa. Additionally, this research will go beyond Kristina Kallas’ analysis to 
include discussions on the relationship between the Russian-speakers and Estonia to draw 
conclusions about Estonia’s role in their identity formation and belongingness.  
 
1.4 Methodology and Theories 
The primary source for the research material comes from the semi-structured interviews 
conducted with Russian-speaking residents from the town of Narva, Estonia. The interviews 
were all conducted in Narva, Estonia for three reasons: geographic closeness to Russia, the 
high percentage of current/former Russian citizens/ethnic Russians and the strong historical 
connection with the former Soviet Union and present-day Russia. The interviews are analyzed 
to expose common characteristics, perceptions and desires among the interviewees according 
to their own descriptions and explanations. This information is used to discern possible shared 
identity traits among the community of Russian-speaking Estonians in Narva. These shared 
traits will then be analyzed to determine the critical discourses according to the interviewees 
that influence their sense of belongingness.  
Because the purpose of this research is to better understand how the community 
perceives itself vis-à-vis Estonia and Russia, theories will deal primarily with concepts of 
identity and belongingness. The study of self and identity is a topic that is multidisciplinary in 
and of itself. As interdisciplinary social scientist Phillip Hammack explains in the introductory 
chapter of the book The Oxford handbook to Identity Formation, “Identity is thus concerned 
with sameness and difference at the level of social categorization, group affiliation, and 
intergroup relations, as well as at the level of individual consciousness or subjectivity” 
(McLean and Syed 2015, 1). Since the research focuses on understanding the identity of a 
socially formed Russian-speaking community, a conscious decision was made to focus the 
analysis of identity and its construction from a phycological and social constructivist 
perspective (Ashmore and Jussim 1997, 14). Previous researchers in this field have emphasized 
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the strong relationship between an individual and society in the formation of identity: “Harter 
describes important social influences on self-perception, and Thoits and Virshup note that the 
individual has an active, not passive, role in both the role-identity and social-identity 
formulations. Thus, self and identity are personal and social” (Ibid., 14). 
Within this field, there are four leading theories: McCall and Simmons’ Role-Identity 
theory, Striker’s Identity theory, Tajfel's Social Identity theory and Turner’s Self-
categorization theory (Ibid., 107-119). Common among the theories is the concept of social 
identities, defined as 
 … socially-constructed and socially meaningful categories that are accepted by 
individuals as descriptive of themselves or their group. In essence, social 
identities are answers to the questions "Who am I?" or "Who are we?" when 
those answers refer to sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., male, African-
American), group/ organizational memberships (Little League member, church 
member), social roles (stepfather, attorney), social types of person (intellectual, 
leader), and, in some cases, personality or character traits (optimist, caring) 
(Ibid., 106-107).  
 
The differentiating factor between the four theories however is the amount of importance 
placed on role identity (“I” or “Me”) versus collectivity-based identity (“Us” or “We”). Is 
greater importance given to how individuals conceptualize their identity in relation to society 
when answering the question “who am I?” – the focus of McCall and Simmons’ Role-Identity 
theory and Striker’s Identity theory or when answering the question “who are we?” – the focus 
of Tajfel's Social Identity theory and Turner’s Self-categorization theory. I will also draw 
comparisons with the work done by Phinney et. al. in the article “Ethnic Identity, Immigration, 
and Well-Being: An Interactional Perspective” published in Journal of Social Issues, where 
they argue that “…the interrelationship of ethnic and national identity and their role in the 
psychological well-being of immigrants can best be understood as an interaction between the 
attitudes and characteristics of immigrants and the responses of the receiving society” (Phinney 
et. al. 2001, 1).  
Despite the theories and concepts of identity that exist, identity remains a very fluid and 
broad subject that is often considered constantly shifting and changing depending on the 
surrounding circumstances. Therefore, the purpose of this research is not to definitively state, 
what is the Russian-speaking Estonian identity (if such a declaration can be made). Moreover, 
the scope of this research would not allow for the necessary analysis of the minority 
population’s identity to make such a claim. Identity theories and explanations however, will be 
used to interpret and understand the interviewees’ perspective on how they perceive themselves 
and the concept of their identity according to their own descriptions. I will base my 
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understanding of belongingness on Marco Antonsich’s concept of “place-belongingness” and 
“politics of belonging” (“Searching” 2010, 644). The discourses presented in the interviews 
will help understand the primary factors that influence their sense of belongingness. The 
combination of this information will allow conclusions to be drawn about who the interviewees 
consider themselves to be, how their environment may have influenced these perceptions, and 
ascertain the population’s motivations and desires as they pertain to their mobilization.  
 
1.5 Research Material  
The social composition of the interviewee group consisted mainly of those in the field 
of education (students and teachers), business (small business, real-estate and managerial 
positions) and customer service (hotel and food industries). These individuals were selected at 
random, however some parameters for selection were set by limiting the engagement area to 
the Tartu University Narva College campus café. This site proved ideal because it was a central 
meeting point for the students and faculty of the college as well as a preferred location for many 
young to middle-aged residents of Narva not associated directly with academia for lunch or 
coffee. A few interviewees were selected from outside this environment through engagement 
at their place of work (hotel reception) to represent locally employed members of the 
community. This selection process significantly reduced the likelihood of selecting 
interviewees that were homeless, unemployed or significantly older (age 65 or older) and 
generally increased the opportunity to encounter younger, more-educated residents within 
Narva. 
All interviewees agreed to the terms of the interview6 before starting and their signed 
consent was kept separate from their interview data. To further ensure anonymity of the 
participants, names were not used during the recorded interview. Instead, all notes and 
transcriptions of the interview were associated with a number. For interviewees who provided 
contact information to receive the results of this research, their personal information was not 
recorded or associated in any way with the recordings or transcripts of their interviews.  
The interviews themselves were conducted in Russian with the exception of two 
interviews which were conducted entirely in English and one interview which was conducted 
in Russian and followed by an additional 20 minutes of discussion and follow-on comments in 
English. A few other interviewees would switch back and forth between English and Russian, 
                                                             
6 The interviewees agreed to anonymity, voluntary participation, and consent to collect and use the data for 
research. See Section vi for a copy of the consent forms in English and Russian.   
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but questions were posed in Russian. Although the primary language through which I evaluate 
this research is English, it is important to note two significant considerations about research 
involving the Russian language. Firstly, Russian is a complex and rich language which at times 
can be difficult to translate directly into English because certain terms and concepts are linked 
to Russia’s long history, literature or multiethnic foundations which simply do not exist in 
English. As such, when a direct translation does not provide the full intended meaning of a 
word or phrase, additional comments will be added to support the translation. Additionally, the 
original Russian text for quotations will be cited in the footnotes providing the interviewees’ 
exact words. Secondly, the interviewees were offered the opportunity to conduct the interview 
in Russian to allow them the ability to best express themselves, particularly given the 
complexity of the topic. It is therefore significant that some interviewees chose to conduct the 
interview in English (meaning questions were asked and answers were given in English). As 
researcher and author Madli Maruste suggests when discussing results of her interview-based 
research in Estonia, language selection provides additional indicators about the interviewee:  
[…] On these occasions the question of communication language becomes 
important: will the interaction take place in Russian, Estonian or in some other 
mutually understood language? This depends on a young person’s access to 
education. Young people, who have been able to learn diﬀerent languages, often 
choose English language in their interactions, as English is more neutral and 
does not carry political connotations (2014, 419). 
 
While we cannot conclude that those who chose English are more educated or did so to handle 
political topics more delicately, we can conclude that choosing English over Russian when 
completely immersed in a Russian-speaking environment was a conscious and deliberate 
decision and at least indicates comfort and familiarity with the language, suggesting that those 
interviewees use English on a more regular basis or perhaps interact more with those who do 
not speak Russian as a native language. Although conclusions cannot be drawn about what 
choice the interviewees would have selected had they been given the option to conduct the 
interview in Estonian, research conclusions from the 2012 Human Development report suggest 
that  
The Russian-speaking population have, for their part, adopted the view that they 
should not use Estonian unless they speak it well, which has become a serious 
obstacle in linguistic integration in Estonia, reflected by the more critical self-
evaluation of their competence in Estonian (2012, 123). 
 
Many of the interviewees did express happiness that the interviews were in Russian, not 
Estonian, suggesting that at least in terms of comfort level, the majority of the interviewees 
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would have preferred to conduct the interview in Russian when choosing between that and 
Estonian.  
Prior to conducting the research in Narva, a few Russian-speaking Estonians suggested 
that it would be difficult to gather information because many of the Russian-speaking 
Estonians, particularly those in Narva, were tired of answering official surveys, questionnaires 
or interviews by researchers, statisticians and government offices. Given the already 
historically sensitive nature of relations between Estonia and Russia, coupled with this 
expected interview fatigue, a conscious effort was made to engage the interviewees in a neutral 
and unbiased manner concerning their political leanings or personal preferences for either 
Estonia or Russia. The intent was to ask direct but politically unbiased questions, providing an 
environment where the interviewees could describe themselves and through this description 
reveal their preferences (political, cultural or other) and significant influencers on their self-
understanding and sense of belongingness. This specifically meant that questions would not 
force interviewees to choose one country as better than another or determine if one country’s 
policies (Russia’s spheres of influence or Estonia’s ethnicity-based citizenship for example) is 
politically more correct than another. Instead, questions were phrased so that interviewees 
could comment on certain political aspects as it pertained to the formation of their identity and 
sense of belongingness, giving them the opportunity to explain why they felt a certain way 
without feeling as if they were forced to choose sides. In some cases, this approach made it 
more difficult to draw conclusions about political orientation, but with the intent of this 
research focused primarily on self-perception of identity, belongingness and factors of 
mobilization, assessing political orientation was accepted as a secondary objective.  
The interview questions were semi-structured and sub-divided into four sections with 
the first three sections structured as either yes/no or value-based (range of 1-5) and the fourth 
section consisted of open-ended questions. The topics of the sections were: Section 1: 
background information; Section 2: questions concerning self-identification and belongingness 
to Estonia; Section 3: belongingness to Russia; Section 4: self-identification and identification 
with the Russian-speaking community. Sixteen interviews were conducted with over seven 
hours of recorded material.7  
Drawing conclusions about the entire Russian-speaking population (~326,000 
according to 2018 estimates) is difficult with only sixteen interviews. However, the selection 
of interviewees of both genders ranging in age from 21 to 43 who are operating in both 
                                                             
7 See Section iv for the full questionnaire in Russian and English. 
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academic and non-academic environments within the town of Narva will add to the growing 
collection of studies aimed at providing concrete information about how the population views 
itself. The semi-structured interview method allowed for the comparison of some answers 
among the interviewees to determine percentages that might reveal trends or commonalities 
among the interviewees. It is important to note that interviews were conducted separately and 
interviewees did not interact with each other during the interview, nor did they have access to 
the responses of other participants.8 This is particularly important when collecting answers that 
seemed almost identical because they support strong trends that can be used to make general 
assumptions about the entire interviewee group’s opinion about certain topics and feelings.  
Additionally, the audio of the interviews was recorded for the analysis of linguistic nuances 
and emotional reactions not obtainable from a written survey with the help of native Russian 
speakers.9  
The analysis of this research will be subdivided into three main sections: Section 2.0 – 
Identity, Section 3.0 – Belongingness and Section 4.0 – Discussions and Recommendations. 
Section 2.0 will discuss the interviewees perception of identity constructed from the general 
trends discovered from the interview data and will be presented in three subsections: How are 
the interviewees connected to Estonia?; How are the interviewees connected to Russia?; and 
how are Russian-speaking Estonians unique? Section 3.0 will discuss the interviewees’ sense 
of belongingness and the discourses which influence their sense of inclusion and exclusion. 
Section 4.0 will discuss the Russian-speaking Estonian’s willingness to mobilize as a result of 
their identity and belongingness and offer recommendations about what Russia and Estonia 
might learn from this research. The research will conclude with discussions about the 
applicability to other communities, intercultural encounters along critical borders and the 
policies that shape those interactions.   
 
1.6 Historical Background of the Russian Speaking Population 
 Finally, before discussing the results of the interviews, a short review of the region’s 
recent history and most significant events, particularly those following the collapse of the 
                                                             
8 One exception to this separation between interviewees occurred when interviewee #11 heard interviewee #10 
responding to Part 4, Question 5 “What makes you similar to Russians living in Russia?” and when it seemed 
that interviewee #10 could not think of an answer, interviewee #11 added comments such as “language” (which 
interviewee #10 agreed with) and “mentality” as well as other inaudible comments to which interviewee #10 did 
not respond. Interviewee #11 was then asked to allow interviewee #10 to continue and instead participate in the 
full interview process as a separate interviewee after interviewee #10.  
9 The native Russian speakers who contributed to the translation and interpretation of the interview data 
collected are ethnic Russians from Russia and are not members of the Estonian Russian-speaking community 
and therefore may introduce some bias with regards to language and interpretations.   
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Soviet Union, will help to provide the necessary context though which to understand the 
interviewees’ responses. The historical context underscores the concepts of majority/minority 
dynamics, discrimination, and national politics that directly influenced the development of the 
Russian-speaking community. This historical reference will give context to the interviewees’ 
responses when they explain how certain events caused them to self-identify or develop a sense 
of belongingness in a particular way.  
 The town of Narva and the surrounding region have historically wrestled with border 
conflicts instigated by the regional powers such as the Swedes, Germans and Russians even 
before it became an Estonian town. It was not until the beginning of the 20th century that an 
independent Estonia emerged. Francisco Martinez explains that following the collapse of the 
Russian Empire, “the newly independent Republic of Estonia gained control over the whole 
town of Narva, including Ivangorod [now a part of Russia]. The line of that frontier was 
mutually recognised by Soviet Russia and Estonia in the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920” (2016, 
211). However, border conflicts continued and as a result of occupation by Nazi Germany and 
Soviet Russia during the Second World War, “artillery (mostly Soviet) devastated 98.2% of 
the buildings” (Ibid., 211). Following this destruction, a critical shift in demographics occurred 
when Soviet Russia decided to rebuild Narva as a modern socialist city populated by Russians 
in what Karsten Brüggemann describes in “An Enemy’s ‘Outpost’ or ‘Our West’” as a final 
effort to russify the Pribaltika. This concept of russification was deeply rooted in the former 
Russian Empire’s approach to expansionism and was considered “an important means to prove 
elementarily that Russia was a European country” (2007, 89). In essence, replace the local 
residents of the area with Russians so that the town would inevitably develop and remain as a 
part of Russia.  
 Between the 1960s and 1990s, the Soviet government issued mandates to develop 
Soviet factories in Narva. This industrialization coupled with “relatively high living standards 
and easy access to new apartments” encouraged and at times obligated Russian-speakers from 
across the Soviet Union to move to Narva (Martinez 2016, 213).  Given the high percentage of 
Russians in Narva upon the reinstatement of independent Estonia, “…Narva, and the region of 
Ida-Virumaa overall, were identified as a potential sources of secessionist politics” (Ibid., 213). 
Kiur Aarma and Raimo Jõerand’s recent documentary film Rodeo – Taming a Wild Country 
recounted the significant threat Narva posed, suggesting that the demographic differences 
would undermine or prevent the future independence of the country (2017). In the book 
Russians Beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity, author Niel Melvin describes the 
anti-Estonian sentiments within Narva during Estonia’s first free elections.  
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On 16 and 17 July 1993, the Sovietized leadership of the northeast held a 
referendum on national-territorial autonomy for the region. Amid reports of 
major irregularities, the turnout was low (54% in Narva and 60% in Sillamae). 
The local government of Kohtla-Järve (an area with a 70% non-Estonian 
population) refused to hold the referendum. In Narva, 97% of those who voted 
supported autonomy, in Sillamae 98.6%. The Estonian State Court ruled the 
referendum illegal on 11 August 1993 (1995, 49). 
 
Narva and Ida-Virumaa did not break away from the fledgling Estonian-state following the 
first free elections, but the dilemma of demographics remained an unresolved issue.  
In general, the life of ethnic Russians within the Baltics became uncertain with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, characterized by large doses of incredible opportunities coupled 
with extreme uncertainty for the future. Most notably, ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia 
found themselves in a particularly challenging situation, as their status was placed in question 
when the two newly independent countries did not automatically award citizenship to them. 
Rather, they were labeled foreigners in Estonia’s 1993 Aliens Act (Välismaalaste Seadus 
võetud 8. juulil 1993) and non-citizens in Latvia’s equivalent legislation (Cheskin 2013, 290), 
and in the case of Estonia, would have been deported if they did not apply for residency permits 
as a foreigner (Melvin 1995, 52). Two years later, the government introduced the 1995 
Citizenship Act (Kodakondsuse Seadus Vastu võetud 19. jaanuaril 1995) which allowed 
permanent residents to apply for citizenship, but they were required to obtain a high level of 
language proficiency in Estonian. Consequently, statelessness associated with citizenship 
continued, resulting in many Russian-speakers living without defined citizenship, legal rights 
to land or property, or the ability to travel in Europe without restrictions. The challenging 
citizenship process seemed to be designed only to encourage Russian-speakers’ emigration 
back to their original home of origin or force marginalization of their soviet heritage and 
culture. One such discouraging example is found in a report published by the Jamestown 
Foundation in the journal Monitor in 2002: “Under Estonian law, former Soviet security and 
military officers are not entitled to guarantees regarding citizenship, residency, pension rights 
and related matters” (2002, 2). Essentially, overnight a community that was once considered a 
majority not only became a minority and diaspora simultaneously but, was also forced to 
renounce their title and related benefits associated with being a citizen of the Soviet Union, 
leaving them searching for a new way to categorize themselves and regain the securities 
associated with citizenship and social inclusion.  
According to research conducted by Meri-Liis Jakobson for the Interact Research 
Report, the Estonian government, recognizing that Russian-speaking Estonians were not 
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integrating by learning the Estonian language and applying for citizenship as intended in the 
initial 1995 Citizenship Act, worked to increase access, particularly in Narva and Ida-Virumaa, 
to language training and information about applying for citizenship (2013, 12). It was not until 
the introduction of the policy “Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007” that a coordinated 
effort was made by the Estonian government to increase programs and funding to improve 
integration, particularly through language training, in order for Russian-speakers to pass the 
citizenship test and begin the process of integration (Ibid., 12). Meanwhile, the Russian 
government made strong and public efforts to accuse Estonia of discrimination and worked to 
defend the Russian-speaking population by pressuring Estonia to award Russian-speakers 
special status or citizenship. For example, Moscow called for “‘social protection’–implying 
pensions and guaranteed residency rights–for former KGB officers and their families; and a 
halt to legal cases against former ex-Soviet military and security personnel in Estonia” 
(Jamestown Foundation 2002, 1). Although these requests were tied to impossible demands for 
immunity for “war crimes and crimes against humanity... and cessation of investigations and 
court cases stemming from Soviet crimes, such as mass deportations or the violent repression 
of anti-Soviet activities”, the fact that Russia purported to stand for better treatment of the 
diaspora helped Russia to maintain its paternalistic role among the Russian diaspora during this 
transitional period (Ibid., 2).  
Although diaspora members did begin earning their citizenship and their children were 
born into Estonian citizenship, even after 26 years of transition, many Russian-speakers living 
within the diaspora have maintained strong connections with Russia through family, proximity 
and language. Olga Davydova references Schmidt et al., 2006 and Saunders, 2004, when she 
explains that the internet and its many forms of media and communication has been particularly 
influential in uniting the Russian-speaking diaspora around the world (Davydova 2008, 394). 
Nevertheless, relations between ethnic Estonians and the Russian speaking community 
remained relatively benign until the relocation of the Bronze Soldier in 2007 reignited tensions. 
As Maruste explains, “After the Bronze Soldier riots the two ethnic groups blamed each other 
for what had happened and the Estonian and Russian governments could find no common 
ground. The media of both countries, which strongly emphasized antipathetic sides of the story, 
added more fuel” (2014, 412). 
The 26-year evolution of these PSS challenges - citizenship, language acquisition, 
nationality, international relations - continue to place Narva and the Russian-speaking 
population at the center of debates. Moreover, time has not made these issues any easier for the 
younger generations growing-up in this environment. Maruste emphasizes that 
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… on the political level the polarization between the two main ethnic groups of 
Estonia was played out as the root of the problem and that was reﬂected in 
young people from Estonian and Russian speaking backgrounds. They were 
under emotional pressure from their families to take sides on the basis of family 
loyalties and histories, not according to their current friends, colleagues or 
partners. The provocative question that was asked in the media and among 
people was: which side would you be on if a war started tomorrow? (2014, 413).  
 
This research aims to give voice to this population and reveal if and how they have resolved 
the conflicts surrounding this border region and what they see as the answer to questions about 
who they are and where they belong.  
 
Section 2. Who am I? Who are We? 
 
As explained during the discussion of identity theories presented by Ashmore and 
Jussim in Section 1, the study of self and identity has evolved over the past two hundred years, 
branching into many different disciplines. Nevertheless, there are still “three critical areas of 
focus within the study of identity: history, culture, and society” (Ashmore and Jussim 1997, 
14). What makes the interviewees’ self-perception of their identity complex is the fact that 
Russian-speaking Estonians share parts of all three of these aspects with both countries. This 
fact raises questions such as: Is their identity shaped more by Russia or Estonia, or has it 
become its own unique identity? To further expound on this idea, Professor Chris Weedon, 
chair of the Centre for Critical and Cultural Theory at the University of Cardiff and author of 
Identity and Culture: Narratives of Difference and Belonging, underscores the complexity 
involved with a diaspora identity: 
Diasporic communities often display multiple and hybrid identities that draw 
both on relatively fixed ideas of traditional culture and new hybrid identities 
and cultural forms – particularly among subsequent generations – that emerge 
from engagement with the culture and society in which the original migrants 
settled (2004, 105). 
 
Weedon continues by explaining that the resultant cultural forms, practices and identities 
exhibited by the diaspora go against ideas of their traditional culture as well as the culture of 
their new environment (Ibid., 105). Given the uniqueness and complexity of such a hybrid 
community, it is reasonable to conclude that only those from within such a hybrid society will 
be able to reveal how the two parent societies have shaped their self-perception. The self-
descriptions from the interviewees in this research will help describe from which parent society 
the social, cultural, emotional and historical influences come from and will help explain the 
Russian-speaking community’s view on how their identity intertwines with Russia and Estonia. 
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Through a comparative reconstruction of their self-perception we can determine what is too 
Russian or what is too Estonian according to the interviewees and by staying within these 
borders we can begin to understand who the Russian-speaking Estonian’s consider themselves 
to be.  
To elicit responses to help the interviewees describe this influence, the interview 
questions focused on: 1) What is their relationship with Estonia? and 2) What is their 
relationship with Russia? By providing the interviewees the opportunity to describe their own 
idea of their identity and then determining common trends among the responses, we can 
identify commonalities that unite the Russian-speaking community and likely have the greatest 
influence on their identity-construction.  
 
2.1. What is the Relationship with Estonia? 
There are two means by which I evaluate the relationship between the interviewees and 
Estonia: externally and internally. The external connections between the interviewees and 
Estonia revolve around residency which includes aspects such as birthplace and citizenship. 
The first section of the interview served to collect statistical information that would help 
capture theses external aspects. Only three of the interviewees stated that they were not born 
in Estonia in Part 1, Question 3 (P1, Q3). These three interviewees however, have all lived over 
35 years in Estonia – equivalent to living over 89% or more of their entire lives in Estonia. 
Among the Estonian-born interviewees, four were older than 27 meaning that they were not 
born into an independent Estonia and may have had to apply for citizenship following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union according to the 1995 Citizenship Act.10 Although only 56% of 
the interviewees were automatically and legally considered Estonian by birth, all but two 
interviewees had Estonian citizenship and possessed an Estonian passport (two of which also 
claimed to hold a second passport with Russian citizenship).11  For the two individuals who did 
not hold an Estonian passport/citizenship, one held a grey passport12 and the second held a 
                                                             
10 No additional questions were asked to determine if Estonian citizenship was automatic or requested for these 
four interviewees.  
11 The scope of this research did not allow for further investigation into the legalities of dual passports or 
citizenship.  
12 According to the research completed by Francisco Martinez in 2016, “Roughly 100 000 Estonian Russians 
carry a special grey passport that labels them as ‘alien’. This status complicates getting a job and does not allow 
one to vote in national elections. Most of the holders are elderly people. Between 2008 and 2011, the number of 
holders dropped from 110 000 to 97 800. 48% of the total due to death; those who obtained Estonian citizenship 
made up 28 percent of the figure, and those who took other citizenship accounted for 23 percent. (2016, 207-
208) For additional information on the grey passport issue, reference the “Estonian Integration Monitoring 
Summary” (2011) by Marju Lauristin, the INTERACT Research Report “Integration Policy Instruments in 
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Russian passport. All of the interviewees answered that they reside permanently in Estonia (all 
but two of the interviewees have lived in Estonia their entire life).  
These results support the statistics which indicate that the current day population of 
Russian-speaking Estonians (particularly those 45 years or younger) have lived a majority of 
their life in independent Estonia. This is in contrast to the previous generation of the Russian-
speaking emigre population that arrived in Soviet-controlled Estonia between the end of WWII 
and the 1980s, held soviet citizenship and did not require a knowledge of Estonian language or 
culture to function on a daily basis (Evas and Väljataga, 14). The percentage of interviewees 
holding a grey passport (6% of the interview population) is also in-line with the national level 
statistics of total grey passport holders in Estonia (just over 6%) and underlines the steady 
decrease of “people with undetermined citizenship” originally identified in 1992 (33% of the 
1992 Estonian population).13 These statistics underline the dynamics of generational change 
which has occurred over the past 26 years in Narva where an increasing percentage of the 
population has lived more than 50% of their life in the independent country of Estonia. In 
particular, younger Russian-speaking Estonians have more tangible external ties with Estonia 
than older Russian-speakers and Russian-speakers under the age of 25 have personally only 
known Estonia as an independent country.  
Residency 
The fact that the interviewees have resided in Estonia either their entire life or a majority 
of their adult life is, in and of itself, a strong external influence on their relationship with 
Estonia and consequently a strong influence on their self-perception. In some way they have 
always been associated with Estonia, particularly more so than the generation before them that 
lived the majority of their adult life in the Soviet Union, unattached from the notion of being 
connected to Estonia or the Estonian people (even if they were living on the territory that is 
now present-day Estonia). A life-long association with Estonia however, does not necessarily 
equate to a greater tendency for assimilation or integration. Initial theories in assimilation state 
that, “In the case of immigrants and their descendants who may not intentionally seek to 
assimilate, the cumulative effect of pragmatic decisions aimed at successful adaptation can give 
rise to changes in behavior that nevertheless lead to eventual assimilation” (Alba and Nee 2003, 
                                                             
Estonia” (2013) by Mari-Liis Jakobson, and the “Mapping Statelessness in Estonia” report (2016) by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR). 
13 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) 2016 “Mapping Statelessness 
in Estonia” report, “the size of this population [grey passport holders] has decreased considerably, from around 
500,000 in 1992, to around 82,000 in 2016.” (2016, 95) However, according to the “Narva in Figures” 2013 
Report, 15% of Narva’s population was made up of grey passport holders. (Vylitok 2013, 9) 
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39). But modern theories of assimilation suggest that a more predictive aspect in assimilation 
is the “social distance” between the individuals assimilating and the society into which they 
are assimilating where social distance is considered, “the subjective state of ‘nearness felt to 
certain individuals,’ not physical distance between groups” (Ibid., 31). Theorists Tomatsu 
Shibutani and Kian Kwan, according to Alba and Nee, explain that: 
When social distance is small, there is a feeling of common identity, closeness, 
and shared experiences. But when social distance is great, people perceive and 
treat the other as belonging to a different category; and even after long 
acquaintance, there are still feelings of apprehension and reserve” (Ibid., 32). 
 
Therefore, we cannot determine if this demographic shift (by birth, citizenship and residency) 
in “native Russian-speaking Narvans” over the past 26 years is a positive or negative one 
without supporting comments from the interviewees on how this relationship has affected their 
perception of social distance within Estonian society.  
Exploring the responses to the open-ended questions in which interviewees expressed 
in their own words their connections to Estonia, the concepts of residency, citizenship and time 
in Estonia are cited as reasons for how they feel and relate to Estonia, and generally indicate a 
sense of familiarity with the country. When asked “What makes you similar to Estonians?”, 
interview #1 stated “[our] place of residence”14 and interview #7 explained, “because I’m not 
purely “Russian-Russian from Russia – I live here…My family is Russian-speaking, but none 
of us have been to Russia, meaning we haven’t lived there. It means I’m from Estonia.”15 A 
preference for living in Estonia was extremely common among the interviewees and was 
described as a result of a greater sense of familiarity which encompassed feelings of comfort 
and safety with the Estonian way of life. Interviewee #4 stated, “I like Estonia, I live well here. 
And I want to stay here to live.”16 Interviewee #15 underlined multiple times throughout the 
interview that perhaps in the days of the Soviet Union life was better for Russian-speakers 
however, when answering what he holds in common with Estonians he said, “Well probably 
that we want to live here in Estonia. In peace, in happiness, and as they say in friendship. I 
want it just as Estonians want it too, I’m sure.”17 Interviewee #13 and #14 used some of the 
strongest language when describing this relationship, bordering on patriotism, although the 
                                                             
14 “место проживания” (Interviewee #1, P4, Q3) 
15 “потому что я не чисто русская-русская из России – я живу здесь… Моя семья русскоязычная, но 
никто из нас в России не был, ну то есть не не был, а не жил там. То есть я из Эстонии” (Interviewee #7, 
P4, Q3) 
16 “Мне нравится Эстония, я здесь хорошо живу. И хочу здесь остаться жить.” (Interviewee #4, P4, Q3) 
17 “ну наверное то, что мы хотим жить в этой Эстонии. В мире, в счастье и как говорится, в дружбе. Я 
этого хочу, просто эстонцы тоже этого хотят, я уверен.” (Interviewee #15, P4, Q3) 
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word itself is not used. Interviewee #13 said, “Probably we love our country, that’s why we 
live here.”18 and interviewee #14 comments, “Love for my own country, in which I live.” In 
almost all of the positive responses, the interviewees cited strong feelings towards Estonia 
because of a desire to reside in “their own country”.   
The conclusion that they were not just residents of Narva, but of Estonia and in a few 
cases underlining that they were residents of Europe, seems to contradict what Martinez 
concludes during his investigation into border concepts where his Narvan interviewees 
described residing in Narva as something altogether unique:  
“Narva is neither Europe, nor Russia; Narva is the border”, Tatyana 
concludes…. Tatyana is right. Narva and Ivangorod are neither Europe nor 
Russia, they belong to the border and create a distinct milieu with its own 
normality and way of constructing identity (2016, 208). 
 
While Narva is indeed a uniquely located town, the fact that in this research interviewees would 
still consider themselves residents of Estonia and Europe suggests that a positive and relatively 
strong relationship exists between them and these larger social organizations.  
Not all respondents however, agreed that the relationship with Estonia is positive with 
regards to residency. Reference to citizenship and passports during the question “What makes 
you similar to Estonians?” by two interviewees suggested a negative association. Interviewee 
#2 said, “Just this, that I have a passport, an Estonian passport”19  Respondent #6 is the only 
interviewee with a grey passport and her answer was simply, “common country, land, state.”20 
Interviewees #2 and #6 seemed to be in opposition to positive ties with Estonia based on their 
short (the shortest among all the respondents) and direct responses. Without further 
questioning, it is unsure whether these comments are directly linked to the controversial aspect 
of Estonian citizenship and passport requirements, particularly the issuance of grey passports 
but, interviewee #2’s reference to the Estonian passport and interviewee #6’s reference to the 
Estonian government (государство) suggest that if a relationship exists between them and 
Estonia, than perhaps it relies more on mandatory bureaucratic requirements than a love for 
their country of residence. They seemed to have no other positive associations with Estonia, 
underscoring a weaker relationship and indicating that for some residents, the social distance 
between them and Estonian society remains large.  
                                                             
18 “наверное, мы любим свою страну, поэтому мы живем здесь.” (Interviewee #13, P4, Q3) 
19 (Interviewee #2, P4, Q3) 
20 “общая страна, земля, государство” (Interviewee #6, P4, Q3) 
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Keeping social scientist Phillip Hammack’s definition of identity discussed in Section 
1.4 “Methodology and Theories” in mind and looking at the interviewees’ group affiliation, 
the strongest tie between the interviewees and Estonia was observed in residency. Residency 
is supported by a number of bureaucratic processes to include citizenship, passports, and 
official registration. The interviewees’ responses revealed that on a personal level, this 
connection is almost exclusively tied to Estonia with only three of the participants being born 
outside of Estonia and only two interviewees holding non-Estonian passports. This life-long 
association with the country earned Estonia the title of “homeland” or place of origin for many 
of the interviewees. We can therefore conclude that the Russian-speaking Estonians, despite 
their differences with ethnic Estonians, identify themselves as part of the larger group who 
considers Estonia their physical home. These results are in-line with statistics highlighted 
during Kristina Kallas’ 2016 research:  
[…] the surveys testify to a strong territorial identification with Estonia among 
Estonian-Russians where the overwhelming majority of them identify Estonia 
as their only homeland.…Territorial identification with Estonia is noticeable 
even among those who were born in Russia - nearly a quarter of this group 
considers Estonia as their only homeland (2016, 13). 
 
Professor Weedon adds however, that belongingness to a group, in this case through residency, 
does not occur only because interviewees associate themselves with others who consider 
Estonia “home”, but also because their identity is in part “socially, culturally and institutionally 
assigned…” (2004, 6) Weedon elaborates on this externally assigned identity by stating,  
In the case of citizenship, an elaborate bureaucracy monitors and allocates the 
markers of citizenship, for example, birth certificates, passports and electoral 
registers. National anthems, sung at official state occasions and at cultural and 
sports events, seek to recruit subjects, drawing on emotional as well as rational 
forms of identification in order to interpellate individuals as citizens of a 
particular nation. In the cases of both gender and national identity, a wide range 
of social practices come into play in recruiting subjects to identify with the 
identities on offer (2004, 6).  
 
The fact that the interviewees regard Estonia as their only homeland coupled with 
institutionally assigned “markers” (passports, birth certificates, etc.) designed to identify and 
unify an Estonian nation have caused the interviewees to categorize themselves as Estonian 
with regards to residency. Even those interviewees who asserted strong connections to and 
influence from Russia (Interviewees #2 and #6) could not ignore the fact that part of who they 
are, at least with regards to residency, is Estonian. It is true that the interviewees could choose 
to change aspects of their residency by moving or seeking a passport from another country 
(although institutionally assigned identity markers can prove bureaucratically challenging to 
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alter), it would be hard to completely erase a relationship that has been established over a life 
time and one that is intertwined with many other aspects of life (for example Estonian social 
services, travel rights as a European citizen, or a free education system). Overall, this external 
association was described as being somewhere between neutral and extremely positive. 
Social and Cultural Characteristics 
Turning now to internal influences, I evaluate how the interviewees described Estonia’s 
influence on their thoughts and feelings concerning self-perceptions, personal perspectives, 
cultural values and social interaction. Although many questions within the interview elicited 
responses which addressed various aspects of these internal influences, two interview questions 
specifically sought to evoke descriptions of how the interviewees’ viewed this relationship (P2, 
Q1 and P4, Q1). From these questions, common themes are identified and are subsequently 
searched for their reoccurrence in other questions throughout the interview.  
For the question, “Which phrase best describes you?” (P2, Q1), interviewees were 
provided a list of five available responses (see Table 1). The audio review of this question 
reveals that in all but two of the responses to this question, the answer was given definitively 
without equivocation or pausing for longer than about five seconds before deciding. 
Interestingly, none of the interviewees offered a sixth description to better capture how they 
would define themselves.  What is important from this question is that a total of 87% of the 
respondents chose an answer that was in some way linked to being at least partly Estonian. 
Another way to view this response is to recognize a strong sense of duality – a combination of 
Russianness AND Estonianess – which we will discuss in detail in Section 2.3: “Who is a 
Russian-Speaking Estonian?”.  
 
Part 4, Question 1 was open-ended: “What is your national identity in your own words? 
How would you describe your identity?” Although the question itself assumes that the 
interviewees have an understanding of a rather broad and complex concept of “national 
identity” and how it manifests itself, the intent of this question was not about evaluating 
interviewees’ understanding of theory, rather to determine which of the interviewees would 
connect their perception of identity to Estonia of their own accord and in what way. During 
Table 1:  Part 2, Question 1 “Which phrase best describes you?” 
Russian (Русский) 13% 
Estonian (Эстонский) 13% 
Russian-speaking Estonian (русскоязычный Эстонский) 13% 
Estonian citizen with Russian ethnicity  
(гражданин Эстонии с русской этнической принадлежностью) 
31% 
Both Russian and Estonian (Русский, и Эстонский) 31% 
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this section, only three respondents listed “Estonian” (Эстонский/ая) as a descriptor of their 
national identity in the first two sentences. Some of the interviewees would not name either 
Russia or Estonia as a descriptor of their national identity: Interviewee #12 said, “I feel that 
both choices are absolutely the same to me as far as who I am by nationality.”21 And 
interviewee #16 said, “Well, my first thought, what comes to mind first is that I really don’t 
consider myself to be any specific nationality.”22 Half of the respondents cited Russian as their 
nationality in the first sentence. However, it is important to note that from all the interviews in 
which a country was named while describing their identity, only two interviewees did not 
provide additional comments and explanations connecting their identity in some way to both 
Estonia and Russia. For example, Interviewee #6 said, “I am a Russian who lives in Estonia”23, 
and interviewee #7 explained that “Well, how can I say this, I’m sort of Russian, but I live in 
Estonia”.24 However, as interviewees #5 and #9 underlined, even these short descriptions were 
not sufficient enough to explain the relationship: Interviewee #5 said, “This is a difficult 
question because there is no definitive answer to it.”25 and interviewee #9 stated, “I ...I don’t 
consider myself more Russian or Estonian.”26 In almost every case, the interviewees elaborated 
on their initial one or two-word descriptions of their identity, moving past the terms “Estonian” 
(эстонский/ая) or “Russian” (Русский/ая) by describing their identity as a combination of 
something Russian and Estonian. It is at this point in the interview when concrete examples 
began to appear. Although the interviewees had begun to mention that a relationship existed 
between them and Estonia when responding during the first three parts of the interview, part 
four served as the catalysts for the interviewees to begin explaining in what ways this 
relationship took shape in their thoughts and actions.  
The interviewees used the following terms to describe personal attributes that they felt 
made them at least partly Estonian: quiet (спокойные/ тихо), reserved (сдержанные), 
secretive (скрытные), closed (замкнутые) and individualistic (индивидуалистично). (P4, 
Q1) With regards to the terms secretive and closed, the respondents themselves referred to the 
cultural stereotypes for which Estonians are considered to be socially more distant than people 
in Western Europe. Interviewee #10 explained that, “Initially, it is very difficult for us to start 
                                                             
21  “Я чувству, что мне абсолютно все равно, кто я по национальности.” (Interviewee #12, P4, Q1) 
22  “Но мысль сразу, что первая пришла, что я на самом деле не отношу себя к какой-то конкретной 
национальной.” (Interviewee #16, P4, Q1) 
23  “я русская, которая живет в Эстонии” (Interviewee #6, P4, Q1) 
24  “ну как сказать, я вроде как и русская, но живу в Эстонии” (Interviewee #7, P4, Q1) 
25 “Это сложный вопрос, потому что однозначного ответа на него все-таки нет.” (Interviewee #5, P4, Q1) 
26 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q1) 
 28 
 
a relationship”27. Interviewee #12 did comment that perhaps the preference towards being soft 
spoken or more silent might also be related to education level, not just cultural affiliations.28  
Interviewee #9 explained that perhaps the best way to understand the Estonian influence is that 
the people of Narva have become more “individualized” over time, particularly when compared 
to Russians in Russia who appear to prefer a more “collectivist” approach to social 
interaction.29  
Mentality 
In addition to their personal characteristics and social preferences, the interviewees 
underlined that their mental approach to many aspects of life has increasingly fallen more in 
line with an Estonian or European way of thinking and includes a greater preference for order 
and rules. For example, interviewee #5 stated: “Mentally, I am already a westerner”30 and 
interviewee #14 says: “I consider myself to be Russian, living according to…having the 
mentality of an Estonian. That is, since I happen to speak Russian, I speak Russian, but I live 
as an Estonian, as a European.”31 Interviewee #9 also underlined the influence and preference 
for order: “The way… things are done, or business is done is very strict in, in Estonia. It’s 
more like German.”32 Interviewee #9’s response has two potential interpretations: order and 
preference is more European (i.e. German) or there are still historical traces of German cultural 
influence from the period of German governing and settling prior to Estonia’s inclusion in the 
Soviet Union.33 Interviewee #12 also suggests a preference for this Estonian way of thinking 
on a daily basis: “In my house, there is probably a more Estonian way of organizing than a 
Russian one”.34   
Although many interviewees commented on sharing a mentality with Estonians, 
interviewee #5 provided the most detail about how the Estonian mentality manifested itself 
within the Russian-speaking community in the form of preference for rules and order. 
                                                             
27 “нам тяжело очень с человеком на первом этапе начать отношения.” (Interviewee #10, P4, Q1) 
28 (Interviewee #12, P4, Q3) 
29 (Interview #9, P4, Q3) 
30  “но ментальность у меня уже западного человека.” (Interviewee #5, P4, Q1) 
31 “я считаю себя русским, живущим по…, имеющим менталитет как бы Эстонии. То есть как бы я 
говорю по-русски, я говорю по-русски, но живу я по-эстонски, по-европейски.” (interviewee #14, P4, Q1) 
32 (Interview #9, P4, Q3) 
33 For more information concerning German influence in Estonia reference Karsten Brüggemann’s Narva Und 
Die Ostseeregion: Beiträge Der II. Internationalen Konferenz Über Die Politischen Und Kultirella Beziehungen 
Zwischen Russland Und Der Ostseeregion, Narva, 1-3 Mai 2003 = Narva and the Baltic Sea Region: Papers 
Presented at the II International Conference on Political and Cultural Relations between Russia and the Baltic 
Region States.   




 … This style of developing here. It’s absolutely Estonian. And only because of that, 
some interesting projects like this [referring to the new Narva college building] was 
able to be made here…. I love this style, there are a lot of things in Estonian mentality 
that I don’t understand.…the music is soft, the talking, talk is soft it’s like not so deep. 
It’s another story, but what is about business, absolutely is 100 percent [Estonian].35  
 
Interviewee #5 explained that this Estonian and European mental approach to business 
specifically refers to avoiding corruption, bribes or applying political pressure to achieve 
results.36 As one of the older interviewees (33 years old), interviewee #5 also commented on 
how the mentality has changed over the past 20 years in Narva. “…the present generation that 
I see, it’s my, it’s like me or a bit younger, [or] a bit older, they understand this Estonian 
mentality. They are more Estonian than even me.”37 Interviewee #5 elaborated on what 
Estonian mentality means and stated, “Estonians are pickier about details. Russians, in their 
mentality, they reason about broader concepts, broader notions. That is to say, pickiness to 
details, this is more typical of Estonians.”38 One final quote about mentality from interview #5 
is worth citing as it is similar to a separate description provided by interviewee #10. In 
responding to Part 4, Question 7 “In your opinion, what are the top three issues that most 
concern someone living in Nava or Ida-Viru county?” interviewee #5 offers an explanation as 
to why Russian-speakers in Narva are adopting this Estonian mentality in business:  
… we do business here like in Russia. This means that it is first done, and then 
it is considered. And this is not right. This is why there is an economic center 
there [Tartu, Tallinn, Pärnu], they first consider it, and then they do it. Here 
things are done like in Russia, almost the opposite way, and this is what 
distinguishes us, and this is sometimes why we do not manage to live well here. 
This almost German accuracy, it is the Estonians, it is not in the Russians. And 
because of this, there is some envy that Estonians live better. But they live 
better, because they have these qualities. 39  
 
While answering a separate question, Interviewee #10 provided an anecdote from a 
project that involved youth visiting Narva from Saint Petersburg, Russia and the 
                                                             
35 (Interview #5, Additional Comments, Lines 275-292) 
36 (Interview #5, Additional Comments, Lines 244-270) 
37 (Interview #5, Additional Comments, Lines 310-311) 
38 “Эстонцы более придирчивы к деталям. Русские в менталитете, они рассуждают более широкими 
понятиями, более широкими обозначениями. То есть придирчивость к деталям, это более свойственно 
эстонцам.” (Interviewee #5, P4, Q2) 
39 “… у нас здесь бизнес ведется по-русски. Это значит, что сперва делается, а потом считается. И это 
неправильно. Это то, почему там есть экономический центр, там сперва считают, а потом делают. Здесь 
делается по-русски, немножко, с другой стороны. И это то, что нас отличает, и это то, почему иной раз у 
нас здесь не получается жить так же хорошо. Эта почти немецкая точность, она есть у эстонцев, ее нет у 
русских. И есть из-за этого какая-то зависть, из-за того, что эстонцы живут лучше. Но они живут лучше, 
потому что они обладают этими качествами.” (Interviewee #5, P4, Q7) 
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subsequent observations made from a drawing exercise given to the students from both 
countries.  
And we Estonians, we must always, for example, think before we do something. 
If we write this, then what will happen if we draw. And here came the students 
from Petrograd. And the assignment was given - the St. Petersburg people did 
everything at once, and we are - oh, we are real Estonians, we need to first 
think about it. And they - first do, then think.40 
 
Two points can be made from the comparison of these strikingly different situations. 
Firstly, the similarity in describing “doing, then thinking” seems to occur in both adult and 
child environments, implying that it is indeed a “way of thinking” about life in general. 
Secondly, the young age of the children in the second scenario suggests that this mentality 
develops early and therefore is more likely to be present among those born into such an 
environment where their way of thinking is shaped from childhood. Interviewee #11’s 
comment about mentality also refences aspects of the earlier discussion about time in Estonia 
and the impact it has had on mentality: “well I think the mentality, the intellect is already 
different, because we grew up with it.”41. These explanations of mental similarities with 
Estonians provide greater support to the previous conclusion that those in the Russian-speaking 
community who have lived longer in independent Estonia have a smaller social distance with 
Estonian society.  
Without delving into a complete linguistic analysis on each interviewee’s use of 
personal pronouns, it is worth noting, particularly from a phycological perspective, that the 
interviewees consistently transitioned from the use of “I” to “we” when describing their 
characteristics, attributes, traditions, perceptions and beliefs. Interview #10’s above response 
provides a clear example of this shift where, initially responding to the question “What makes 
you different from Estonians?” interviewee #10 stated, “…I would not say that anything 
distinguishes me.”42 But only one sentence later continued, “And we Estonians, we must 
always, for example, think before we do something.”43 The shift from individual to collective 
self-referencing supports the claim that broader conclusions about the Russian-speaking 
                                                             
40 “у нас было такое, что я занимался молодежными проектами и у нас приехали ребята из Питера. И мы 
эстонцы мы всегда должны, допустим, подумать, прежде чем что-то сделать. Если мы напишем это, то 
что будет, если мы нарисуем. И приехали вот питерцы. И дали задание – питерцы сразу все сделали, и 
мы такие – о, мы настоящие эстонцы, нам надо сначала подумать. А они – сначала сделать, потом 
подумать.” (Interviewee #10, P4, Q2) 
41 “ну я думаю, менталитет, интеллект уже немножко другой, потому что мы росли с этим.” (Interviewee 
#11 P4, Q4) 
42 “да я бы не сказал, что меня что-то отличает.” (Interviewee #10, P4, Q2) 




community can be drawn from these interviews since the interviewees speak on behalf of the 
community.  More importantly, the shift indicates that the interviewees consider themselves a 
part of a larger group – Estonian society – when it comes to exhibiting social behaviors and 
mental preferences for discretion, silence, reflection and order; another support for the impact 
of group affiliation on identity formation as outlined by Phillip Hammack (McLean and Syed 
2015, 1). 
This self-inclusion and social alignment with the larger Estonian society also provide 
substantial support for Turner’s theory on socially influenced self-categorization as a result of 
cognitive alignment between the individuals and a larger social organization to which they 
ascribe (Ashmore and Jussim 1997, 118). Ashmore and Jussim explain that “Turner's emphasis 
is on group relations as a product of self-categorization […where the] main goal is to explain 
how collective identification occurs” (Ibid., 118-119). The authors argue that Turner’s primary 
point is that “individuals think and act in group-characteristic ways… less because of human 
needs or motivations and more because they are cognitively identified with the group” (Ibid., 
118-119). Turner’s perspective on identity offers three factors that influence the likelihood of 
such self-inclusion: the relative accessibility of a category, its normative fit, and its comparative 
fit (Ibid., 118). 
 The authors of Self and Identity further cite Turner stating, “relative accessibility is the 
individual's ‘readiness’ to use the category, based on ‘past experience, present expectations, 
and current motives, values, goals, and needs’” (Ibid., 118). As the discoveries about residency 
indicated, the number of bureaucratic processes and individual rights tied to living in Estonia 
demanded a greater interaction with Estonia, an understanding of Estonian procedures and 
cooperation with Estonian authority to achieve personal and professional objectives. Since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Estonian government has persistently tied Estonian 
citizenship and residency with an expectation to integrate into Estonian society through the 
1993 Aliens Act, the 1995 Citizenship Act and subsequent integration programs, thus 
emphasizing through past experiences and current expectations a need to value Estonian social 
and mental characteristics.44 As another example, interviewee #5 explained that residents of 
Narva are increasingly considering themselves more western-oriented with regards to mentality 
                                                             
44 Estonian Citizenship Act 1995, Section 8 states, “the proficiency requirements in the Estonian language for a 
person who wants to acquire Estonian citizenship are the following:1) the applicant is able to cope in most 
everyday situations and 3) the applicant is able to fully understand the gist on familiar topics such as work, 
school and leisure.” (1995, 3-4) 
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in an effort to improve the status and future possibilities of Narva and Ida-Virumaa, particularly 
in comparison with other industrial centers in Estonia.45  
Turner’s comparative fit “reflects the degree to which the individual perceives fewer 
differences on relevant categorical characteristics among ‘us’ than between ‘us’ and others 
(Turner et al., 1987); this is also called ‘the principal of meta-contrast’" (Ashmore and Jussim 
1997, 118). While responding to the question, “What makes you similar to Estonians?”, 
interviewee #9 verbally walked through this “meta-contrast” process of comparison by first 
identifying a characteristic, identifying the “us” and the “other” aspect of that characteristic, 
conducting a self-examination, determining which group had fewer differences from 
interviewee #9’s own personal assessment, and then self-aligning with said group:  
Some... cultural…things. Russian and Estonian cultures are very different. One 
is individualized, another is collectivist cultures. So yes, I’m more private I 
guess. I don’t like to communicate much. So…so I guess the social part is more 
Estonian in me.46  
 
Interviewee #9 paused often when making the comparison between Russian, Estonian and 
personal characteristics, suggesting that this was perhaps the first time consciously making the 
comparison or at least sharing the conclusions of such a comparison out loud. The hesitation is 
also evidence that the answer was not an immediate, obvious or clear one. Interviewee #12 also 
admits a preference for forming societal bonds based on commonalities versus national origin 
when reflecting on identity:  
I would also like now, not to perceive other people on the basis of their 
nationality. Rather, to consider them from the standpoint of whether this person 
is close to me, whether he is interesting to me and whether I can learn 
something from him. 47 
 
Even when interviewees were unable to identify the exact attribute that drew them closer to 
Estonians, interviewee #7 suggested that there was a recognition that they were somehow 
closer behaviorally to Estonians than Russians: “And of course, it is somehow in my behavior, 
it seems, something is there, more from Estonians.”48.  
The strongest argument for Turner’s theory given the interviewees’ responses 
concerning behaviors and mentalities is the normative fit: “the degree to which the stimuli in 
                                                             
45 (Interview #5, Additional Comments, Lines 165-173) 
46 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q3) 
47 “и не воспринимать других людей тоже исходя из их национальности. А рассматривать их с точки 
зрения, близок ли мне этот человек, интересен ли он мне и могу ли я чему-то научиться у него.” 
(Interviewee #12, P4, Q1) 
48 “И, конечно, это в поведении моем как-то, наверное, проявляется, что-то есть такое, более от 
эстонцев.” (Interviewee #7, P4, Q3) 
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the context match normative stereotypes or beliefs about the comparison criterion or category 
that is being applied” (Ashmore and Jussim 1997, 118). Put in other terms, how well do the 
interviewees’ descriptions of their own characteristics and preferences align with the 
perceptions and stereotypes of either Estonian or Russian characteristics and preferences? 
Almost every description above underlines the perception that Estonians are quieter, socially 
more distant, and mentally more European than Russians. When given a choice between 
aligning themselves with one social group or the other, their normative fit was much closer to 
Estonians, leading to a general ascription to Estonian society with regards to behavior and 
mental preferences.  
While other similarities with Estonians presented themselves throughout the interview 
(religious identity or holiday celebrations), only the social and mental preferences discussed 
met all three of Turner’s criteria which according to Ashmore and Jussim causes “a 
psychologically active or salient influence” - an activation of these traits among the members 
of the community in everyday life (Ibid., 118). A comparison with Turner’s theory on collective 
identification formation and the clear presence of relative accessibility, normative fit, and 
comparative fit suggests that the majority of the interviewees consider themselves “Estonian” 
with regards to social and mental preferences exhibited on a daily basis.  
In an effort to determine in what other ways the interviewees related to Estonians, two 
questions asked the interviewees to clarify where they draw the line between them and those 
they perceive as ethnic Estonians: “What makes you similar to Estonians and what makes you 
different from Estonians?” (P4, Q2 and Q3).  These questions were also open-ended and while 
the answers further supported the concept of duality – a desire to state they exhibited both 
Russian and Estonian characteristics – one common factor surfaced by which the majority of 
the interviewees evaluated their relationship with Estonia: language. 
Language 
The question “What makes you different from Estonians?” was most frequently met 
with the response: language. For example, interviewee #1 underlined the fact that Estonian was 
not “my native language.”49 while interviewee #2 referenced her inability to use the language, 
“First of all, I cannot speak Estonian.”. Interviewee #3 cited unfamiliarity with the language, 
“Knowledge of the Estonian language.”50 and interviewee #14 simply referred to the language 
as an inhibitor, “The only barrier is the language.”51.  The Estonian language is an aspect 
                                                             
49 “мой родной язык” (Interviewee #1, P4, Q2) 
50 “Знание эстонского языка” (Interviewee #3, P4, Q2) 
51 “Единственный барьер – это язык.” (Interviewee # 14, P4, Q2) 
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which demands significant attention because it was a vital method by which the interviewees 
established the line that seemed to indicate the greatest separation between themselves and 
those they considered Estonian. In response to Part 4, Question 2, 56% (9 out of 16) of the 
interviewees cited language as the first factor distinguishing them from Estonians.  
Returning to the statistics collected at the beginning of the interview, Part 1, Question 
6 was designed to determine what linguistic ties the interviewees held with Estonia: “What is 
the language you use most often for your everyday activities and how well do you 
speak/understand Russian, Estonian and English?” The primary language for all respondents 
was Russian, with only three individuals commenting that they used both Russian and Estonian 
for everyday activities. When the respondents were asked to provide a self-assessment of how 
well they spoke Estonian (see Table 2), the average level was 3.5 (between the descriptions of 
sufficiently well and very well). In addition to this specific language question, multiple times 
throughout the entire interview process interviewees referenced the role of the Estonian 
language across a spectrum of issues.  This repeated reference underlines the critical role 
language plays in determining the strength of the relation between the interviewees and 
Estonia. Moreover, although language is viewed as a significant distinguishing factor between 
ethnic Estonians and the interviewees, the perception of the Estonian language was not always 
presented as negative. 
Table 2: Self-assessed Language Fluency 
 Estonian Russian English 
5 – Fluent/Native 13% 100% 6% 
4 – Very well 31% 0% 19% 
3 – Sufficiently well 50% 0% 31% 
2 – Basic level 6% 0% 44% 
1 – Not at all 0% 0% 0% 
 
Interviewees #1, #2, #3, #9, #11, #13 and #16 all referenced language when responding 
to Part 2, Question 4, “In your opinion, is there a noticeable difference in concerns about 
domestic economic problems from Russian-speaking Estonians and Estonians within Narva 
and Ida-Viru county (Yes or No). If so, what are those differences?” This question was 
originally intended to identify if Russian-speaking Estonians and ethnic Estonians prioritized 
economic difficulties differently. For example, Russian-speakers felt the government should 
apply funds to improve housing subsidies while ethnic Estonians believed funds should be used 
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to increase the national minimum wage. However, the wording confused many interviewees 
and based on the responses given, the question was interpreted by the interviewees as, “What 
are the socio-economic differences between Russian-speaking Estonians and ethnic-
Estonians?” When answering their interpretation of the question, language presented itself as 
a central factor.  Interviewee #16 explained that there is an economic difference between 
Russian-speakers and ethnic Estonians and it revolves around Russian-speakers’ grasp of 
Estonian: “Yes there is. It is the problem of knowing the Estonian language.”52 Interviewees 
#2, #3, #9 and #13 supported this claim. Interviewee #3 explained that the Estonian language 
played a vital role in employment when Russian-speakers want to find a job, “I know that in 
general in Estonia, it is so that if you are an Estonian, but you do not speak Russian, than most 
likely you will hire a Russian who speaks Estonian.”53 Interviewee #2’s comments support 
Interviewee #3’s claim: “Priority is given to those who speak Estonian.”54 While interviewee 
#9 stated, “I think that being able to speak Estonian here fluently gives you more opportunities 
to find a job.”55. Interviewee #13 also agreed that the Estonian language was one explanation 
as to why some Russian-speakers were able to advance within the job market; “And the 
Russians’ [status] is always lower, and the salary is different, and the position is different. But 
again, we have many Russians who have learned Estonian and have progressed very well.”56 
In response to this question, not all interviewees viewed the Estonian language positively. 
Interviewees #1 and #11 emphasized that there is an unbalanced focus on the Estonian language 
at the risk of marginalizing the Russian-speakers: “In Estonia, most of the Estonians and the 
whole state is focused on studying the Estonian language and they treat the Russians…well, 
it’s not very good.”57 (Interviewee #1) or “There are those who do not speak Russian and this 
is very important. It is still necessary.”58 (Interviewee #11) Despite the concern that focus on 
the Estonian language is oppressing linguistic needs to speak and practice Russian, none of the 
interviewees disputed the fact that learning Estonian provides greater opportunities to Russian-
speakers, particularly with regards to employment opportunities.  
                                                             
52 “да, есть. Именно проблема в знании языка эстонского.” (Interviewee #16, P2, Q4) 
53 “Я знаю, что вообще в Эстонии есть такое, что если ты эстонец, но ты не говоришь на русском, то 
скорее всего возьмут на работу русского, который говорит по-эстонски.” (Interviewee #3, P2, Q4) 
54 “Приоритет – у тех, кто говорит по-эстонски.” (Interviewee #2, P2, Q4) 
55 (Interviewee #9, P2, Q4) 
56 “А русские всегда ниже, и зарплата отличается, и должность отличается. Но опять же у нас есть 
многие русские, которые выучили эстонский и продвинулись очень хорошо.” (Interviewee #13, P2, Q4) 
57 “в Эстонии большая часть эстонцев и все государство сосредоточено на изучении именно эстонского 
языка. И к русским они относятся, ну так не очень хорошо.” (Interviewee #1, P2, Q4)  
58 “ну есть и такие, которые не владеют и русским языком и это очень важно. Это все равно нужно.” 
(Interviewee #11, P2, Q4) 
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The Estonian language was also linked to advancement within the field of education. 
For Part 2, Question 5, “How do you perceive the opportunities of youth from Narva and 
surrounding Ida-Virumaa to pursue advanced education compared to youth from other areas of 
Estonia?”, four interviewees underlined the positive correlation between a high proficiency in 
Estonian and increased educational opportunities. Interviewee #3 stated, “You learn Estonian, 
or you don’t learn Estonian. If you do not learn it, then you have less opportunities.”59 
Interviewee #15 explained, “Well, it’s harder of course. It is necessary to know the Estonian 
language very well because we do not have higher-level education offered in the Russian 
language.”60 Interviewee #13 stated that Russian-speaking Estonians have “significantly fewer 
opportunities. Because everything is in Estonian and in Ida-Virumaa we mostly have 
Russians”61 - implying that Russian-speakers do not speak Estonian well enough to have the 
same opportunities as Estonian-speakers. Interviewee #9 suggested that this lower language 
level for Russian-speaking Estonians is a result of their inability to improve their Estonian:  
I think that most of the young people…Russian-speaking [young people] think 
that they have less opportunities because of the lack of language. But it’s also 
a factor because you don’t get enough…let’s say, you don’t get enough practice 
maybe, in Estonian, so your language doesn’t develop.62 
 
Interviewee # 16 seemed to agree with this assessment that location in Estonia influences the 
chances to employ the Estonian language, comparing Russian-speakers living in Tallinn to 
those who live in Narva: “they have more opportunities to integrate, they have more 
opportunities to learn the language, they have a greater choice of jobs…”63 These comments 
suggest that discoveries from earlier research about Russian-speaking Estonians access to 
native Estonian speakers published in the Estonian Human Development Report have not 
improved much over the past 10 years for people living in Ida-Virumaa:  
Today, the problem is not so much the lack of qualified teachers, course books 
or methodological material, but mostly that both Russian-speaking teachers and 
students lack communication experience with native speakers, especially in 
north-eastern Estonia, where the problem is compounded by spatial 
segregation, in which linguistic integration takes place at an even slower rate. 
(Heidmets 2012, 123) 
                                                             
59 “Ты учишь эстонский или ты его не учишь. Если ты его не учишь, то у тебя меньше возможностей.” 
(Interviewee #3, P2, Q5) 
60 ну это сложнее, конечно. Нужно знать очень хорошо язык эстонский, потому что у нас же нет 
образования на русском языке высшего.” (Interviewee #15, P2, Q5) 
61 “значительно меньше возможностей. Потому что все на эстонском, а в Ида-Вирумаа у нас в основном 
одни русские.” (Interviewee #13, P2, Q5) 
62 (Interviewee #9, P2, Q5) 
63 “у них больше возможностей интегрироваться, у них есть больше возможности учить язык, у них есть 




Both Part 2, Question 7 and Part 4, Question 6 addressed the topic of integration, 
questioning the interviewees’ perspectives on the role of the Estonian government and the role 
of the Russian-speaking Estonians. The responses to these questions that referenced language 
highlighted a generational change in the perception of the Estonian language as well as changes 
in the Russian-speaking Estonians’ and ethnic Estonians’ approach to language acquisition. 
When answering “How often does the Estonian government offer non-integrated Russians the 
ability to participate in identifying and solving the challenges of integrating into Estonian 
society?” (P2, Q7), interviewee #11 provided a short anecdote about children’s acquisition of 
Estonian as a positive step for solving the issue of integration:  
…in kindergarten, my daughter is five years old and they are already learning 
Estonian and English through games.... My second child is in 7th grade, 
completely immersed in the Estonian language, she is learning well, she is 
integrating.64  
 
Part 4, Questions 6 asked the interviewees to discuss relatively recent and notable changes that 
have occurred in Narva and the surrounding area over the past seven years as it relates to 
integration. Interviewee #3 said, “I have Estonian friends. They see that I want to speak in 
Estonian with them and they help me. That is, they themselves take the initiative and they 
help.”65 She later underlines in the same response that, “One should know the official state 
language.”66 This response underlines her willingness and sense of responsibility tied to 
leaning Estonian, as well as the positive reception by ethnic Estonians. Interviewee #6 said, 
“And they [the Estonian government] began to do more. Some measures are being taken so 
that Russians here learn Estonian and thus integrate more quickly into society.”67 Interviewee 
#12 provided an example of such integration efforts, highlighting the generational difference 
in how language acquisition is perceived:  
There are a lot of integration programs, when children from Narva, active 
children, go and live and study the language in an Estonian environment…. 
They already perceive themselves as full citizens of this country because for 
them there is no problem with the Estonian language. For the stereotypical 
adult, for example, it is obligatory to learn the language. And if you ask them 
why - ‘to get a B2 certificate, so that I'm not fired at work’. It seems to me that 
                                                             
64 “…у меня дочка пять лет, ни уже учат эстонский английский, в игровой форме…. Второй ребенок у 
меня учится в 7 классе, в погружении в эстонский язык, она учится хорошо, она интегрируется.” 
(Interviewee #11, P2, Q7) 
65 “У меня есть знакомые эстонцы, они видят, что я хочу говорить с ними по-эстонски, и они помогают 
мне. То есть у них самих из них исходит инициатива и они помогают.” (Interviewee #3, P4, Q6) 
66 “ Государственный язык ты должен знать.” (Interviewee #3, P4, Q6) 
67 “И больше стали делать, какие-то меры принимаются для того, чтобы русские здесь учили эстонский 
язык и таким образом интегрировались быстрее в общество.” (Interviewee #6, P4, Q6) 
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the purpose of the language is simple - to allow us to converse with each other, 
this is the goal. But people in Narva, they perceive it as some sort of 
punishment. ‘There will be a language proficiency inspection, I will be checked 
and fired.’ This means [for those who think like that] that learning Estonian is 
necessary only for this reason. But, it seems to me, among young people, there 
is no longer such an attitude towards the [Estonian] language.68  
 
Finally, Part 4, Question 7, “In your opinion, what are the top three issues that most concern 
someone living in Narva or Ida-Virumaa?” interviewees again cited language as a central 
concern: “studying the Estonian language.”69 (Interviewee #1); “the opportunity for Russians 
to learn Estonian without being forced to do so.”70 (Interviewee #9); “Well, Language. For 
example, in order to learn Estonian, I left for six months to live in Tartu.”71 (Interviewee #10) 
and “Training in Russian – that is one of the main issues.”72 (Interviewee #15) 
Two-thirds of the interviewees referenced language, often on more than one occasion, 
as a determining factor in their relationship with the larger Estonian society. Through these 
references and quotations, the interviewees established that greater proficiency in the Estonian 
language increases job opportunities for Russian-speakers in work environments outside of the 
Russian-speaking community, offers greater educational opportunities in Estonia (particularly 
with regards to higher education), improves the opportunity to receive information directly 
from figures of authority within Estonia and in general strengthens their relationship and 
integration with ethnic Estonians. This connection between language proficiency in Estonian 
and the various positive outcomes in terms of better opportunities, integration and social 
inclusion, suggests that the more proficiently a Russian-speaker master’s Estonian, the more 
connected they are to Estonia on a number of different levels – again reducing the social 
difference between Estonian society and the Russian-speaker. As Maarja Siiner and Triin 
Vihalemm state in chapter 5.3.1. of the 2012 Human Development Report, “Estonia has been 
rather successful in convincing the Russian-speaking population that knowing Estonian is an 
important and almost inevitable means of social mobility” (Heidmets 2012, 122). 
                                                             
68 “Очень много интеграционных программ, когда дети из Нарвы, активные дети, ездят и живут и 
изучают язык в Эстонской среде.... Они уже воспринимают себя полноправными гражданами этой 
страны. Потому что для них нет проблемы в эстонском языке. Взрослые, например, есть такой 
стереотип, нам надо учить язык. И если ты спрашиваешь его, зачем – затем, чтобы получить сертификат 
Б2, чтобы на работе меня не уволили. Мне кажется, язык, его задача просто – чтобы нам с тобой 
договориться, цель такая. А люди в Нарве, они воспринимают его, как какое-то наказание. Приедет 
инспекция по языку, меня проверят и уволят. То есть надо только для этого. И вот мне кажется, у 
молодежи, уже нет такого отношения к языку.” (Interviewee #12, P4, Q6) 
69 “и изучения вот эстонского языка” (Interviewee #1, P4, Q7) 
70 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q7) 
71 “Ну язык. Я, например, чтобы выучить эстонский, на полгода уезжал в Тарту жить.” (Interviewee #10, 
P4, Q7) 
72 “Обучение на русском языке – один из главных вопросов.” (Interviewee #15, P4, Q7) 
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The amount of emphasis on language is not surprising as it has been and remains a 
primary focus for the Estonian integration process and many of Russia’s language support 
programs and legal initiatives to protect the linguistic rights of Russian compatriots abroad. 
From the interview descriptions it can be concluded that the less Estonian an individual knows, 
the more isolated the individual is from job opportunities, social interaction, social awareness 
and governmental benefits, thus increasing the social distance between themselves and ethnic 
Estonians. This is supported by the data collected and analyzed from national level surveys in 
the 2012 Human Development Report where Maarja Siiner and Triin Vihalemm conclude that 
Both objective data and subjective self-positioning show that competence in the 
national language among non-titulars is connected with higher social status and 
better pay opportunities compared to those non-titulars who have poorer 
command of the language (Ibid., 124). 
 
This supports Tomatsu Shibutani and Kian Kwan’s theory that when social distance remains 
great, these individuals will likely assimilate slower into Estonian society and their self-
perception of identity will reflect less aspects of Estonian culture (Alba and Nee 2003, 32). 
However, based on the analysis thus far, it cannot be concluded that the converse is true: the 
stronger the language connection is to Russian, the stronger the connection remains between 
the Russian-speaking Estonians and Russia. This remains to be analyzed during section 2.2: 
“What is the relationship with Russia?”.  
Final conclusions about Estonian Relations 
The interviewees highlighted all aspects of Phillip Hammack’s definition of identity; 
revealing similarities with and differentiating characteristics from ethnic Estonians (“sameness 
and difference”), ascribing themselves or the entire community in certain areas of Estonian 
society (“social categorization or group affiliation”) and underlining where some areas of this 
relationship have experienced a generational change (individual continuity and change over 
time”) (McLean and Syed 2015, 1). The three primary means by which Russian-speaking 
Estonians related to Estonia and ethnic Estonians were through: residency, social and mental 
behavior, and language. The first two aspects were presented as the strongest connections 
between the interviewees and their perception of Estonia, suggesting that they are the areas 
where they consider themselves most similar to ethnic Estonians. The foundation of this 
relationship is best explained by Turner’s collective identity formation theory which states that 
individuals self-ascribe to a larger society when they have a need or motivation, when they 
have fewer differences between them and said society than between them and other groups, 
and when their self-assessment aligns with known stereotypes and assumptions of said society 
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(Ashmore and Jussim 1997, 118). The presence of these three factors over an extended period 
of time (26 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union) has led to the salience, or emergence 
of these traits in the interviewees’ everyday lives. These findings support what Kristina Kallas 
observed as a strong affiliation with Estonia within the Russian-speaking community:  
Territorial identification with Estonia is closely associated with everyday 
social, economic and cultural practices in the Estonian territorial space. Due to 
long-term residence in Estonia, Estonian-Russians identify with socio-
economic structures and practices, the legal framework and everyday cultural 
practices of Estonia, and simultaneously disassociate themselves from Russia 
(2016, 14). 
 
Language was one of the primary ways in which Russian-speaking Estonians distinguished 
themselves from ethnic Estonians. However, the interviews indicated that this aspect is 
undergoing generational changes and is being constructed less as a barrier and more as a bridge 
among the younger generations. That is to say, while the older generation viewed the Estonian 
language as a wall that prevented their ability to be accepted as a member of society, this 
concept is changing among younger generations and the perception is that the language offers 
greater access for those who are motivated to access the language.  
In all three of the identified similarities between ethnic Estonians and Russian-speaking 
Estonians, time has played a critical role in drawing out and solidifying these connections. In 
the book, Introduction to Border Studies, Alexander Sebentsov and Vladimir Kolosov discuss 
the case of state borders in the PSS and claim that, “as a rule, the longer a political border 
exists, the more it is organically integrated into national and ethnic identity and the better a 
population and economy become adapted to the characteristics of the border areas” (2015, 202). 
The interviewees described a self-perception of identity that is somewhere in-between national 
and ethnic, where the influence of time and exposure to ethnic Estonians are significant factors 
in solidifying the salient characteristics that the interviewees exhibit on a daily basis. Using the 
understanding of PSS borders presented by Sebentsov et al., we can assume that the perceptions 
the interviewees have described is likely characteristic of Narva and Ida-Virumaa region where 
the political border influences the larger population and local economy on a daily basis. In a 
similar vein, given the uniqueness of this border area (lower number of ethnic Estonians, 
primary means of communication, proximity to Russia) the Estonian influences of the political 
border are only half of the picture. Understanding the interviewees relationship with Russia 





2.2. What is the Relationship with Russia? 
Determining what kind of relationship the interviewees hold with Russia helps to 
determine how they compare themselves to ethnic Russians in Russia but also to evaluate their 
self-perceptions as a sub-group to the larger Russian-speaking community. Although the 
statistics in response to the question “Which phrase best describes you?” were covered in Table 
1, section 1.1 (only 13% answered “Russian” (Русский)), it is worth noting that in response to 
this question and throughout the entire interview process, none of the interviewees identified 
themselves or any other members of the Russian-speaking community in Estonia as “Россиян” 
which is a term that has an ethnic connotation to it.73 The term was only mentioned twice during 
the entire interview process: Interviewee #11 used this term, when referring to Russians from 
abroad coming to Estonia as tourists74 and interviewee #3 used “Россиян” when she was trying 
to clearly differentiate herself from Russians living in Russia: “Well, that is I do not relate to 
being Russian (Россиян), I absolutely do not relate.”75 It is also worth noting at this point that 
the term Russian (Русский) in Estonia is used to describe both Russians from Russia and a 
Russian-speaking Estonian (in the sense that an individual meets all official/legal requirements 
to be Estonian, but the individual’s native tongue is Russian or the individual is ethnically 
related to Russians in Russia). When confusion arose about whom I or the interviewees were 
referencing during the interview, clarifying terms were used such as Russians from Russia, 
Russian-speaking Estonians, or people residing in Estonia that speak Russian as a native 
tongue. For the question “When the Russian government speaks on behalf of Russian 
emigrants, Russians who live outside of Russia, do you feel the Russian government is referring 
to you?”76 (P3, Q1a), I used the term emigrant (эмигрант) intentionally because it was the term 
used by the Russian government when describing Russian-speaking people who live outside 
of Russia (Russian Federal Law 2013, 1-2)77. The objective was to determine how the 
interviewees perceived descriptions about themselves from the Russian government. This term, 
was met with resistance by some of the interviewees: “I never think about myself that way 
because I’m not an emigrant.”78 This resistance in and of itself reinforces the concepts of 
                                                             
73 For more information on the differentiation between “Русский” and “Россиян” see “The Three Colors of 
Novorossiya, or the Russian Nationalist Mythmaking of the Ukrainian Crisis” (2015) by Marlène Laruelle.  
74 (Interviewee #11, P2, Q4) 
75 “Ну то есть я себя не отношу туда, к россиянам я себя абсолютно не отношу.” (Interviewee #3, P3, Q1b) 
76 “Когда Вы слышите, что правительство России говорит от имени русских иммигрантов, проживающих 
за границей, чувствуете ли Вы, что оно говорит и от Вашего имени тоже?” (Interview Part 3, Question 1a) 
77 Российская Федерация Федеральный Закон в Редакции Федеральных Законов от 23.07.2013 г. N 203-
ФЗ, Статья 1. Понятие соотечественника 
78“ никогда про себя так не думаю, потому что я не эмигрант” (Interviewee #15, P3, Q1a) 
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residency and permanence which tied many of the interviewees to Estonia as discussed during 
Section 2.1. Similarly, I deliberately chose not to use the term compatriot 
(соотечественников) to observe if this was a phrase the interviewees would use of their own 
accord when describing themselves. This term was only used once as a reference by 
interviewee #14 in response to Part 3, Question 1c: “I know there are special programs, 
programs to support compatriots. And there are different integration courses there. But how 
to make it affect my life? I do not know.”79  The term was clearly not used as a self-referral nor 
was it used to refer to a specific group or sub-section of Russian-speakers in Estonia.  
When describing their identity in their own words (P4, Q1) eight respondents cited 
“Russian” (Русский/ая) as their primary self-identifying term: “I consider myself Russian”80 
(Interviewee #14), “Well, I consider myself Russian…”81 (Interviewee #13) or “I think that I 
am Russian”82 (Interviewee #2). As mentioned when discussing connections to Estonia, 
transitioning into the open-ended questions yielded similar depth of detail and justification for 
Table 1 responses. All but two of the respondents built off of their initial self-description of 
“Russian” to explain why they considered themselves as such. Although interviewee #15 was 
the only one to state directly: “Well I am really Russian. I have my roots in Russia.”83 the 
central theme of “roots”– family and cultural – emerged when the interviewees explained why 
they considered themselves Russian.  
Family Roots 
The aspect of family roots was generally presented as a matter-of-fact explanation for 
considering oneself Russian: “I am Russian since my parents and relatives are also Russian, 
that is to say, all of my roots are Russian.”84 (Interviewee #1) or “Through my parents I am 
Russian and I feel that I am Russian.”85 (Interviewee #5). Interviewee #3 stated, “My parents 
are Russian. We speak Russian at home. My grandmother and grandfather also speak Russian. 
I have an aunt who lives in Saint Petersburg, my dad’s sister.”86 The strength and importance 
of family roots also presented itself within Madli Maruste’s research which focused on how 
                                                             
79 “я знаю, что есть специальные программы, программы поддержки соотечественников. И разные там 
интеграционные курсы. Но как, чтобы оно повлияло именно на жизнь, я не знаю.” (Interviewee #14, P3, 
Q1c) 
80 “я считаю себя русским…” (Interviewee #14, P4, Q1) 
81 “Ну я сама считаю себя русской…” (Interviewee #13, P4, Q1) 
82 (Interviewee #2, P4, Q1) 
83 “ну я действительно русский, я корнями действительно в России.” (Interviewee #15, P4, Q1) 
84 “я русская, так как родители мои тоже русские и родственники все, то есть все корни русский.” 
(Interviewee #1, P4, Q1) 
85 “По родителям я русский человек и я чувству, что я русский человек.” (Interviewee #5, P4, Q1) 
86 “Мои родители русские. Мы дома говорим по-русски. Бабушки и дедушки тоже говорят по-русски. У 
меня тетя живет в Питере, папина сестра.” (Interviewee #3, P4, Q5).   
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the traumas and unresolved issues from the Soviet Period manifest themselves in younger 
Russian-speaking Estonians “who have been born or have been living most of their lives in the 
re-independent Estonia” (2014, 419).  Maruste emphasized that “…ethnic and national identity 
is inﬂuenced and shaped by the stories told to them by their parents, grandparents, teachers and 
last but not least the politicians” (Ibid., 419).  Maruste explained that the constant influence of 
family (or in the case of teachers and politicians, the influence of older ethnic Russians who 
maintain authority over and constant contact with the younger generations) that the way to 
perceive issues during the Soviet period persists in present-day Estonian society although the 
actual situation has changed dramatically over the past 26 years.  In the case of Maruste’s 
research, tensions and traumas manifested themselves within the younger generation even if 
those individuals never personally experienced the traumas and issues of the Soviet Period. 
Similarly, the interviewees’ references to family underline the influence that family can have 
on perpetuating self-identification as Russian and maintaining ethnic ties to Russia although 
the younger interviewees never lived in Russia or the Soviet Union.  
Nevertheless, a few interviewees highlighted how family roots complicated this self-
identification.  In the case of Interviewee #9, the family ethnicity is mixed: “I’m from bilingual 
or bicultural family. My mom is Russian my dad is Estonian. So, I’ve always been in 
between.”87 A family connection was also not as strong for those who felt that separation from 
their Russian family had weakened or erased such a connection with Russia: “I no longer have 
a connection with this country [Russia]. My grandparents have already died.”88 (Interviewee 
#6) Phrases such as these imply that aspects such as inter-ethnic marriages or extended 
separation (no family to visit) from Russia could blur and weaken what some of the 
interviewees and Maruste established as a strong influence from and connection to Russia 
through family roots.   
This concept of family roots strongly supports Stryker’s identity theory which is based 
on “identity commitment” where individuals are committed to an identity based on the number 
of social ties or the affective importance of the social ties that are related to the identity 
(Ashmore and Jussim 1997, 112). Ashmore and Jussim quote Stryker’s explanation of this 
concept stating, "A man is committed to the role of 'husband' in the degree that the number of 
persons and the importance to him of those persons requires his being in the position of husband 
and playing that role" (Ibid., 112). Applying this theory to the interviewees, it can be argued 
                                                             
87 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q1) 
88 “у меня уже нет связи с этой страной, мои бабушка с дедушкой уже умерли.” (Interviewee #6, P4, Q4) 
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that the more family ties an interviewee has with family that expect the interviewee to take on 
the identity of Russian, the more important the concept of “Russian” becomes in self-
perception. “Identities that are based on more relationships or intense, emotionally positive 
relationships will be placed higher in the commitment hierarchy” (Ibid., 112). Conversely, 
interviewee #6’s response about the grandparents that have passed or interviewee #7’s 
comment, “My family is Russian-speaking but none of us have been in Russia, meaning we 
haven’t lived there. That means I’m from Estonia, yes, but I speak Russian”89 suggests that the 
further removed the Russian-speaking Estonians are from family members who consider 
themselves Russians from Russia, the less important the concept of being “Russian” becomes.  
Cultural Roots 
References to cultural roots also justified interviewees’ claims to ties with Russia. 
Interviewee #6 stated plainly that “…history, literature and culture”90 were among the top ties 
to Russia.  When asked to describe their identity, interviewees used phrases such as: “Well, 
first of all, I was brought up in a Russian family, so I’m the bearer of Russian culture.”91 
(Interviewee #12) or “I’m Russian by ethnicity”92 (Interviewee #5). Unlike family ties, 
references to cultural roots, which included references to literature and history, appeared more 
frequently throughout the interview, suggesting a greater strength and importance of this 
particular tie to Russia. Interviewee #4 explained that for some, the richness of the Russian 
culture is attractive:  
I really respect Russian culture. Russians have very old national songs which 
are very developed [culturally]. Russians have had many writers and chic 
composers. They also have stylish castles, where you can see where the old 
Tsars were. That is to say, I really like the culture. How they all united together 
and made something. They, as one, took everything and made it happen.93  
 
To emphasize the sometimes latent but present historical ties within Narva and Estonia, 
interviewee #9 recounted personal observations from 2006-2007 when the Russian-speaking 
community demonstrated their affiliation with Russia and the Soviet Union when hundreds of 
ribbons, handed out by pro-Russian political groups, were worn in support of veterans from 
                                                             
89 “Моя семья русскоязычная, но никто из нас в России не был, ну то есть не не был, а не жил там. То 
есть я из Эстонии, да, но с русским языком.” (Interviewee #7, P4, Q3) 
90 “…история, литература, культура.” (Interviewee #5, P4, Q5) 
91 “ну прежде всего, если я воспитана в русской семье, то соответственно я носитель русской культуры.” 
(Interviewee #12, P4, Q1) 
92 “Русский я этнически” (Interviewee #5, P4, Q1) 
93 “я уважаю очень русскую культуру. У них очень старые национальные песни, которые у них очень 
развиты. У них очень были писатели, у них композиторы шикарные. Потом у них очень шикарные 
замки, которые можно посмотреть, где цари вот. Ну то есть мне очень нравится культура. Как они все 
вместе сплотились и что-то делали. Они как единое целое, взяли все и сделали.” (Interviewee #4, P4, Q5) 
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World War II. Interviewee #9 explained that the ribbons carried an underlying message: “So 
in a way it is said that by wearing this ribbon, whether on yourself on your car, you respect the 
victims on the Second World War, so the Nazis versus the Soviets94.”95  In Olga Davydova’s 
article, she explains that “The strength of the Great Patriotic War [WWII] discourse lies in its 
proximity to almost all families in Russia, whose members fought, suffered or killed during the 
war” (2008, 399). Although political borders now separate the Russian speaking community in 
Estonia from Russians in Russia, interviewee #9’s description shows that the Russian WWII 
narrative continues to unite members of the Russian-speaking community in Estonia with 
Russians in Russia as a result of a shared history with and collective memory of the Soviet 
Union.  
For many of the interviewees, the access to their cultural roots was through language. 
Where the Estonian language served as a distinguishing factor between the Russian-speaking 
community and Estonians, the interviewees cited the Russian language as not only a unifying 
aspect with Russian-speakers outside of Estonia, but also as the means through which they 
could access deeper aspects of their Russian cultural roots expressed in humor, literature and 
media. Interviewee #15 said, “I love Russia, I love Russian people. I understand them perfectly; 
both those who live here and those who are there [in Russia].”96 Interviewee #14 elaborated 
on this common understanding:  
When you speak with a Russian, without fail you have some kindred feelings. I 
mean, even if you meet an Estonian abroad, you are unlikely to speak with him. 
But if you meet a Russian abroad, that is, not in Estonia, somewhere in another 
country, then you will be greeted and you will have a feeling of some kind of 
community. That is, you will feel like you are a part of a singular group.97 
Some interviewees focused on other aspects of cultural connectedness that transpire through 
the use of the Russian language. Interviewee #9 stated,  
I understand the humor, I understand the language, I understand the…the little 
details which are in the culture. So, I’m not missing out on jokes for example, 
So that. So, I know to, how to communicate with Russians so, so to feel [like] 
one of them I guess.98 
                                                             
94 This narrative “Nazis versus the Soviets” is the application of the Russian generated narrative concerning the 
liberation of Estonia from Nazi, Germany which is in opposition to the Estonian generated narrative of unlawful 
occupation by the Nazis and the Soviets. 
95 (Interviewee #9, P3, Q1d) 
96 “Я люблю русских людей, я прекрасно их понимаю…” (Interviewee #15, P4, Q5) 
97 “Когда ты говоришь с русским, у тебя в любом случае возникают какие-то родственные чувства. То 
есть даже когда ты встречаешься за границей с эстонцем, ты вряд ли с ним заговоришь. А если ты 
встречаешься за границей с русским, то есть не в Эстонии, там где-нибудь в другой стране, то ты 
можешь поздороваться и у тебя будет чувство какое-то общности. То есть вы будете чувствовать себя 
какой-то единой группой.” (Interviewee #14, P4, Q5) 




Interviewee #12 also discussed humor by stating, “…Well the base [of cultural connection] is 
literature and films. Because even jokes are understandable to us, because those phrases that 
they take from films, they are clear and funny to me. In other words, humor.”99 Humor is a 
particularly interesting aspect within Russian culture as it is multi-layered and historically 
based. Professor of Russian history and author of the book Tiny Revolutions in Russia, Bruce 
Adams explains that: 
Anecdotes and jokes were a hidden form of discursive communication in the 
Soviet era, lampooning official practices and acting as a confidential form of 
self-affirmation [….] Above all they provide invaluable insights into everyday 
life and the attitudes and concerns of ordinary people (2015, i). 
 
Another prominent researcher of Russian humor and author of the book Taking Penguins to 
the Movies: Ethnic humor in Russia, Emil Draitser, emphasizes that “a proper reading of an 
ethnic joke requires a concrete historical background of the time of their circulation” (1998, 
18). In addition to the historical and quotidian insight jokes provide, the humor is also “a means 
of understanding the attitudes and customs, beliefs and idiosyncrasies, and inter- and intra-
group relationships of this [Russian] multinational society” (Ibid., 9). While the interviewees 
did not reveal what kind of humor (dark humor, ethnic humor, anti-Soviet humor, etc.) they 
understood or shared with Russians, what is important is that much of this humor was only 
really transferable through the Russian language: “translations cannot capture all the shades of 
meaning in some of the jokes, and there are absolutely wonderful but untranslatable puns and 
other plays on words in many others” (Adams 2015, 2). In summary, through the Russian 
language, the interviewees are able to participate in and understand Russian culture which helps 
cultivate their Russian cultural roots despite their physical separation from Russia. Moreover, 
this concept of identifying with a larger group through shared characteristics again reflects 
Turner’s collective identity formation concept. The interviewees have expressed that there are 
shared traits (history, language, humor,) that unites them with the larger Russian society.  
In addition to the necessity of Russian as the medium through which one expresses and 
understands cultural humor, interviewees underlined that cultural aspects related to literature 
and media were also more accessible through the Russian language. Interview #12 stated,  
I mainly read in Russian and very rarely in Estonian. Literally, my list would 
be very short in Estonian. And there are differences. The Russian literary 
market, the literature printed in Russian, is huge. The entire Estonian book 
                                                             
99 “…вот эта вот база, литература, фильмы. Потому что даже вот шутки нам понятны, потому что те 
фразы, которые они берут из фильмов, они мне понятны и мне это смешно. То есть юмор.” (Interviewee 
#12, P4, Q5) 
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market is much narrower. For a small country, some things cannot be printed 
because it is economically unprofitable.100 
Without discrediting or devaluing Estonian literature, the interviewee’s comment underlines 
an undeniable fact: the proliferation and notoriety of Russian literature and Russian writers and 
the generated interest and availability of Russian language material is significantly larger than 
that of Estonia. Therefore, we can conclude that Russian literature and the culture it describes 
has a greater opportunity to influence the Russian-speaking community. Similarly, when 
discussing present day culture and media, interviewee #9 noted the fact that a majority of media 
sources available within Narva and Ida-Virumaa are primarily in the Russian language. “…here 
the Russian speakers are more, Russia-centered, or they, they get a lot of information from 
Russian media channels.”101 Interviewee #5 also claimed that “…usually here local Russians 
we see only Russian government channels.”102 and interviewee #13 said, “I mostly watch 
Russian news.”103 In addition to emphasizing that a majority of the media is presented in the 
Russian-language, interviewees #5 and #9 commented that the media is heavily influenced 
from Russia, meaning the material presented could be considered one-sided. This claim is 
substantiated in Olga Davydova’s article “Bronze Soldier goes Transnational” where she 
explains how Russian media has been transformed to serve as a tool for eliciting emotions and 
reactions from the audience to raise political mobilization: 
It is used largely and purposely as an explicit vehicle for triggering precise, 
emotional responses from its audiences. Politics is commonly dramatized on 
television, presented mostly in the form of infotainment: news as a collage of 
non-related fragments, highly emotional and often moralizing, humoristic or 
sarcastic comments. Infotainment aims to produce a particularly emotional 
reaction in terms of appropriation or rejection, agreement or outcry, concerning 
a particular event or set of events (2008, 394-395). 
 
Regardless of the objectivity of the media presented, its availability in the Russian language, 
use of humor and connection to events ongoing in Russia help to keep the community in Estonia 
connected to Russia. Olga Davydova cites Schmidt et al., 2006 and Saunders, 2004 when she 
adds that the material and the language used in Russian-centric internet-based media are also 
“seen as something that unites the Russian-speaking diaspora around the world” (Davydova 
                                                             
100“Я читаю в основном на русском, и очень редко на эстонском. Буквально у меня список будет очень 
короткий на эстонском. И есть различия. Русский литературный рынок, то, что печатается на русском, 
он огромен. Все-таки эстонский книжный рынок он намного уже. Маленькая страна, что-то ты не 
будешь печатать, это экономический невыгодно.” (Interviewee #12, P4, Q5) 
101 (Interviewee #9, P2, Q4) 
102 (Interviewee #5, Lines 375-376) 
103 “ я смотрю в основном русские новости.” (Interviewee #13, P3, Q1a) 
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2008, 394). Although not explicitly stated by Davydova, one can conclude that a dedicated and 
unilateral emphasis on presenting a positive Russian perspective can have an influence on self-
perception and connectedness with Russia. Indeed, the comments from the interviewees 
suggest that a shard history, an attractive and rich literature, and a common language through 
which to communicate, understand, and perceive the world explain why interviewees related 
strongly to their Russian cultural roots.  
Discussions about the Russian language also diverted slightly from discussions of 
culture, focusing instead on the protection of the Russian language education within Estonia.  
Interviewee #12 cited a reoccurring topic during Narvan political campaigns of introducing a 
second high school in Narva because the additional school would provide “more opportunities 
to receive education in Russian.”104 Interviewee #12 implied that having a strong Russian 
education contributed to personally having more opportunities for life improvement in 
comparison to other Estonians: “I can get an education here or there [Saint Petersburg]. And 
[I have] a huge base in Russian literature. I think I have more [opportunities to improve my 
life]. Definitely more.”105 Interviewee #11 argued that the Estonian government had a 
responsibility of maintaining a high level of Russian language proficiency within the public 
service domain, claiming that a substantial number of people (particularly the older generation 
of Russian-speaking Estonians) still communicate primarily in Russian: 
Well, there are those who do not speak Russian and this is very important. It is 
still necessary…Well, for example, if I’m calling there to book tickets…and I 
need it quickly, I’m a little nervous. And I naturally cannot say it in Estonian…I 
press the number 2 [help option for Russian speakers] but then the girl cannot 
speak Russian. And I need this information.106 
 
Interviewee #11 continued that Russian is important not only for the residents in Estonia, but 
also for the Russian-speakers who visit Estonia: “This language should be [spoken] because 
there are a lot of tourists and they want to come here. And if you greet them well and you speak 
the language of these tourists, it’s nice for them, they will come back here.”107 According to 
the Statistical Yearbook of Estonia 2015 (Eesti statistika aastaraamat 2015), “Two of Estonia’s 
                                                             
104 “…будет больше возможности получать образование на русском языке.” (Interviewee #12, P4, Q7) 
105 “Я могу получать образование и здесь, и там. И огромная база русскоязычной литературы.” 
(Interviewee #12, P2, Q6) 
106 “ну есть и такие, которые не владеют и русским языком и это очень важно. Это все равно 
нужно…Это ну например если звоню там, брониру билеты…и надо это быстро, я немножко нервничаю. 
И я естественно это на эстонском не могу сказать. Я вот звоню и нажимаю цифру два, а там девочка не 
может сказать по-русски. А мне нужна эта информация.” (Interviewee #11, P2, Q4) 
107 “Этот язык должен быть, потому что туристов очень много, и они хотят приехать сюда. И если их 
хорошо встречать и ты говоришь на языке этих туристов, это же им приятно, они еще вернутся сюда.” 
(Interviewee #11, P2, Q4) 
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most important partner countries in tourism are Finland and Russia – 60% of all accommodated 
foreign tourists arrived from these countries” (2015, 374). Considering this, interviewee #11’s 
comment adds an economic value for Estonia to invest in Russian proficiency, at least as it 
pertains to Ida-Virumaa. Interviewees expressed a desire for Estonia to place greater emphasis 
on the importance of conversing in Russian because it is part of their cultural roots. 
Interviewees also emphasized however, that maintaining a high proficiency in Russian offered 
opportunities for future career advancement, is still a necessity for Russian-speakers who are 
less proficient in Estonian and facilitates better relations with Russian tourists who stimulate 
the local economy. 
It is interesting to point out that discussions about the Russian language proficiency 
level of the interviewees was also commented on by the native Russian-speaker from Moscow 
who transcribed the majority of the audio interview material. The difference in Russian 
proficiency of the younger interviewees (specifically their vocabulary and sentence structures) 
was noticeably different from the older Russians and according to the native Russian speaker, 
someone from Russia would associate their proficiency level with someone with a low-level 
education. While there are many things that could have affected the younger interviewees’ 
word choice and tone (for example the informal interview environment of a café, my approach 
during the interviewee as a fellow student or nervousness from conducting an impromptu 
interview) it is still interesting that there is both a generational difference and regional 
difference in language usage observed when presented to a native Russian-speaker from 
Russia. This phenomenon gives credit not only to the interviewees who feel that Russian is 
deteriorating within Estonia when compared to Russians from Russia, but also to Russia’s 
2016-2020 language plan which was developed to reinforce the standardization of the Russian 
language across the PSS.108 Already in 2012, the Human Development Report concluded that 
“there has been a significant shift towards the self-reported preference of the usage of Estonian 
at the expense of Russian. One reason for the change may be the poor knowledge of Russian 
among Estonian youth but also the higher status of the Estonian language in the public sphere” 
(2012, 122). Given the critical role the Russian language is playing according to the 
interviewees thus far, future research on how language alterations/changes between Russian 
spoken in Estonia and Russian spoken in Russia might be a complimentary study, particularly 
                                                             
108 Decree of 20 May 2015 No. 481 on the federal target program "Russian language” for 2016-2020. Original 




as it pertains to influencing the separation or isolation of Russian-speaking Estonians from 
Russians in Russia.  
Institutional Connections 
While the connection to Russia through family and culture was strong, similar ties were 
not as strong through official government institutions. Part 3, Questions 1 and 2 sought to 
determine the interviewees awareness of the Russian government’s actions as well as to 
determine their perception of that government as it related to their status as a Russian-speaker 
living outside of Russia. During this section, the connection appeared weak based on two 
factors: evaluating the responses by percentages (See Table 3) and the lack of knowledge 
of/interest in Russian governmental actions/policies (observed through self-acknowledgement 
and lack of comments).  
Table 3: Responses to Part 3, Question 1: Do you feel the Russian Government… 
Question 1a 1b 1c 1d 













offers you the ability 
to help resolve 
challenges as a 
Russian abroad?  
Never 50% 63% 38% 50% 
Once in a while 25% 19% 38% 38% 
Sometimes 6% 6% 19% 6% 
A majority of the time 19% 6% 6% 6% 
Always 0% 6% 0% 0% 
 
Beginning with the statistical responses, 75% or more of the interviewees felt that when 
the Russian government addressed policies aimed to support Russian-speakers living outside 
of Russia that: 1) this did not refer to them, 2) that the policies did not address concerns that 
mattered to them and 3) that they had not been given the opportunity to be a part of determining 
what type of support was needed (See Table 3). For the question “Do you feel the Russian 
government offers solutions that improve your day-to-day life?”, the percentage that answered 
“once in a while” or “sometimes” increased slightly (57%), however the comments for this 
question still denoted a sense of disassociation from said solutions: “I heard they offer 
something, but I would not use such services. I don’t need them.”109 (Interviewee #3) or 
                                                             
109 “Я слышала, что они что-то предлагают, но я бы не стала пользоваться такими услугами. Мне не 
надо.” (Interviewee #3, P3, Q1c) 
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“Probably, rarely, but I don’t even know.”110 (Interviewee #7). These comments are similar to 
comments made by Interviewee #14 discussed earlier when acknowledging the existence of a 
compatriot policy, but suggesting that it was not personally applicable: “But how to make it 
affect my life? I do not know.”111 A majority of the interviewees claimed that perhaps they were 
unable to provide more information because they were simply uninformed of such things. 
While the argument is not that every member of the Russian-speaking community should be 
politically active or aware of governmental policies (Estonian or Russian), the lack of 
interest/knowledge supports the idea that there is a disassociation between the Russian 
government and the Russian-speaking Estonians.  This disassociation was verbalized in phrases 
such as: “My government is not there, it is here.”112 (Interviewee #3), or “I’m not the target of 
their groups”113 (Interviewee #9). Interviewee #16 even suggested that Russia is not in a 
position to offer solutions for Russian-speaking Estonians: “Unfortunately, they [Russian 
government] cannot even provide a normal life for their own citizens.”114 
Interviewee #11, an Estonian passport holder, suggested that the policies might be more 
relevant for two subgroups within Estonia: “You know, this can apply to those who have a red 
or grey passport. They can be connected with them [Russian government]”115. Interviewee 
#12’s comments seemed to support this hypothesis by explaining that current policies on travel 
between Estonia and Russia really benefit those who do not have citizenship in Estonia:  
Although there are some citizens, foreigners, without citizenship, they have the 
opportunity to visit Russia without a visa. In my case – I pay for the visa, more 
than any other visa…now for me the most expensive visa is a visa to Russia, 
although, it would seem, I was born there.116 .  
 
However, isolating the responses of the grey and red passport holders among the interviewees 
did not yield similar conclusions. Interviewee #6, the only grey passport holder among the 
interviewees, answered with either “never” (Q1a, Q1b and Q1d) or “once in a while” (Q1c) 
with no supporting comments. Interviewee #15 held only a Russian (red) passport and also 
answered either “never” or “once in a while” for all questions except for Question 1d, with a 
                                                             
110 “наверное, редко, но я даже не знаю.” (Interviewee #7, P3, Q1c) 
111 “Но как, чтобы оно повлияло именно на жизнь, я не знаю.” (Interviewee #14, P3, Q1c) 
112 “Не там мое правительство, оно здесь.” (Interviewee #3, P3, Q1b) 
113 (Interviewee #9, P3, Q1d) 
114 “Они не могут, к сожалению, даже своих граждан обеспечить нормальной жизнью.” (Interviewee #16, 
P3, Q1c) 
115 “вы знаете, это может относиться к тем, у кого красный или серый паспорт. С ними может связано.” 
(Interviewee #11, P3, Q1d) 
116 “Хотя есть часть граждан, иностранцы, без гражданства, у них есть возможность посещать Россию 
без визы. В моем случае – я плачу за визу дороже, чем за какую-либо другую визу…Сейчас для меня 
самая дорогая виза – виза в Россию, хотя я, казалось бы, родилась там.” (Interviewee #12, P3, Q1d) 
 52 
 
response of “sometimes”. Interviewees #13 and #14 claimed they held both an Estonian and 
Russian passport and their responses were only slightly more positive for Question 1a 
(interviewee #13 chose “a majority of the time”) and for Question 1c (interviewee #14 chose 
“sometimes”). In other words, among the grey and red passport holders, there was no clear 
indication that they perceived the questions about Russian policies drastically differently than 
those with an Estonian passport. Moreover, among the red passport holders, phrases of 
disassociation were still used: “because I’m not an emigrant”117 and “Russia has forgotten 
us”118 (Interviewee #15), “Russia doesn’t care”119 (Interviewee #13) “Never, I am not an 
emigrant, I am a native”120 (Interviewee #11). While the data collected during these interviews 
did not reveal a clear differentiation between the opinions of Estonian passport, Russian 
passport and grey passport holders’ perceptions of the Russian government, the responses to 
these four questions did provide a strong indication that the messages and policies directed 
towards the Russian-speaking population living outside of Russia are not received as relevant 
or pertinent for the interviewees or Russian-speaking Estonians in general.  
Part 3, Question 2 presented a quotation from Former Russian President Medvedev 
concerning the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, in which he addressed Russia’s efforts to defend 
the Russian population living outside of Russia. Interviewees were then asked to comment on 
how much they agree with the justification provided about Russia’s actions. The answers did 
not reveal any trends among the interviewees (See Table 4). For a few of the interviewees, the 
situation and their interpretation of events was very clear: “each country must support and 
protect its citizens”121 (Interviewee #14) or “Russia has no, should have no political interest 
in other country [sic]”122 (Interviewee #9). Many of the comments however, expressed 
hesitation based on lack of knowledge of the event: “It is difficult for me to answer the question, 
as I do not have information.”123 (Interviewee #12) or “I do not know this situation, I cannot 
say anything”124 (Interviewee #7). This lack of knowledge and hesitation could be due to a 
number of reasons, to include: the amount of time passed since the event, the age of the 
interviewees at the time of the event, or the amount of coverage in Narva of the event. While 
                                                             
117 “потому что я не эмигрант” (Interviewee #15, P3, Q1a) 
118 “Россия про нас забыла” (Interviewee #15, P3, Q1b) 
119 “России все равно” (Interviewee #13, P3 Q1c) 
120 “никогда, я же не эмигрант, я коренной житель” (Interviewee #11, P3, Q1a) 
121 “каждая страна должна поддерживать и защищать своих граждан” (Interviewee #14, P3, Q2) 
122 (Interviewee #9, P3, Q2) 
123 “для меня сложно ответить на этот вопрос, потому что я не владею информацией.” (Interviewee #12, 
P3, Q2) 
124 “я не знаю эту ситуацию, не могу ничего сказать.” (Interviewee #7, P3, Q2) 
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the responses did not reveal any trend regarding association with the Russian government, it 
equally did not show a connection between the interviewees and the larger Russian-speaking 
population living outside of Russia.  
 
Table 4: Responses to Russian involvement in Russo-Georgian War 
Completely agree 19% 
Agree with most of the quote 6% 
I somewhat agree 13% 
I disagree with most of the quote 25% 
I completely disagree 25% 
No response provided 13% 
 
Final Conclusions about Russian Connections 
The interviewees’ strongest examples of connection to Russia were through their 
perceived roots - family and cultural. The concept of family roots supports Stryker’s identity 
theory which attributes this connection to the interviewees’ commitment to an identity of 
“Russian” assigned to them by the social ties they hold with family members that also consider 
themselves Russian, particularly those that are still located in Russia (Ashmore and Jussim 
1997, 112). While family ties to Russia presented themselves as an influential and enduring 
force that decreased the social distance between the interviewees and Russians, research and 
the interviewees’ comments also suggest that this connection is negatively affected by time. 
Stated plainly, the longer Russian-speaking Estonians remain in Estonia, the weaker their 
family connections are to those who are still in Russia and hold the idea of self-perception of 
“Russian” as critical. With regards to culture, in addition to a shared history and collective 
memory, the Russian language is identified as the key attribute through which culture is 
transferred between Russian-speaking Estonians and Russians. This occurs through literature, 
media (TV and internet), humor and the interaction with others who share their native language. 
In contrast to the strong unofficial ties the interviewees held with Russia, the 
relationship with official Russian institutions, particularly those aimed at addressing Estonia’s 
Russian-speaking community, was much weaker than their connection to Estonian state 
institutions. External connection of residency and citizenship were significantly lower with 
only one Russian-only passport holder, and all interviewees holding Estonian citizenship. 
While during Section 2.1, the interviewees considered the Estonian government the provider 
of citizenship, the government under which they fell legally and the institution that affected 
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their economic situation, all references made about the Russian government were met with 
unfamiliarity or a feeling that the Russian government had no interest in the interviewees’ 
situation or had no influence over it. We can conclude that despite dissatisfaction with certain 
Estonian government actions, their connection was much stronger than that established with 
the Russian government.  
Finally, exploring the relationship between the interviewees and the Russian 
government also somewhat revealed how Russian-speaking Estonians view other Russian-
speakers living outside of Russia. The interviewees inability or unwillingness to identify with 
Russian-speaking Georgians speaks to the relationship held with the larger Russian-speaking 
community within the PSS.  There is a significant lack of cognitive alignment between Russian-
Speaking Estonians and the larger Russian-speaking community living outside the borders of 
Russia. The implications of this will be discussed in more detail during the conclusion. For 
now, it is sufficient to recognize that Turner’s theory on socially influenced self-categorization 
would suggest that Russian-speaking Estonians consider themselves different from other 
Russian-speakers located throughout the PSS. We will now explore how the Russian-speaking 
Estonians have come to establish themselves as neither Estonian or Russian, rather as a unique 
community.  
 
2.3. Who is a Russian-speaking Estonian? 
Thus far, the analysis has clearly shown that neither the single word descriptors of 
“Russian” or “Estonian” nor their associated stereotypes, governments, cultures or social habits 
fully capture the way the Russian-speaking interviewees categorize themselves or the larger 
Russian-speaking community of Narva and Ida-Virumaa. Perhaps interviewee #5 stated it best: 
“I’m not 100 percent one, nor 100 percent the other.”125 Moreover, their explanations showed 
that comparisons between the two countries were not binary: if Russian-speaking Estonians 
considered themselves quieter than Russians, that did not make them either “quiet Russians” 
or “loud Estonians”. Similarly, if they said that they did not feel Estonian in certain situations, 
that did not necessarily mean that they therefore felt Russian. Instead, the interviewees have 
described themselves as simultaneously exhibiting both Russian and Estonian traits, yielding 
something that is neither Russian nor Estonian. This attraction to and distancing from both 
countries is described by the interviewees as complex and conflicting as they and the larger 
Russian-speaking community struggle to answer the questions “Who am I” and “Who are we” 
                                                             
125 “Я сто процентов не один, сто процентов не другой.” (Interviewee #5, P4, Q1) 
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vis-à-vis Russia and Estonia. Citing Samnani et al. (2012) in their article “Acculturation 
Preferences, Ethnic and Religious Identification and the Socio-Economic Adaptation of 
Russian-Speaking Immigrants in Belgium” authors Dmitry Grigoryev and John Berry suggest 
that other minorities faced with similar questions of integration into a new society versus 
maintaining the customs and cultures of their former society reacted in one of four different 
ways.  These four reactions make up Samnani et al.’s dissonance theory which states that 
minorities will react:  
 (1) by trying to completely accept the different values and norms through 
adopting the assimilation preference; (2) by taking some of the new values and 
norms, while retaining some of their original own values and norms through the 
integration strategy; (3) by trying to distance themselves from the new values 
and norms, rejecting them, and at the same time adhering strictly to their 
original culture by the separation strategy; (4) by rejecting the values and norms 
of the new culture, and at the same time, giving up their own, using the 
marginalization strategy (Samnani et al., 2012 as cited in Grigoryev and Berry 
2017, 541-542). 
 
 As mentioned at the beginning when discussing the results of Part 1, Question 6, 87% of the 
interviewees described themselves with an answer that had aspects of both Estonian and 
Russian descriptors. When coupled with supporting analysis from Sections 2.1 and 2.2 which 
stated that the interviewees hold multiple connections with Estonia and Russia, we can 
conclude that option two of the dissonance theory most accurately describes the interviewees’ 
responses: “taking some of the new values and norms, while retaining some of their original 
own values and norms through the integration strategy” (Grigoryev and Berry 2017, 541-542). 
Nevertheless, despite repeated emphasis on the ties to both countries, the interviewees also 
revealed significant areas of isolation from both countries. Key factors in this isolation were 
physical separation from ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians as well as ethnic discrimination 
and political exclusion.  
Physical and Social Separation from Estonians 
When driving from Tallinn to Narva, the transition to a more Russian-oriented 
environment becomes particularly apparent at the border between the regions of Lääne-
Virumaa and Ida-Virumaa: billboard advertisements, street names and a majority of the radio 
stations switch from Estonian to Russian. Interviewee #9 even stated that “There’s still a notion 
that… Estonia ends at the border of Ida-Virumaa. Whether we want it or not, it [this 
perception] still exists.”126 Narva was selected as the starting point for this research because 
                                                             
126 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q7) 
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statistics showed that the city held the greatest percentage of those considered Russian-
speaking Estonians and conversely, the least number of ethnic Estonians. The interviewees’ 
comments emphasized the extremity of this ethnic separation in Narva as it pertained to daily 
interactions.  Interviewee #7 stated, “Particularly here, I do not see Estonians…. Well there 
are some, but it’s very rare to come across them here in Narva because here is considered a 
purely Russian-speaking city. Of course, there are some here, but I haven’t seen many.”127 
Interviewee #9 also agreed that the percentage of ethnic Estonians to Russian-speaking 
Estonians was noticeable: “There’s a bigger contrast in, in Narva because the population of 
Russians is so high.”128 Interviewee #8 had difficulty describing satisfaction with how 
Estonians and Russians interact because, “I have seen very little communication between 
Estonians and Russians [Russian-speaking Estonians]. Maybe only here at the college.”129 
While interviewee #3 simply stated, “In general, it seems to me that they do not interact at all. 
I think there are too many Russians [Russian-speaking Estonians] here.”130 Based on previous 
research statistics and the interviewees’ comments, it is possible to conclude that a majority of 
the people living in Narva are isolated from ethic Estonians on a daily basis.  
Ethnic Discrimination from Estonians 
Despite the interviewees’ emphasis that interaction with ethnic Estonians is minimal in 
Narva, strong sentiments of persecution and discrimination from ethnic Estonians towards 
Russian-speaking Estonians were expressed, particularly with regards to job opportunities and 
income levels. Here again, it is worth noting that the interviewees transitioned from describing 
situations in which they were personally discriminated against and instead spoke as a 
representative of the collective Russian-speakers living in Estonia. Interviewee #15 stated, 
“Well, first of all, Estonians earn more than the Russians. Absolutely! For us the case is such 
that Estonians earn automatically probably around 25 percent more than Russians.”131 
Interviewee #13 agreed with this differentiation of job opportunities. “Well, yes, there is a 
difference, that's for sure. Because only Estonians have the good jobs and work in good 
positions. But the Russians are always lower, the salary is different and the position is 
                                                             
127 “Я тут эстонцев-то особо не видела.” (Interviewee #7, P2, Q2) 
128 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q7) 
129 “я мало где наблюдала, где общаются эстонцы с русскими. Если только тут у нас, в колледже.” 
(Interviewee #8, P2, Q2) 
130 “Вообще мне кажется, они вообще не взаимодействуют. Мне кажется, здесь слишком много 
русских.” (Interviewee #3, P2, Q2) 
131 “ну самое первое – эстонцы зарабатывают больше, чем русские. Стопроцентно! У нас автоматически 
процентов, наверное, на 25 эстонцы зарабатывают больше, чем русские.” (Interviewee #15, P2, Q4) 
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different.”132 Interviewee #2 was more critical, stating that a Russian-speaking Estonian “will 
not be hired, as it were, because he is Russian”.133 Interviewee #7, although unwilling to 
comment specifically on ethnic discrimination in the job market, nonetheless concluded, “Still, 
Estonians have more opportunities [in life].”134 
In addition to the negative associations of discrimination and the associated lower 
income for Russian-speaking Estonians, unfair employment has other implications on the 
severity of the Russian-speaking population’s isolation. Grigoryev and Berry reference Aycan 
and Berry’s (1996) research on immigrants from Turkey in Canada to explain the critical role 
that employment plays in positively shaping a community, particularly one faced with 
challenges of relating with another culture: 
The authors note that employment provides a certain purpose in life, determines 
status and identity, and allows immigrants to establish relationships with other 
people in the larger society. This last function is especially crucial for 
immigrants, since the more immigrants interact with groups in society in 
general, the faster they learn the skills of everyday life in the host country. 
Unemployed immigrants will suffer not only a decrease in psychological well-
being but also a delay in their sociocultural adaptation (Aycan & Berry, 1996). 
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that employment for immigrants 
performs many other important functions in addition to generating income 
(Grigoryev 2017, 540). 
While the title of immigrant does not accurately describe the Russian-speaking community’s 
place within Estonia, Aycan and Berry’s studies still suggest that the less Russian-speaking 
Estonians are able to participate in the Estonian job-market, the more likely it is that ethic 
Estonians and Russian-speaking Estonians will remain culturally isolated. Moreover, it can be 
assumed that when employment does occur and ethic Estonians are paid more than Russian-
Speaking Estonians, the relationship of superior (ethnic Estonian) to inferior (Russian-speaking 
Estonian) could psychologically (and negatively) influence how the cultural relations between 
the two groups develop. This negative sentiment was expressed by a few of the interviewees. 
Interviewee #13 explained that the animosity between ethnic Estonians and Russian-speaking 
Estonians is still very present: 
Many Estonians do not like Russians, and Russians also do not like Estonians. 
That’s how it is for us, this is very common. Especially in the Estonian cities. If 
native Estonians see Russians, then a bad situation can develop. That’s how it 
                                                             
132 “ну да, есть разница, это точно. Потому что у нас все хорошие работы, на хороших должностях 
работают только эстонцы. А русские всегда ниже, и зарплата отличается, и должность отличается.” 
(Interviewee #13, P2, Q4) 
133 “Его как бы не будут брать на работу, потому что он русский.” (Interviewee #2, P2, Q4) 
134 “Все-таки у эстонцев больше возможностей.” (Interviewee #7, P2, Q6) 
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was for us. It was Estonians against the Russians, that's literally about five 
years ago.”135  
 
Similarly, interviewee #7 highlighted ethnic hostility when comparing ethnic sentiments in 
Kohtla-Järve, the interviewee’s hometown (in Ida-Virumaa) with sentiments in Narva:  
“…in Kohtla-Järve, somehow there is more respect for [ethnic] Estonians than 
here in Narva. In Narva, everyone somehow believes that: ‘No, this is a Russian 
city. Estonians have all the others.’ I do not agree with this. I do not like it when 
they say it. By this I mean, I am calm towards the fact that there are Estonians 
and Russians. Still, we live in their country, we need to somehow respect each 
other.”136  
 
Interviewee #7 not only underlined the ethnic tensions that an unequal job market perpetuates, 
but the statement, “Still, we live in their country…” also demonstrates the associated feelings 
of isolation and separation which result from such inequality and discrimination. It is not 
interviewee #7’s country, it is the country of ethnic Estonians from which interviewee #7 is 
separated. In the panel discussion hosted by Deep Baltic held on April 7th, 2017 with Kristina 
Kallas and Francisco Martinez titled “Discussing Identity and Minorities in an Estonian Border 
City”, Madli Maruste referenced her research which also addressed topics of discrimination, 
revealing that isolation between ethnic Estonians and Russian-speaking Estonians extends well 
beyond the job market:  
And I have interviewed a lot of young people, asking about this – young people 
from Narva, Tartu, Tallinn. Young people with this mixed heritage, maybe 
Russian speaking – they told me stories of how they had not been included in 
the [Estonian Song] festival. Let’s say they wanted to participate because they 
told me “this is an Estonian party and I really wanted to participate. And I went 
to this choir training and I had learnt all the songs, etc., and then my teacher 
told me ‘no, no, you can’t attend, because this is an Estonian party’” (2017, 15). 
 
Finally, interviewee #15 suggested that ethnic discrimination has also hindered those with a 
Russian background from serving within the higher levels of Estonian government, resulting 
in unfair representation for Russian-speakers in Estonia:  
Even if you learn a language, there is still such a thing called a "glass ceiling", 
you will not jump above it. All the same, at the highest level, all the bosses, are 
still always Estonians. Therefore, there are things where Russians are not 
                                                             
135 “Многие эстонцы не любят русских, а русские также не любят эстонцев. Такое есть у нас, такое 
встречается очень часто. Особенно вот в эстонских городах. Если эстонцы коренные видят русских, то 
не очень хорошая ситуация может сложиться. У нас такое было. Было, что эстонцы шли против русских, 
вот буквально лет пять назад это было.” (Interviewee #13, P4, Q3) 
136 “… в Кохлаярви как-то больше все-таки уважения к эстонцам, нежели здесь в Нарве. В Нарве все как-
то считают, что нет, это русский город. Эстонцы такие все сякие, у меня такого нет. Мне это наоборот не 
нравится, когда там говорят. То есть я спокойно к этому отношусь, что есть и эстонцы и русские. Все-
таки мы живем в их стране, нужно друг друга как-то уважать.” (Interviewee #7, P4, Q6) 
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allowed to do. In the Riigikogu [the unicameral parliament of Estonia], in my 
opinion, there are two or three Russians. All in all, 101 people, but three 
Russians.137 
 
Economic differences from Estonians 
Accumulated reports on Estonia’s progress since independence highlight that the 
country as a whole has transitioned through different economic conditions. Between 1989 and 
2009, the 2010 Poverty Study Report highlighted four distinct economic periods in Estonia: 
transitional reforms, a stabilization period, a period of fast economic development and growth 
of welfare, and a period of global economic crisis (Kutsar 2010, 59). While today Estonia has 
moved beyond the global economic crisis of 2008 and is realizing new economic opportunities, 
one consistent factor through these economic changes has been and continues to be the lower 
standing of Ida-Virumaa in comparison with the rest of Estonia with regards to economic 
conditions and poverty. Statistical reporting indicates that Ida-Virumaa is consistently among 
the lowest in terms of employment, minimum wages, and disposable income levels (Kutsar 
2010, 77 and Loode and Poder 2015, 175). The interviewees’ comments highlighted these 
statistical differences. Interviewee #15 pointed out that, “Our region of Ida-Virumaa is where 
money is least allocated.”138 Interviewee #10 also referenced statistics stating, “Ida-Virumaa 
is considered the poorest region… it is all based on statistics. We have a lot of people who 
work under the table that is, moonlighting somewhere, unofficially.”139 The interviewees, 
however did not show a consensus that they felt economic conditions in Ida-Virumaa were 
primarily a result of ethnic discrimination. Interviewee #12 explained that the struggles in Ida-
Virumaa were comparable to other places in Estonia: “In fact, I had an internship in Pärnu 
and I worked there. And I can say that all the economic problems are the same.”140 Earlier in 
this analysis (Section 2.1 “Mentality”), interview #5 suggested that the difference in economic 
conditions between Narva and other larger cities such as Tallinn and Tartu were more a result 
of the mentality of the locals in Narva and their unwillingness to plan and develop the city 
well141. Despite the lack of a common explanation for current regional economic variances, the 
                                                             
137 “Даже если выучишь язык, все равно есть такое понятие называется «стеклянный потолок», выше 
него ты не прыгнешь. Все равно на высшем уровне, все начальство, все равно всегда эстонцы. Поэтому 
есть такие вещи, куда русских не пускают. В рийгикоге всего по-моему два или три русских, всего из 
101 человек и три человека русских.” (Interviewee #15, P2, Q5) 
138 “У нас такой регион Ида-Вирумаа, куда меньше всего выделяется денег.” (Interviewee #15, P2, Q3) 
139 “Ида-вирумаа считается самым бедным регионом…это все опирается на статистику. У нас много 
людей, кто работает на халтурах, то есть подрабатывает где-то, неофициально.” (Interviewee #10, P4, Q7) 
140 “На самом деле, у меня был опыт жизненный и в Пярну, я работала там. И могу сказать, что 
экономические проблемы у всех одинаковые.” (Interviewee #12, P2, Q4) 
141  (Interviewee #5, P4, Q7) 
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fact remains that economic conditions in Ida-Virumaa are considerably different. A large 
percentage of Estonia’s Russian-speaking population living in Ida-Virumaa is in a separate 
economic category than other Estonians, thereby further isolating them from ethnic Estonian 
society. Moreover, this isolation is likely compounded by the earlier mentioned perceptions of 
ethnic discrimination. The combination of minimal daily interaction with ethnic Estonians, a 
strong sense of perceived ethnic discrimination, and significant differences in socio-economic 
conditions clearly places Russian-speaking Estonians in physical, psychological and economic 
isolation from ethnic Estonians.  
Similarly, the interviewees are also isolated from ethnic Russians in Russia as a result 
of the political border. A direct result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence 
of Estonia, the political border severely altered Narva and Ida-Virumaa’s transportation routes; 
restricted the ease of contact between family members living in Estonia and Russia; and 
rendered a once simple process to access products, work and amenities found in Russia to a 
nationally controlled event. While Russia initially made efforts to provide former Soviet Union 
citizens the opportunity to gain Russian citizenship in the first few years after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Estonian regulations prevented dual citizenship, thus forcing those who 
sought the benefits of Estonian and European citizenship to forego Russian citizenship and 
consequently making access to Russia and Russian society more difficult (Melvin 1995, 49). 
Moreover, regulation differences between Russia and the EU prevent easy access for Russian-
speaking Estonians to the Russian job market in which their native language would be an asset.  
Physical and Social Separation from Russians 
The result of these politically implemented regulations over the years has been 
significant restriction on cross-border interaction, particularly when compared to restriction-
free borders that exist within the European Union (EU). As Francisco Martinez highlighted in 
his study of the border from a Narvan perspective,  
The entrance into the European Union and the Schengen area meant abolishing 
the simplified border-crossing regime established after Estonia regained its’ 
independence. Nowadays, silent individuals cross a heavily surveyed bridge 
that functions as a passage connecting a longer road – from Russia to Europe 
or vice versa (2016, 216). 
 
As a result of this border, families members on both sides of the Russian/Estonian border are 
unable to visit each other without the involvement of controlled paperwork which, as 
interviewee #4 mentioned when discussing border control changes, has an associated cost: 
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“And now they are making visas much more expensive.”142 In Section 2.2 “Institutional 
Connections”, interviewee #12 also underlined the cost associated with travel, stating that the 
Russian visa is more expensive for those who hold an Estonian passport versus those with a 
grey passport.143 According to research completed in March 2016 by Native ProspectorSM 144 
however, the cost of cross border travel is not as dramatic or expensive as the interviewees 
implied. The report stated that,  
Narva residents regularly cross the border into Russia by foot or by car to 
purchase cheaper priced goods. About 1.8 million people and 220,000 cars 
cross the border between Narva and Ivangorod each year. Narva residents cross 
the border with multiple-entry visas which are inexpensive and easy to obtain 
(2016, slide 3). 
 
While considering the visa affordable or expensive can be rather subjective, there are clear and 
strict monetary and legal actions taken when the border is not respected. Martinez recounted 
the consequences when two of his interviewees recounted an unintentional border crossing:  
Accidental border crossings still occur, as for the fishermen Mikhail Sukhoshin 
and Alexander Ladur, who crossed the dividing line of the Narva river in 
November 2014, and were sentenced with two months and nine days in prison. 
On the edge of the European Union, this zone has a severe visa policy (2016, 
216). 
 
Between interviewees’ sentiments, other personal accounts and cross-border research, we can 
conclude that the changes in cross-border travel since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
particularly when coupled with other factors such as cross-border migration security concerns 
or global economic downturns, have been significant enough (both in cost and complexity) to 
discourage travel among those Russian-speaking Estonians who would otherwise have an 
interest in repeated travel between Estonia and Russia. Interviewee #5 listed this restriction as 
one of the top three areas that should be addressed by the local and national government: 
“unhindered crossing of the border, rapid crossing of the border, this is a technical issue.”145  
                                                             
142 “А сейчас делают визы, намного дороже стали делать.” (Interviewee #4, P4, Q1) 
143 (Interviewee #12, P3, Q1d) 
144 Native ProspectorSM is a research initiative to facilitate and develop a more informed understanding of the 
operational environment with special focus on terrorist safe havens in the U.S. Army European Command Area 
of Responsibility (EUCOM AOR). The initiative supports EUCOM and United States Government (USG) 
planning for indirect, population-centric operations. This report, in response to a Request for Information (RFI), 
is the first in a series of area assessments of locations in Ida Viru county, Estonia. This report particularly 
focuses on the city of Narva, Estonia. It is based on open-source research and a Native Researcher (NR) survey 
of 15 residents of Narva. 
145 “беспрепятственное пересечение границы, быстрого пересечения границы, это технический вопрос” 
(Interviewee #5, P4, Q7) 
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Finally, border controls also separate Russian-speaking Estonians from products, 
services and markets in Russia and the people who offer them – all aspects that influence and 
shape daily activities and habits. As one of the interviewees from Martinez’s research 
explained, “Also, if there were no border, it would be possible to create employment there too, 
and not just here, how it currently happens. Do you know? It takes an hour to cross the border” 
(2016, 207). While no interviewees in this research specifically expressed a desire to find a job 
in Russia, they did underline the economic advantages in terms of prices and available goods 
that were difficult to obtain because of the border. Interviewee #12 explained that many 
Russian-speaking Estonians are interested in Russian products because, “In our country, the 
market for goods and products is much narrower than in Russia.”146 In April of 2016, a second 
Native ProspectorSM interview-based research in the district of Narva- Joesuu confirmed that 
individuals who must transit through the border crossing in Narva to access Russia are 
interested in Russian commodities:  
Eleven of the 15 respondents reported frequently crossing the border into 
Ivangorod, Russia often to purchase goods at a cheaper price. The most 
common goods respondents identified purchasing included alcohol, cigarettes, 
electronics, and petroleum gas (2016, slide 11). 
 
The transactions that occur between the people when they do cross the border and interact is 
particularly important for their identity formation. The descriptions Francisco Martinez 
provides about Estonian based markets best describe the transactions that occur in Estonian 
markets (in this case he describes a market in Tallinn), underlining what Russian-speakers are 
prevented from participating in when excluded from Russian markets:  
A market is also a social place, not only a search for profit activity or a purely 
economic phenomenon…. This market creates certain types of social bonds 
beyond the aspiration to maximise profit and helps segments of the society find 
their place in the world. To a great extent, clients and sellers of this market 
derive their social identities and sense of belonging through their market 
activities, by means of the social relations they build and their inter-subjective 
awareness. For instance, here language and ethnic identity can have a particular 
impact on business. Likewise, relations of reciprocity play an important role in 
both the provision and distribution of goods. This informal economy continues 
after socialism to be of crucial importance to households in meeting needs that 
the market cannot provide (2016, 84). 
 
For those who did seek the more economically priced commodities, Interviewee #4 
explained that national regulations continue to restrict how Russian-speaking Estonians 
interact in Russian markets:“…there is a tightening of rules: you cannot bring alcohol 
                                                             
146 “В нашей стране рынок товаров и продуктов он намного уже, чем в России.” (Interviewee #12, P4, Q5) 
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to some extent, you cannot carry cigarettes”147 If incentive to travel to Russia continues 
to decrease based on these restrictive regulations, it is logical to conclude that legal 
cross-border trade will likely decrease as well, thus further decreasing contact that 
Russian-speaking Estonians have with ethnic Russians in Russia.  
To summarize, in Narva and the surrounding region of Ida-Virumaa, Russian-speaking 
Estonians can live within a kilometer from ethnic Russians living in Russia (family or 
unrelated), yet to interact with them requires government issued paperwork in the form of visas 
or passports (with associated costs); long waiting procedures and security checks each time 
they cross the border; and restricted access to products (both in terms of imports and exports) 
and markets (commercial and employment). Thus, despite their commonalities, the Russian-
speaking Estonians are politically and to a large extent socially isolated from Russians in 
Russia in their day-to-day activities, especially if they are unwilling or unable to pay the price, 
in time and money, to travel to Russia.  
Isolation from Estonian and Russian Society 
Although the interviewees expressed sentiments of connection with Estonia, ethnic 
discrimination with regards to job opportunities, work salary and language proficiency have 
led to isolation and a collective sense that Russian-speakers in Estonia are somehow different. 
Likewise, political regulations and controlled border procedures separated Russian-speakers in 
Estonia from Russians in Russia despite their commonalities. As a result, Russian-speaking 
Estonians are forced to evaluate their social position in contrast to and isolation from that of 
their ethnic Estonian and Russian counterparts. In other words, how they view themselves is 
based on conflict orientation where the interviewees focus on their relationship with the larger 
organization or community (Estonian society and Russian society) through the lens of an 
ingroup (Russian-speaking Estonians) versus an outgroup (Ethnic Estonians or Ethnic Russians 
in Russia).  
This conflict orientation is the basis for Tajfel’s identity theory. Tajfel argued that 
collective identities become salient and influence group behavior only when situations 
stimulate intergroup categorizations and comparisons (Ashmore and Jussim 1997, 116). This 
conflict orientation left the Russian-speaking Estonians economically and linguistically 
isolated from ethnic Estonians and politically and socially separated from Russians in Russia, 
                                                             
147 “ Ужесточение идет каких-то правил. Что нельзя алкоголь провозить в какой-то мере, нельзя сигареты 
провозить.” (Interviewee #4, P4, Q1) 
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thus forming a community that exhibits aspects of Estonian society and aspects of Russian 
society but, is neither Russian nor Estonian.  
Tajfel’s identity theory helps explain how Russian-speaking Estonians have become a 
unique community as a result of isolation, but what is more important and revealing from the 
interviews is how this uniqueness is perceived and interpreted by the interviewees. Although 
there is a clear sense of victimization with regards to the discriminatory practices against the 
community or unfair political regulations that divide people who otherwise have much in 
common, the majority of responses indicate that the interviewees’ perception of their situation 
is positive and one of opportunity. This topic was addressed in Lesley Harman’s book titled 
The Modern Stranger: On Language and Membership, where marginality (an unwillingness to 
accept this in-between status) is contrasted with duality (embracing the benefits of having 
aspects of both sides). To explain this concept Harman references Peter Rose’s research (1967) 
on the marginal man where he presents the way in which a Jewish diaspora community adapted 
when surrounded by a majority Cristian culture. Harman initially quotes Rose stating:  
Complete assimilation into the Christian community is not the goal of the 
American Jew. This means giving up a part of himself, a part that sometimes 
even he cannot explain, (p. 471) He is more a part of his community than he is 
apart from it. He is far more assimilated to the Gentile milieu than his urban 
cousin [the urban Jew]. But, as indicated below, he remains a Jew. (p. 472) 
(cited in Harman 1988, 29-30 – brackets in original text) 
 
Harman continues in his own words:  
Whereas marginality expresses an unwillingness to be between two worlds — 
a sense of process, of victimization — duality reflects a positive choice to forge 
a third way in recognition of the impossibility of either complete assimilation 
on the one hand, or complete preservation of the old ways on the other. Whereas 
marginality brings with it a sense that there is resistance — either by the 
stranger or the host — duality suggests co-operation and mutual acceptance 
(Harman 1988, 29-30). 
 
It is here where the concept of duality and the sense of willingness to operate in the area 
considered “in between” mentioned earlier in this analysis can be addressed in full. A majority 
of the interviewees’ responses indicated not only a recognition of their own duality, but also 
highlighted the interviewees’ focus on the opportunities associated with the duality and an 
assignment of individual responsibility in achieving/obtaining these opportunities. In addition, 
interviewees also highlighted the generational differences observed among Russian-speaking 
Estonians and their perception of duality.  
Recognition and Application of Duality 
 65 
 
From the start of this research, there is a recognized difficulty involved in describing 
who the interviewees consider themselves to be because of a complex intersection of influences 
from Russia and Estonia. The most revealing questions of the interviewees’ self-recognition of 
duality on some level were Part 1, Question 6 when 87% chose an answer that included 
descriptions of Estonian and Russian origin and Part 4, Question 1 where 62% of the 
interviewees offered their own definition of identity, which also incorporated both Estonian 
and Russian aspects. Moreover, as in the American Jewish example, the interviewees embraced 
this in-between status opposed to focusing on a perspective of victimization: “Well, I respect 
both the Estonian and the Russian nationality. In other words, I’m loyal to both one and the 
other.”148 (Interviewee #4) or “I want to take the best from all of the cultures…. Of course, I 
was brought up in Russian literature, but nevertheless I would like to eliminate [cultural 
prejudice] and not perceive other people on the basis of their nationality”149 (Interviewee #12). 
Interview #9’s response demonstrates not only self-recognition, but a personal desire to clarify 
this duality with others: “So I couldn’t say that I’m like purely Estonian. I understand but, but 
sometimes I want to explain them [those who ask about my identity] more.”150 Some 
interviewees, like interviewee #14, did suggest that duality came as the only option, asking 
rhetorically, “I speak Russian, but I live in Estonia, in Europe. And how would I completely 
integrate? However, I can.”151 While not as embracing as Interviewee #9’s response, 
interviewee #14 still demonstrates a sense of self-awareness of this duality and a personal 
decision to make the best of it.  
Opportunity and Individual Responsibility  
Perhaps just as important as recognizing and positively embracing their duality, is the 
sense of opportunity the interviewees associated with the unique position of being a Russian-
speaking Estonian. Despite the specific concern of salary and job placement in comparison 
with ethnic Estonians discussed during Section 2.3 “Ethnic Discrimination from Estonians”, 
around two-thirds of the interviewees expressed an overall sense of opportunity to improve 
one’s personal standing in life and the opportunity to provide something to the larger society 
as mediators between Estonians and Russians. Beginning with statistics among the 
                                                             
148 “ну я уважаю как эстонскую национальность, так и русскую национальность. То есть я лояльна и к 
этим и к этим.” (Interviewee #4, P4, Q2) 
149 “Мне хочется взять все лучшее от любой культуры…. Безусловно, я воспитана на литературе русской, 
но тем не менее мне хотелось бы сейчас отказаться вообще и не воспринимать других людей тоже 
исходя из их национальности.” (Interviewee #12, P4, Q1) 
150 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q2) 
151 “ я говорю по-русски, но живу я по-эстонски, по-европейски. И как бы я полностью интернируюсь, 
как я могу” (Interviewee #14, P4, Q1) 
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interviewees, when answering the question, “How do you evaluate your opportunities to 
improve your life compared to other Estonians?” (P2, Q6), 56% stated “equivalent 
opportunities” and 13% stated “definitely more opportunities” totaling 69% with a positive 
perspective on opportunities related to life compared to other Estonians (See Table 5). 
Similarly, when comparing their educational opportunities to Estonians in other regions (P2, 
Q5) 63% of the interviewees felt that had just as many opportunities as any other Estonian (See 
Table 5). Interviewee #11 stated, “I believe [we have] equal opportunities. Because for those 
who study well and are interested in their studies, it means that they have an equal opportunity. 
I'm not saying that's all. But if there is a goal to get an education, then the opportunities are 
equal.”152 In a later question discussing observed changes over the past seven years, 
Interviewee #11 implied that if there was not a perception of opportunity or satisfaction, the 
discontent would have been obvious: “We are all happy with life. If there were not enough, we 
would leave, right?”153 
 
Table 5: Responses to Opportunities in Education and life improvement 
 P2, Q5 P2, Q6 
Definitely have more opportunities 
13% 6% 
Have a few more opportunities 
25% 25% 
Have equivalent opportunities 
63% 56% 
Have less opportunities 
0% 0% 
Have significantly less opportunities 
0% 13% 
No response provided 
0% 0% 
 
In addition to benefiting the individual, duality was also described as beneficial to the 
Russian-speaking community as a whole by placing them in a unique position to serve as a 
mediator between Estonians and Russians. Interviewee #4 explained that, “If we have the 
border so close, we should communicate with each other…we must somehow in some way come 
to some general agreement.”154 The concept of duality allowed interviewee #7 to see the value 
of understanding and respecting more than one culture: “Let's just say, I'm for tolerance, that 
                                                             
152  “я считаю, равные возможности. Потому что, кто учится хорошо и заинтересован, значит, равные 
возможности. Я не говорю, что все. Но если есть цель получить это образование, то возможности 
равные.” (Interviewee #11, P2, Q5) 
153 “Жизнью мы все довольны. Если бы были недовольны, мы бы ушли, правильно?” (Interviewee #11, 
P4, Q6) 
154 “Если у нас так рядом граница, то мы должны общаться между собой… Ну помириться мы должны 
уже как-то, к какому-то общему соглашению прийти.” (Interviewee #4, P4, Q1) 
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is, I respect different cultures and different opinions, due to the fact that we have a multicultural 
society.”155 And interviewee #9 expressed that mediating between the two countries has not 
only been happening since childhood, it was happening during the interview itself: “And in a 
way, like here right now, I’m defending both sides.”156 Interviewee #9 adds that this duality is 
increasingly benefiting individuals and the interaction between Russia and Europe thanks to 
younger Russian-speaking Estonians and their language efforts, 
… the kids from Russian schools who have managed to acquire Estonian in a 
really good way…. they have more opportunities because they can connect 
and… they may be more successful in business. Not only towards Europe but 
also towards Russia…157  
 
Interviewee #10 agreed that learning the Estonian language offered Russian-speaking 
Estonians greater opportunities to work as the intermediary between Russians and Estonians:  
More opportunities, definitely more opportunities. It’s becoming more so that 
Estonians are fluent in English, but they consider Russian a difficult language. 
And communication in Russian is harder for them. But it's easier for us to learn 
the Estonian language. And it is becoming so that we are speaking Estonian 
more fluently in addition to already speaking Russian fluently.”158  
 
Given the earlier responses from the interviewees on their ability to understand subtler levels 
of Russian mentality such as humor while also embracing an Estonian mentality for order and 
structure in their every-day lives, it is no wonder that this ability to go between the two cultures 
is enhanced by fluency in both languages. More importantly, the recognition of these 
opportunities by the interviewees again support an overall attitude of embracing their duality 
as a positive attribute. Interestingly, similar conclusions were also discovered in Ammon 
Cheskin’s research of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia when her respondents indicated 
that, “For most people it was desirable for Latvia to start to utilize its perceived geographical 
and linguistic advantages vis-a`-vis Russia, and to put more efforts into developing economic 
ties with Russia” (Cheskin 2013, 306). 
In addition to underlining the positive aspects of duality, many of the interviewees 
responses carried an aspect of personal responsibility, motivation and willingness to confront 
the challenges duality presents. Interviewee #3 stated,  
                                                             
155 “Скажем так, я за толерантность, то есть я уважаю различные культуры и различные мнение, за счет 
того, что у нас все-таки мультикультурное общество.” (Interviewee #7, P4, Q1) 
156 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q1) 
157 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q6) 
158 “больше возможностей, определенно больше возможностей. У нас получатся так, что эстонцы они 
хорошо английским владеют, а русский он считается тяжелый язык. И им в коммуникации получается 
тяжелее. А нам русским проще выучить эстонский язык. И мы получается, и эстонским хорошо владеем 
и русским свободно.” (Interviewee #10, P2, Q6) 
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The main thing is to want it. If you want it, then you will have it. And if you do 
not want it, then it will not happen for you. It seems to be very much this way to 
me. Even language courses can be mastered. The main thing is that you want 
it.159 
 
Interviewee #12 describes these self-motivated youth as “active youth”: “I meet these children 
here at the events in the college, in which they participate voluntarily, not because the school 
makes them. These are the youth that are active….”160 Given the significant number of 
references to individuality the interviewees’ attributed to Estonian influence earlier, it could be 
argued that their support for this individual responsibility might also originate from interaction 
with Estonian society. At different points in the interview, comments about proactivity, 
planning and individual responsibility were placed in comparison with a Soviet or Russian 
“wait for the government” approach. For example, Interviewee #5 explained:  
…usually it’s like Russian mentality. They are waiting that someone will come 
and make all done. Will bring some goods, will bring some money and just give 
it and we all live like Cinderella. It’s not working in Europe. Its worked 
somewhere maybe years ago in Russia with those companies before that. But 
here it’s not working. You can’t just sit and wait and someone will give you 
some goods and money.161 
 
The individual responsibility and motivation towards duality cited by many of the interviewees 
supports McCall and Simmons’ Role-identity theory where the interviewees focus on 
themselves as a unique individual operating in different roles with an ability to influence 
society. In short, this theory centers around the idea that the identity is primarily focused with 
the concept of “I” or “Me” and the interaction with society based on self-determined or socially 
obligated roles. The role of a Russian-speaking Estonian as an individual exhibiting duality is 
obligated based on the unique conditions of Ida-Virumaa and through this role, Russian-
speaking Estonians perceive that they can positively influence Estonian and Russian societies.  
Generational Differences in Duality  
While the concept of duality throughout the interview was described as touching most 
Russian-speaking Estonians, old and young, a clear generational difference emerged in how 
the Russian-speaking Estonians addressed the dissonance created when operating in-between 
being Estonian and being Russian. Returning to the concept of Samnani’s dissonance theory, 
                                                             
159  “Главное, что ты хочешь. Если ты хочешь, то у тебя и будет. А если ты не хочешь, то для тебя как 
будто бы и не делают. Мне кажется, очень многое. Курсы даже языка можно получить. Главное – что ты 
хочешь.” (Interviewee #3, P2, Q3) 
160 “ Я вот этих детей встречаю здесь на мероприятиях в колледже, в которых они участвуют по 
собственному желанию, не потому что школа отправила. И соответственно, это все-таки именно та часть 
молодежи, которая активная…” (Interviewee #12, P4, Q6) 
161 (Interviewee #5, Additional Comments, Lines 331-335) 
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Grigoryev references Yik Wong and Kwong (2006) and states that, “The greater the gap 
between the perceived identity and cultural values and norms of immigrants and those typical 
for the host country, the harder it will be for immigrants to integrate into these new 
circumstances” (Grigoryev 2017, 541-542). Interviewees underlined that older Russian-
speakers maintain a stronger connection to present-day Russia as a result of their extended time 
and experience as a member of the Soviet Union. Interviewee #3 responded to the question 
“Does the Russian government address your concerns?” (P3, Q1b), by stating that the 
interviewee’s father likely views the government as addressing his needs more, “because if 
you compare, for example, me and my father, who is more towards Russia - he is interested in 
Russian culture, history – then he, as far as he is concerned, I think, yes. And about me – no.”162 
In the previous sections of this research, many interviewees explained that this difference, or 
gap, between the idea of being Soviet and the idea of being Estonian, which emerged after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, manifested itself in many ways among the older generation: 
traditions, language, custom celebrations, legal rights, and social interaction to name a few. 
During the earlier referenced panel discussion (Discussing Identity and Minorities in an 
Estonian Border City), Kristina Kallas placed this dramatic change for the older generation in 
perspective:  
There is this term for the Russian-speaking people of the post-Soviet spaces – 
it is a minoritised majority – they used to be a majority, and then they were 
minoritised. They were told eventually that “no, no, no, you are now a 
minority”. And this is a huge identity conflict in them, because they have never 
thought of themselves ever in their lives growing up as a minority; this was 
never part of their identity. But overnight they became a minority (2017, 18). 
 
Conversely, the interviews in this research emphasized that among the younger generations 
there is a closing of this gap; they are observing a change in perspective about identity, the 
Estonian language, and the strength of one’s “Russianness”.  This also aligns with Tomatsu 
Shibutani and Kian Kwan’s assimilation theory where subsequent, younger generations tend 
to assimilate or integrate because they are able to close the social distance and relate more with 
their host country (Alba and Nee 2003, 31). Interviewee #10 stated: 
Well, if you look at young people, then there is a normal relationship. And if 
you look at the adult generation, such as the grandmothers and grandfathers, 
                                                             
162  “Потому что, если сравнивать, например, меня и моего отца, который больше себя к России 
- он интересуется российской культурой, историей - то он, по поводу него, я думаю, да. А по 




then they are still – “Well, we are Russian, they are Estonian. We celebrate 
May 9th and they celebrate Independence Day.163  
 
Interviewee #12 states,  
Then there's the youth. There are a lot of integration programs, when children 
from Narva, active children, go and live and study the language in the Estonian 
environment. And it seems to me that they are very different. They come, they 
tell their family about the experience. At least, recently, as far as active youth, 
teenagers and schoolchildren are concerned, they no longer perceive Estonia 
as something alien.164 
 
Part of this generational shift might be attributed to the change in family connections, as stated 
in the section discussing family roots. The weakening of these roots due to separation (physical 
or political) as well as the intermarriage of ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians may blur the 
line between Russian and Estonian (See section 2.2 “Family Roots”). But, according to some 
of the interviewees, this generational difference can also be observed from the Estonian side 
in the form of greater acceptance of Russian-speaking Estonians. Interviewee #3 was quoted 
earlier (Section 2.1 “Language”) as admitting having Estonian friends that actively work to 
help her speak Estonian165.  And interviewee #9 stated that currently there are “more Russian 
names in politics, in business…. they have to… prove themselves harder…. But when they do, 
the Estonian society accepts them… Maybe a couple of years ago it didn’t show yet.”166  
These comments and observations suggest that the “the gap between the perceived 
identity and cultural values and norms of immigrants and those typical for the host country” 
(Grigoryev 2017, 541-542) is decreasing among younger Russian-speaking Estonians. Indeed, 
Grigoryev argues that as ties to the original culture becomes weaker, “it will be easier and more 
effective to reduce dissonance through the assimilation preference or integration preference 
than for those whose original culture is central to their self-identity” (Ibid., 541-542). Francisco 
Martinez, while participating in the panel discussion, referenced similar conclusions from his 
research of the Russian minority in Estonia:  
The so-called Russians in Estonia, they used to be a majority, nowadays they 
are a minority because the empire has collapsed, so there is a revanchist 
                                                             
163  “ну если смотреть молодежь, то тут идет нормальные отношения. А если смотреть взрослое 
поколение, ну там бабушки и дедушки, тогда они еще – вот мы там русские, они эстонцы. Мы 9 мая 
празднуем, а они пускай празднуют день независимости.” (Interviewee #10, P4, Q6) 
164 “Потом еще молодежь. Очень много интеграционных программ, когда дети из Нарвы, активные дети, 
ездят и живут и изучают язык в Эстонской среде. И вот мне кажется, они очень меняются. Они 
приезжают, они рассказывают своей семье. По крайней мере, последние мероприятия, где была активная 
часть молодежи и подростков, школьников. Они уже не воспринимают Эстонию, как нечто чужое.” 
(Interviewee #12, P4, Q6) 
165 (Interviewee #3, P4, Q6) 
166 (Interviewee #9 P4, Q6) 
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atmosphere, or there has been – now it is perhaps changing with the 
generational transformation (2017, 13). 
 
The older Russian-speaking generation in Estonia is described by the interviewees as still 
preferring to “distance themselves” from Estonian values and norms and attempting to adhere 
primarily to “their original culture”, indicating a preference for the separation strategy reaction 
in Samnani’s dissonance theory (Grigoryev 2017, 541-542). Meanwhile, the younger 
generation is increasingly showing a tendency to incorporate aspects of both Estonia and Russia 
– applying the integration strategy. 
To summarize the analysis of duality, the interviewees revealed that many Russian-
speaking Estonians are aware of their unique status of being in-between what is considered 
Russian and what is considered Estonian and this is generally valued as a positive attribute. 
The younger the individual, the more likely that the Russian-speaking Estonian will willingly 
incorporate aspects of both Russian and Estonian background and assign a personal 
responsibility to maximizing the available opportunities offered by being an individual of 
duality. This individual responsibility and motivation supports McCall and Simmons’ Role-
identity theory where the interviewees focus on themselves as a unique individual operating in 
different roles with an ability to influence society. These conclusions support Francisco 
Martinez’ discussions in his 2016 doctoral research where he concludes that “Narva plays a 
crucial role as a mediator and juncture between distinct worlds” (2016, 57). The interviewees 
perceive themselves as possessing identity traits of both Estonian and Russian origin that make 
them uniquely qualified to operate successfully between ethnic Estonians and Russians in a 
way that is not marginalizing. In the words of Grigoryev, “That is, they possess two forms of 
social capital: bonding with their own group; and bridging to the larger society” (2017, 550). 
 
2.4. Conclusions on Self-perceptions of the Russian-speaking Estonians 
It is now interesting to return to the identity formation theories referenced during the 
analysis to underline the variety of influences on the interviewees’ self-perception of what 
constitutes a Russian-speaking Estonian. Ashmore and Jussim summarize the four theories by 
stating that:  
McCall and Simmons and Stryker (and those who draw from their work) 
generally tend to presume that social roles are the primary bases for "me" states; 
Tajfel and Turner (and those who draw from their work) generally presume that 
large-scale social categories and groups are the primary bases for "we" states. 
The social psychological literature has often equated social roles with me's and 




In other words, the first two theories center around the idea that the identity is primarily focused 
with the concept of “I” or “Me” and the interaction with society based on self-determined or 
socially obligated roles. The third and fourth theories on the other hand, are more concerned 
with the concept of “Us” or “We” and how this perspective is based on relative comparison 
with an outgroup or an ability to find commonality with others who share similar 
characteristics. Ashmore and Jussim conclude that each of these theories has its strong points 
and weaknesses and they may be influenced by the context surrounding the identity in question. 
In this analysis, interviewees provided multiple supporting examples for all four of these 
theories.  
Individuality, individual responsibility and self-motivation (in their mental approach, 
in business operations or in maximizing their duality) cited by many of the interviewees 
supports McCall and Simmons’ Role-identity theory where the interviewees focus on 
themselves as a unique individual operating in different roles with an ability to influence 
society. This was evident by the interviewees’ conviction that a Russian-speaking Narvan’s 
future and access to life opportunities is dependent on how hard they study, how well they learn 
Estonian, and how willing they are to accept their role as in-between two cultures. 
Nevertheless, this individuality was somewhat restricted when family ties with Russia caused 
some of the interviewees to see themselves as an individual attempting to operate within the 
role of “Russian” in-order to meet the expectations resultant of their Russian family roots. This 
is a clear support of Striker’s Identity theory where behavioral expectations dictate what they 
should do based on the number of relationships (social ties) a particular role has. This theory 
also implies that the less family ties with Russians in Russia, then the more likely Russian-
speaking Estonians will execute roles that are more related to and dependent on roles defined 
by Estonians and Estonian culture.  
When it comes to Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory, the interviewees isolation from both 
Estonians and Russians as a result of discrimination and restricted social interaction caused the 
interviewees to view themselves as a unique ingroup, in opposition to the outgroups (Estonians 
and Russians). Despite their isolation, interviewees justified adopting many of the social and 
mental preferences of the Estonian society while simultaneously valuing their historical and 
cultural ties to Russia, because they still perceived a similarity of interests or goals with the 
two larger societies. The formation of their self-perception is therefore also based on Turner’s 
theory, where commonalities and characteristics allowed the interviewees to relate to both 
Estonians and Russians.  
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The emergence of this separate and distinct perception of what it means to be a Russian-
speaking Estonian is further supported by Ashmore and Jussim’s explanation of how different 
identities can merge.  
Alternatively, multiple identities may merge or fuse into one entity. For 
example, a woman may come to think of herself not only as a wife or a 
traditional woman but as a homemaker. Her gender-role orientation may shape 
her enactment of the wife identity to such an extent that the two become 
inseparable and are experienced— and perhaps even cognitively processed— 
in a unitary manner. When multiple identities are conjoined (e.g., student 
activist) or are fused within a single self-descriptive term (e.g., breadwinner = 
adult, parent, gainfully employed), their meaning and behavioral consequences 
may reside in the amalgamation itself” (1997, 128-129). 
 
In short, the traits discovered through this interview reveal that the interviewees drew 
equally from identity orientations described as individual and collective (“me” and “we”). 
When considering the two larger societal influences in question (Estonian and Russian) and 
bearing in mind the comment made by interviewee #9: “Russian and Estonian cultures are 
very different. One is individualized another is collectivist cultures.” then it is perhaps logical 
that the merging of these two identities would yield a community that has found a balance 
between “me” and “we”. Additionally, the interviews suggest that this self-perception is 
somewhat fluid and influenced by the demands of the surrounding environment. This explains 
the conflict and dissonance observed in the interviewees responses which Ashmore and Jussim 
quote McCall and Simmons as explaining, “…discrepancies between one's ideal self and one's 
situational self, producing pressures to validate” (Ashmore and Jussim 1997, 110). Ashmore 
and Jussim also quote McCall and Simmons to further explain that this attempt to answer the 
question “Who am I” and “Who are we” is a never ending process, likening it to “dusting a 
huge old house: by the time one gets to the upstairs, the downstairs is badly in need of dusting 
again (1978, p. 163 as cited in Ashmore and Jussim 1997, 110).  
Although there are unresolved issues between these theories that cannot fully explain 
all aspects of self-perception, identity formation or the role of the individual versus the 
collective, using these models and theories has demonstrated the complexity of the Russian-
speaking Estonian’s case and rendered meaningless the idea that simple one-word labels such 
as Russian or Estonian could in anyway describe the unique people or environment of Narva 
and Ida-Virumaa. Indeed, this research supports Professor Chris Weedon’s claims that a hybrid 
identity has formed by combining aspects of Estonian and Russian cultures. Nevertheless, we 
have arrived at a point where we can answer the first question of this research: Do Russian-
speaking Estonians self-identify more as a member of Estonian society or a compatriot of 
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Russia?  The interviewees indicated that despite feelings towards and connections with Russia, 
there is a clear recognition that they are a member of Estonian society and that there is almost 
no connection with Russia through the term compatriot. So initially, it appears that the answer 
is “a member of Estonian society.” This relationship however, is complex. Interviewees 
explained that as a member of Estonian society they often experience discrimination, economic 
hardship and social exclusion while concerning Russian society, they still desire to cultivate 
their relationship with regards to language, culture and cross-border transactions even if they 
do not consider themselves compatriots. In short, who they consider themselves to be is pushed, 
pulled and influenced by both sides – they see themselves as in the middle.  
 
Section 3. Where do I/We belong?  
 
While the interviewees’ responses suggest that Russian-speaking Estonians consider 
themselves to be in the middle, this does not imply that they are equidistant between what they 
consider Russian and what they consider Estonian. Moreover, the theories cited and the 
interviewees themselves admitted to the constant fluctuation of the situation based on changing 
aspects in the surrounding environment. But to determine where the community sees itself, we 
need a way to measure where along the scale of in-betweenness the Russian-speaking Estonians 
lie. To accomplish this, we will introduce and discuss the aspects of belongingness that 
presented themselves during the interviews. While describing who they consider themselves, 
the interviewees also shed light on how they feel about their relationships with Russian and 
Estonian societies. Did they feel more at home among one of the two societies? Which country 
seemed to provide them a greater feeling of inclusion and conversely which country stimulated 
a greater feeling of exclusion? What factors made them feel this way? In short, we will use the 
interviewees descriptions on how the two countries made them feel to measure where they 
perceive themselves along the scale between Russian and Estonian. Analyzing these responses 
will help answer research question 2: Do Russian-speaking Estonians have a clear preference 
for one country over another?  
 
3.1. Belongingness 
Marco Antonsich states that “belonging should be analyzed both as a personal, intimate, 
feeling of being ‘at home’ in a place (place-belongingness) and as a discursive resource which 
constructs, claims, justifies, or resists forms of socio-spatial inclusion/exclusion (politics of 
belonging)” (“Searching” 2010, 644). The concept of evaluating the place-belongingness of 
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post-soviet minority groups is not a new concept. The idea that a Russian-speaking 
community’s belongingness might be unclear since the community could associate 
belongingness to a place of residence (like Estonia in this case) and to their historical homeland 
(Russia or the Soviet Union), has led others to research which place might evoke a greater 
sense of belongingness (Cheskin 2016 and Kallas 2016).  
Antonsich argues however, that place-belongingness is not the only aspect worth 
considering.  He states that place-belongingness is inconclusive without also understanding the 
interviewees’ socio-spatial inclusion and the discourse surrounding it (Antonsich “Searching” 
2010, 649). Equipped with a better understanding of how the interviewees view themselves 
and evaluate the position of the larger Russian-speaking population in Narva and Ida-Virumaa, 
we will use this information to identify the common discourses of belongingness presented by 
the interviewees. These discourses will simultaneously identify the most important aspects of 
socio-spatial inclusion according to the interviewees and provide an indication on which 
country the Russian-speaking Estonians feel creates a greater sense of belongingness.  
 
3.2. Place-Belongingness 
 The concept of place belongingness, where the idea of feeling at home represents, “a 
symbolic space of familiarity, comfort, security, and emotional attachment” (Antonsich 2010, 
646), was indirectly addressed in Section 2.1 “Residency”, when interviewees attributed a 
sense of familiarity and comfort with Estonia. Place belongingness towards Estonia was 
manifested in responses about residency, citizenship and their reasoning for using the term 
“Estonian” in their self-description: “Well, how can I say this, I’m sort of Russian, but I live in 
Estonia”.167 (Interviewee #7) In reviewing Antonsich’s elaboration of place-belongingness in 
a separate article titled “Meanings of place and aspects of the Self: an interdisciplinary and 
empirical account”, the interviewees’ connection with Estonia is not surprising as Antonsich 
attributes length of residency to playing a critical role in developing familiarity with a location 
(Antonsich 2010, 122). 
Just as important as the interviewees’ affirmation of place-belongingness to Estonia, is 
their indication that it would be difficult for them to establish a similar belongingness in Russia 
because of feelings of uncomfortableness and insecurity. The majority of these feelings were 
discovered when answering the question, “What makes you different from Russians living in 
Russia?” (P4, Q4). Interviewee #3 stated, “I live in Estonia, I want to live in Estonia, and I will 
                                                             
167  “ну как сказать, я вроде как и русская, но живу в Эстонии” (Interviewee #7, P4, Q1, Line 123) 
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live in Estonia, I will be an Estonian citizen. I'm scared of Russia a little, honestly .... In general, 
I would not want to live in Russia.”168 And Interviewee #7 said, “…let's say, if I come to 
Russia…I will most likely be somehow uncomfortable there. That is, I live here in Estonia, even 
though I speak Russian, I'm comfortable here.”169 Interviewee #9 attributed this uncomfortable 
feeling to cultural differences, “I don’t think I would be comfortable living in Russia. Because 
I’m, more European or well, it would be difficult for me to adjust to the ways of Russian 
culture.”170  Interviewee #10 stated, “I come to Russia and I do not feel safe.”171  
Some of the interviewees offered reasons why there might not be a similar sense of 
place-belongingness with Russia. Interviewee #12 suggests that since Narva is such a small 
town in comparison to places in Russia, such as Moscow or Saint Petersburg, maybe Russian-
speaking Estonians feel uncomfortable in Russia where there are more people and life is 
drastically different from “small-town” life: “…perhaps, it is a comparison of a resident of a 
small city and a resident of a large city. And maybe there are such differences everywhere. 
They [large city residents] are more assertive. Residents of small towns are less daring.”172  
Yet, interviewee #10 suggested that even in a small town, Russia evoked a sense of insecurity: 
“In Russia they are too active. I, for example, have a visa, I come to the town of Ivangorod 
[Narva’s sister city] and I already feel in danger. There is no security, I want to return back 
here [to Estonia] quickly.”173  Interviewee #15 suggested that it may be a result of the greater 
order and discipline that exists in Estonia compared to Russia: “That is, it is calmer here, and 
we have become more law-abiding ourselves.”174  While interviewee #16 explained that the 
differences may lie in the perceptions of political freedoms that Estonia offers: “The political 
advantage of living in a freer country. Russia is currently not free.”175 Whatever the 
justification, the interviewees clearly establish that there is minimal place-belongingness 
associated with Russia.  
                                                             
168 “я живу в Эстонии, я хочу жить в Эстонии, и я буду жить в Эстонии, я буду гражданкой Эстонии. 
Меня пугает Россия немного, честно…Вообще я бы не хотела жить в России.” (Interviewee #3, P4, Q4) 
169 “… допустим, если я приеду в Россию…. Мне будет скорее всего как-то некомфортно там. То есть я 
живу здесь в Эстонии, пускай я говорю на русском, но мне здесь комфортно.” (Interviewee #7, P4, Q4) 
170 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q4) 
171 “Я вот в Россию прихожу, и я не чувствую себя безопасно.” (Interviewee #10, P4, Q5) 
172 “… возможно, это сравнение жителя маленького города и жителя большого города. И возможно, тут 
везде есть такие различия. Они более напористые. Жители маленьких городков менее смелые.” 
(Interviewee #12, P4, Q4) 
173 “В России они слишком активные. Я вот, допустим, у меня есть виза, я прихожу в Ивангород, и я уже 
чувствую себя опасно, нет безопасности, хочется обратно сюда вернуться по-быстрому.” (Interviewee 
#10, P4, Q4) 
174 “То есть здесь спокойнее, ну и мы стали более законопослушными сами.” (Interviewee #15, P4, Q4) 
175 “Политическое преимущество жить в более свободной стране. Россия в настоящее время 
несвободна.” (Interviewee #16, P4, Q4) 
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This lack of place-belongingness in a physical sense appears to correspond with what 
Ammon Cheskin discovered when conducting similar research on the Russian-speaking 
population in Latvia.  
When asked what the respondents considered to be their homeland (Rodina), 
they were unanimous in citing Latvia. Then, when asked if Russia also 
represented some form of homeland, the participants agreed that it did. One 
undergraduate referred to Russia as their ‘secondary (vtorostepenyi) homeland’, 
others as their ‘spiritual homeland’ (2013, 295-296). 
 
Although the interview questions in this research did not go beyond the concept of physical 
place-belongingness to explore concepts of a spiritual place-belongingness, the aspects of 
culture, language, family and history that Cheskin attribute to creating this spiritual homeland 
did correspond with the influences that the interviewees presented as their strongest 
connections with Russia during Section 2.2 “Family Roots” and “Cultural Roots”. However, 
the noticeable disassociation with the Russian-speaking community of Georgia (P3, Q2) and 
the lack of reference to other Russian-speaking communities outside of Russia in general 
suggest that the Russian-speaking Estonians would likely not extend the concept of an 
imaginary homeland to include the larger “Russian-speaking community”. For this research, 
we therefore conclude that the interviewees clearly assign place-belongingness to Estonia.   
 
3.3. Interviewees’ Discourses on Belongingness 
As the interviewees explained how they came to their conclusions about their self-
perceptions, they also presented the subjects and issues that they considered most critical in 
the discourse about their socio-spatial inclusion. Even with the numerous and at times 
conflicting opinions and issues discussed by the interviewees, three broad topics surfaced 
among the responses as being central in the interviewees’ discourse on socio-spatial inclusion: 
1) Education, particularly with regards to the Estonian and Russian languages, 2) the 
environment of Ida-Virumaa and 3) the physical exposure to ethnic Estonians and ethnic 
Russians. The interviewees consistent references to these three discourses underline their 
criticality in understanding who they are and how they assess their social inclusion or exclusion 
vis-à-vis Estonia and Russia. 
Education Discourse  
Beginning with the discourses addressing education and language, we have already 
established that this topic was not only the immediate way for the interviewees to describe 
themselves when reflecting: on the question “Who am I?” and “Who are we?” (“I speak 
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Russian, but I live in Estonia” 176), but through this discourse, interviewees also expressed 
feelings of belongingness. Within this discourse, feelings of inclusion were balanced with 
feelings of exclusion. For example, interviewees suggested that continuing education in 
Estonian for younger generations will further improve interaction with ethnic Estonians177 and 
create more opportunities in the job market178, demonstrating feelings of social inclusion. 
Likewise, social exclusion was highlighted when interviewees criticized a lack of focus on 
Russian proficiency and education, to the detriment of older Russian-speaking Estonians in 
need of social support179 and younger Russian-speaking Estonians pursuing higher 
education180. The interviewees own recognition of the importance of education in improving 
their sense of belongingness aligns with conclusions by numerous researchers in this field. As 
Anu Toots and Triin Lauri explain in the 2012/2013 Estonian Human Development Report,  
Education’s second, cultural and political task is to increase social cohesion…. 
According to several studies, educated people are more tolerant, are greater 
supporters of democracy (Mc Mahon 2004), behave more constructively in 
regard to their health (Grossmann 2000), are happier (Putnam, Helliwell 1999) 
and cope better on the labour market. The economic and social functions of 
education are intertwined, because modern economies and democracies 
presuppose the existence of socially sensitive people with open mindsets, who 
are able to quickly adapt to new working collectives and cultures, and to 
intelligently and actively participate in public life (Heidmets 2013, 30). 
 
The sentiments of exclusion were particularly focused on the use of the Russian language at 
the upper levels of the Estonian education system. It is cited as a source of exclusion because 
it is seen as discrimination based on native language. According to the interviewees, this 
exclusion causes students who choose to study in Russian and focus less on Estonian to have 
fewer opportunities later in life (P2, Q5). Interviewee #14 explains,  
in any case, I think that one of the most important principles of integration is 
the possibility of receiving an education in schools both in Russian and in 
Estonian. That is, we are not restricted in our right to study. That is, it is 
possible to speak your language at school as well as Estonian. This gives us 
two paths.181   
 
                                                             
176 “я говорю по-русски, но живу я по-эстонски” (Interviewee #14, P4, Q1) 
177 (Interviewee #12, P4, Q6) 
178 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q6) 
179 (Interviewee #11, P2, Q4) 
180 (Interviewee #15, P2, Q5) 
181 “в любом случае я думаю, что одним из важнейших принципов интеграции является возможность 
обучения в школах как на русском, так и на эстонском. То есть нас не ограничивают в правах на 
обучение. То есть есть возможность говорить на своем языке в школе. И также на эстонском. Нам дают 
два пути.” (Interviewee #14, P4, Q6) 
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Interviewee #9 agreed with this perspective stating, “the opportunity for Russians to learn 
Estonian without being forced to do so... that you protect your identity, your culture. But, at 
the same time you are able to, to participate in the life in the rest of the country.”182  
In addition to discussing education itself, this discourse also handles the generational 
difference discussed earlier between younger Russian-speaking Estonians (up to about age 
35) and older Russian-speaking Estonians. The interviewees described high level of exclusion 
with the older generation and high levels of inclusion with younger generations when 
discussing the Estonian language. Similarly, the interviewees expressed feelings of exclusion 
for the younger generation that was unable to study in and practice Russian regularly.  There 
was not however, a greater feeling of inclusion among the older generation based on their 
education or proficiency in Russian.  Overall, the balance between inclusion and exclusion as 
a result of education suggests that this discourse is heavily dependent on the age of the 
Russian-speaking Estonian and the language in question.  
Ida-Virumaa Environment Discourse 
 Discussions about the environment of Ida-Virumaa and Narva were primarily focused 
on feelings of exclusion, often describing residents of Ida-Virumaa as living in a region that is 
poor economically, politically and culturally. Although the interviewees underlined the ethnic 
discrimination involved with difficulty in securing work and sufficient wages, the issue of work 
was also a stand-alone issue in Ida-Virumaa concerning availability of jobs and sufficient 
wages. Particularly in response to the open-ended question where interviewees were asked to 
list the top three issues facing Ida-Virumaa or Narva, employment and wages was among the 
top three. Interviewee #6 listed, “issues of unemployment, work, and sufficient wages for 
work.”183 Interviewee #1 stated that Narva’s main concern was a “question of wages and 
jobs…”184 Interviewee #2 agreed stating, “In Narva we don’t have enough jobs...”185 
Interviewee #11 listed, “work, work difficulties…”186 and interviewee #3 considered jobs as 
the top issue needing improvement.187 Interviewee #13 claimed that workers in the area were 
in need of an 
increase of salaries. Because we have a lot of people who in Ida-Virumaa get 
below average, below the minimum…. And the salary already depends on the 
availability of jobs, because there are very few of them in Ida Virumaa. We have 
                                                             
182 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q7) 
183 “вопросы безработицы, работы, достойной оплаты этой работы.” (Interviewee #6, P4, Q7) 
184 “…вопрос заработной платы, рабочих мест…” (Interviewee #1, P4, Q7) 
185 (Interviewee #2, P4, Q7) 
186 “… работа, трудности с работой” (Interviewee #11, P4, Q7) 
187 (Interviewee #3, P4, Q7) 
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many from Estonia who go either to Tallinn, or to Finland and Sweden to 
work.188 
 
In addition to poor wages, interviewees felt that the corruption in their region separated them 
from the rest of Estonia, making up a second subcategory of this discourse. Interviewee #9 
explained that the political environment in Ida-Virumaa is one that still runs on corruption: 
“…the elections…are rigged here.” When asked to specify at what level one could observe 
political corruption, Interviewee #9 specified the municipal level, underlining that it extended 
beyond just Narva but was specific to Ida-Virumaa: “I don’t think that the… [national] 
government election would be as much influenced [by corrupt individuals].”189 Interviewee 
#12 elaborates on this municipal corruption stating,  
It seems to me now, since the elections were held recently, the most important 
topic, which is discussed in the media and online, is that the same people who 
were in power before the elections remained in power. And there are a lot of 
questions; how did it happen that people who are convicted, again took 
positions of power in Narva. And yet everyone is discussing that everyone has 
faced, everyone knows that some people were offered money in elections so that 
they would vote. And why do the authorities not react to this in any way? Why, 
for example, are there no criminal cases about the fact that votes were bought 
up in Narva? And people with criminal experience, with a criminal past are 
again in power, are making choices for the entire population, deciding the 
future of our city? This is what is most urgent now.190 
 
Interviewee #4 expressed a sense of frustration that the political environment in Ida-Virumaa 
has been and always will be this way: “But still, I believe nothing will change.”191 Interviewee 
#15 echoed interviewee #12 stating,  
Centrists here in Narva have won for 12-13 years. We are all tired of it. But 
everyone knows perfectly well how people are selected from among us, how 
people go to dormitories, collect alcoholics and then take them to vote. 
Absolutely, and everything practically before our very eyes…. And in the end, 
                                                             
188 “повышение зарплат. Потому что у нас очень много людей, которые в Ида-Вирумаа получают ниже 
среднего, ниже минимального…. А от зарплат уже зависит и наличие рабочих мест, потому что в Ида-
Вирумаа их очень мало. У нас же очень многие из Эстонии ездят работать либо в Таллинн, либо же в 
Финляндию и Швецию.” (Interviewee #13, P4, Q7)  
189 (Interviewee #9, P3, Q1d) 
190 “мне кажется, сейчас, так как выборы прошли совсем недавно, самая важная такая тема, которая 
обсуждается во всех средствах массовой информации и на интернет-порталах, то, что у власти остались 
те же люди, которые были и до выборов. И масса вопросов, как так получилось, что люди, которые 
осуждены, они опять заняли позиции у власти в Нарве. И еще все обсуждают, что все сталкивались, все 
знают, что кому-то предлагали деньги на выборах, чтобы они проголосовали. И почему органы власти 
никак на это не реагируют? Почему, например, никаких дел уголовных не заведено по факту того, что в 
Нарве скупались голоса? И люди с криминальным опытом, с криминальным прошлым снова у власти, 
делают выбор за все население, решают будущее нашего города? Вот это самое актуальное сейчас.” 
(Interviewee #12, P4, Q7) 
191 “Но все равно же ничего не изменится, я считаю.” (Interviewee #4, P4, Q7) 
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centrists win again, every year. Theft flourishes in full. Everyone knows that 
they cannot do anything. I do not know why.192 
 
Interviewee #16 simply stated, “In Ida-Virumaa, the [political] power has not changed.”193 In 
a slightly different thread, but still a support for the poor conditions of the region, Interviewee 
#16 also mentioned that Ida-Virumaa is under threat of depopulation: “And in Ida-Virumaa the 
population is constantly falling, that is, it is getting old, people are dying and young people are 
leaving… the population is constantly decreasing in Ida-Virumaa.”194 
A final sub-category of the Ida-Virumaa environment that promoted feelings of 
exclusion focused on the lack of cultural events and attractions within the area compared to 
other areas of Estonia and Russia. Interviewee #9 explained that “But still you don’t have… 
culture. Like you don’t have a theater here. You don’t have a concert hall here. So, the 
Estonians from the rest of the country do not have enough reason to come here.” And 
interviewee #3 stated,  
Where to go in the evening, what to do in the evening. Kohtla-Järve and Narva 
are places where there is nothing to do. You can walk, you can go to eat (there 
are a couple of places there). You can go to the culture house, but this is for 
children, there are all sorts of big clubs for kids. And me and my friends are 
just sitting at home. And there just isn’t a way to go somewhere and experience 
something new. For me, the question of leisure is open. I live there, I come for 
the weekend. I want to go somewhere with my mother, I'm going to hang with 
my friends. There is no decent place there. Therefore, everyone leaves or is self-
destructive.195  
 
When the Native ProspectorSM survey conducted in 2016 asked Russian-speaking Estonians 
from Ida-Virumaa to explain why they travel to Russia, “Three respondents [out of 15] reported 
traveling to Russia often for cultural events such as ballets and concerts” (2016, slide 11). 
                                                             
192 “ Центристы вот в Нарве которые побеждают уже 12-13 лет. Надоели всем. Но все прекрасно знают, 
как у нас покупаются голоса, как у нас ездят люди по общежитиям, собирают алкоголиков и потом везут 
их голосовать. Абсолютно у всех практически на глазах…И в итоге побеждают опять центристы, 
каждый год. Воровство процветает по полной программе. Все знают, сделать ничего не могут. Не знаю, 
почему.” Interviewee #15, P4, Q12) 
193 “в Ида-Вирумаа власть не менялась” (Interviewee #16, P4, Q6) 
194 “И в Ида-Вирумаа постоянно падает население, то есть оно стареет, люди умирают и молодые 
уезжают. То есть получается, что население постоянно уменьшается в Ида-Вирумаа.” (Interviewee #16, 
P4, Q6) 
195 “Куда сходить вечером, что делать вечером. Вот именно в кохлоярви, в Нарве есть места, а там нечего 
делать. Ты можешь погулять, ты можешь сходить поесть (там есть пара мест). Ты можешь сходить в дом 
культуры, но это для детей там больше кружки всякие. А мне со своими друзьями – только дома сидеть. 
А сходить куда-нибудь, чтобы это было что-то новое. Вот нет. Для меня вопрос досуга открытый. Я 
живу там, я приезжаю на выходные. Я хочу даже вот с мамой куда-то сходить, с друзьями потнцевать. 




Interviewee #12 did indicate however, that some effort has been made to increase Ida-
Virumaa’s attractiveness to outsiders within the past few years:  
A summer marathon gathers up to several thousand. And many people come 
who have never been to Narva. They discover for themselves. Before there was 
always a stereotype, for 20 years, that Narva is a very dangerous city. And now 
the Estonians who come here are now saying [realizing] that this was a 
stereotype.196 
 
Nevertheless, across the different economic, political and cultural areas that are unique to Ida-
Virumaa the overall perception from the interviewees was that the region placed them in a 
condition that was more disadvantaged than their neighboring Estonian and, with regards to 
culture, Russian regions. Thus, the discourse on the Ida-Virumaa environment is one of 
exclusion with an emphasis on the longevity and unchangeability of this exclusion.  
Physical Interaction Discourse  
 The final discourse revolves around the physical interaction with ethnic Estonians and 
Russians. This discourse was also one that was primarily focused on exclusion. Those that 
identified opportunities to have closer contact with ethnic Estonians indicated a need to travel 
outside of Ida-Virumaa to meet this engagement. With the exception of a few references to 
recent events, this lack of contact was also a result of insufficient attractions within Ida-
Virumaa to bring ethnic Estonians into the region. The discourse on the Estonian side dealt 
mostly with the recognition that daily activities occurred without the need or ability to interact, 
highlighting what was perceived as economic and ethnic discrimination by the Russian-
speaking Estonians. On a similar note, there is a sense of exclusion from contact with ethnic 
Russians, however the focus seems to be more on the economic and political advantages this 
connection would provide for Russian-speaking Estonians than on a sense of discrimination. 
While the interviewees expressed desires to increase interaction with ethnic Russians in Estonia 
(mainly by increasing tourism) and in Russia (through more accessible border control policies) 
the discourse does not emphasize the social exclusion from Russian society as the primary 
concern. It is rather a concern that less interaction with Ethnic Russians will disadvantage 
Russian-speaking Estonians economically – it would be a missed opportunity to maximize their 
duality. Overall, the discourse is one focused on exclusion with the community offering 
suggests that would increase their interaction with ethnic Estonians and Russians to improve 
                                                             
196 “Марафон летний собирает до нескольких тысяч. И многие приезжают, кто не был никогда в Нарве. 
Они открывают для себя. И потом всегда был стереотип, на протяжении 20 лет, что Нарва это очень 
опасный город. И вот эстонцы как раз, которые приезжают сюда, как раз и говорят о том, что с этим 
прощаются стереотипом.” (Interviewee #12, P4, Q6) 
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their social inclusion in Estonian society and their economic position as unique individuals 
capable of interacting with ethnic Russians.  
Conclusions from the Discourse Analysis 
The three primary discourses concerning how the Russian-speaking Estonians evaluate 
their socio-spatial inclusion focused heavily on the significant exclusion they experience as a 
community. Initially, these feelings of exclusion not only seem to provide further support for 
Tajfel’s social identity theory focused on conflict orientation where the community defines 
itself (the ingroup) in opposition to the surrounding societies (outgroups), but also suggest that 
the community may have weak feelings of belongingness for both countries. A closer review 
of the discourses however, reveals a commonality among the responses that indicates a rather 
strong sense of belongingness to Estonia. Within each of the discourses is a consistent proposal 
to address the issue and improve Russian-speaking Estonians’ inclusion in society with Estonia, 
not Russia. For example, the discourse on education concentrated heavily on proposals to 
improve the ability to study Estonian as a means of improving social inclusion. When education 
in Russian was addressed, the emphasis was placed on improving its use and acceptance in 
Estonia as a way to improve Russian-speaking Estonians’ status and opportunities, not as a 
means to access Russian society. Education in general was considered a desired objective 
among many of the respondents because of the opportunities it allowed for future success, yet 
education in Russia was rarely mentioned as a means to achieve this goal. The key to resolving 
the education discourse according to the interviewees lies in Estonia, not in Russia. Within the 
discourse concerning the environment of Ida-Virumaa, we can also see a similar focus on 
improving the inclusion within Estonian society. Economically, the interviewees continually 
compared themselves to the conditions of others in Estonia and Europe, even with Ivangorod, 
their sister city right across the bridge, few comparisons were made with Russia. Discussions 
of the political corruptness of Ida-Virumaa likened an improvement of the situation to western 
and European countries and a worsening of the situation to approaching situations in Russia. 
This preference for comparing themselves to other areas in Estonia was also observed when 
discussing the cultural exclusion of Ida-Virumaa, again suggesting that the objective was to be 
more like the rest of Estonia. In the final discourse and solutions proposed by the interviewees 
on physical contact with ethnic Estonians and Russians, a cursory observation seems to indicate 
a balance in the desire to improve contact with ethnic Estonians (school programs traveling to 
other parts of Estonia) and ethnic Russians (improve border relations and ease restrictions to 
facilitate better interaction). However, cross-border relations only superficially focus on 
improving contact with Russians, the focus is primarily on improving the economic benefits 
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for the community. As interviewee #16 explained, the second recommendation to improve the 
region is by improving “…relations with Russia, because Ida-Virumaa it’s right next door to 
Russia. That means, the better the relationship with Russia, the better for the Narvans.”197 
Thus the goal is similar to what was observed with improving the Russian language, not as a 
means to seek better inclusion in Russian society, rather as a way to improve the condition of 
the Russian-speaking Estonian community in relation to the rest of Estonia.  
These discourses suggest a strong desire among the Russian-speaking Estonians to 
improve their relationship with Estonia, making it of higher importance and suggesting that the 
Russian-speaking Estonians are situated closer on the scale of belongingness to Estonia. The 
fact that there were opportunities to improve belongingness with Russia (schooling in Russia, 
increased travel/trips to Russia) but the interviewees did not suggest or introduce these 
proposals indicates that belongingness for the community is focused more on Estonia. There is 
a clear motivation and desire for greater inclusion as well as economic and cultural 
improvement vis-à-vis Estonia. Now that we have established a) how the interviewees perceive 
themselves and the Russian-speaking community and b) the country with whom the 
interviewees have a greater belongingness, we can conclude with general assessments about 
what this information indicates about the Russian-speaking community’s role and influence at 
the national level.  
 
Section 4. Discussions and Recommendations  
 
This research has discovered that the Russian-speaking Estonians consider themselves 
as having embraced their duality; psychologically, linguistically and culturally. We have also 
discovered that although they declare that they have formed a community that is unique from 
its surrounding environment, functioning almost as a bridge between Estonia and Russia, they 
still show a greater sense of belongingness to Estonia. But what does this mean for the 
community moving forward? What can Russian and Estonian take from this research? Can the 
self-perceptions of Russian-speaking Estonians be applied to other Russian-speaking 
communities outside of Russia? Using the analysis on self-perception and belongingness, we 
will offer conclusions on what this information tells us about the community’s willingness to 
mobilize to address the identified issues of exclusion and offer recommendations for both 
countries to consider when considering the Russian-speaking population. These discussions 
                                                             
197 “…отношения с Россией, потому что Ида-Вирумаа, оно прям вот соседствует с Россией. То есть чем 
лучше отношения с Россией, тем лучше для нарвитян.” (Interviewee #16, P4, Q7) 
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will also provide a starting point for future research to further explore how intercultural 
encounters shape social, economic and political frameworks of the modern world.  
 
4.1 Thoughts on Community Mobilization  
The discovery of who the community considers itself to be and where they feel they 
belong has brought to light many of the issues that challenge the Russian-speaking Estonians’ 
sense of inclusion in both Estonian and Russian society, as well as the interviewees’ opinions 
on solutions addressing exclusion and discrimination. The interviewees’ self-reflection on the 
community and discourses on belongingness revealed a sense of duality and an expectation of 
personal responsibility among Russian-speaking Estonians to meet the challenges of their 
unique situation. Finally, although we assessed their belongingness to favor Estonia, discourse 
surrounding their socio-spatial inclusion focused heavily on perpetual exclusion, particularly 
as a result of Ida-Virumaa’s poor environment. The interviewees repeatedly offered examples 
of successful integration, inclusion and progress, but the majority of the examples occurred 
outside of Ida-Virumaa:  language immersion in other areas of Estonia198, improved job 
opportunities for Russian-speakers outside of Ida-Virumaa199, better integration between ethnic 
Estonians and Russian-speaking Estonians in Tallinn200 or greater cultural and business 
opportunities in Tartu.201 Perhaps more telling, some interviewees suggested that this would 
always be the case for the Russian-speaking community in Ida-Virumaa. In the words of 
interviewee #16,  
And now this situation in Ida-Viraumaa has been going on for a very long time, 
that nothing is changing, well, that is stagnation. And this is the difference 
between Russians who do not live in Ida-Virumaa, and Russians who live in 
other parts of Estonia, that is, they have more opportunities. And those Russians 
who distance themselves from the government, are all types of active people, 
they either do their own thing here, or simply leave from here. The second 
option, unfortunately, is more popular.202    
 
                                                             
198 (Interviewee #12, P4, Q6 and Interviewee #10, P4, Q7) 
199 (Interviewee #16, P4, Q6) 
200 (Interviewee #13, P4, Q12) 
201 (Interviewee #5, P4, Q7) 
202 “И сейчас такая ситуация в Ида-Вирумаа уже очень давно, что ничего не меняется, ну то есть 
стагнация. И вот это вот отличие между русскими, которые живут не в Ида-Вирумаа, и русскими, 
которые живут в других частях Эстонии, то есть у них больше возможностей. А те русские, которые не 
связывают себя полностью от правительства, они такие всякие активные, то они либо здесь делают что-




This continuation of unsatisfactory conditions even though the interviewees suggested 
that the community had clearly identified the problems as well as many viable solutions, is 
noteworthy. The interviewees consistently indicated that they held an expectation for Russian-
speaking Estonians to take personal responsibility in improving their situation. Key to their 
success was embracing their duality and mediating between Russia and Estonia – respecting 
both cultures, providing insight on perspectives and opinions of both sides and improving 
communication between the Russian and Estonian languages. But, analyzing the interviewees’ 
responses, supported by historical observations, indicates that Russian-speaking Estonians are 
hesitant to operate on a more collective level to achieve this improvement and mediation on 
behalf of the entire Russian-speaking community. For example, interviewee #9 self-identified 
as an individual who has operated in-between the notion of Russian and Estonian since 
childhood, speaks Russian and Estonian fluently, and has claimed that “we need more…people 
acting as bridges between the two countries.”203. But interviewee #9 did not consider herself 
to be capable of serving as such a bridge on a community level: “I think I’m in the middle and 
I don’t want to interfere…. But if I’m asked I would …I would give my opinion…But I’m not 
active enough to be the bridge person.”204 A final reference to Estonia’s Bronze Soldier 
incident in 2007, an event considered by many a threat to the Russian-speaking community’s 
culture and history in Estonia, is another telling example of this non-existent community 
mobilization within Ida-Virumaa. Olga Davydova analyzed the media coverage and activities 
against the move of the Bronze Soldier to identify the primary actors and their main reasons 
for opposing the removal of a soviet-era statue. She reported that,  
Absent from this interpretation is the problematic situation of ethnically non-
Estonian Russian speakers, whose push for equality with ethnic Estonian 
citizens during the creation of the Estonian nation could have been a very 
strong factor in the background of the protest against the removal of the 
monument (2008, 396). 
 
Aside from general coverage in the media during the months immediately following the 
incident, after the Bronze Soldier was moved, little was heard from the Russian-speaking 
Estonians. An event, played out on an international stage and offering the greatest visibility to 
the community to voice its concerns, offer solutions and begin activating their duality for the 
region did not yield any formidable mobilization from the community. Or perhaps more 
accurately, the community’s desire to improve their situation in relation to ethnic Estonians did 
                                                             
203 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q7) 
204 (Interviewee #9, P4, Q7) 
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not drive them to unite and voice their opinions to the Estonian government or even turn to the 
Russian government for support in improving their situation.  
This lack of community mobilization was particularly evident among the interviewees 
when answering the question, “Who do you think best understands or articulates Narva and 
Ida-Virumaa’s needs or issues?”(P4, Q8), where interviewees declared that change in Ida-
Virumaa needed to be initiated by “those of us from this region” (сами жители), but at the 
same time, the interviewees had difficulty naming a specific person actually making those 
changes. The most frequently referenced names when asked to provide a name or organization 
that is actively working to address issues in Narva and Ida-Virumaa (P4, Q12) were the former 
and current University of Tartu Narva College directors, Katri Raik and Kristina Kallas 
respectively205. Both were praised for making significant efforts to draw attention to and 
improve the poor conditions of Ida-Virumaa – but neither were considered “сами жители”. 
Interviewee #5 stated, “Katri Rake. This woman is absolutely Estonian. But she sincerely and 
wholeheartedly loves Narva and did a very great job here. It's like in the Middle Ages when 
the church went somewhere, it carried light and enlightenment. Similarly, Katri Rake [arrived 
here].”206 Kristina Kallas was similarly lauded but she was also seen as an outsider although 
she considers herself from a mixed Russian and Estonian family. Interviewee #9 stated plainly 
that, “the people who, who have been here, doing the Estonian thing, so to say. To, to keeping 
the culture alive, are the ones who have come from Tartu or other parts of Estonia.”207 In total, 
very few individuals were identified as working on a communal level to improve Ida-Virumaa 
and the ones who were mentioned did not grow up in Ida-Virumaa, even though the 
interviewees’ themselves declared that only someone from within the community could best 
understand how to fix their unique issues. Armed with a better understanding of the people and 
their perceptions of belonging, we can now suggest two explanations for this lack of 
mobilization from within the community: an internal conflict between individual and collective 
identity orientation and an individual approach to resolving conflict between the in-group 
versus the outgroup.  
                                                             
205 The fact that a majority of the interviews were held on the Narva College campus and many of the 
respondents likely interacted with these two individuals is a significant factor in explaining why these two 
names were mentioned. However, these names are also well known throughout Estonia, particularly in politics, 
for their significant efforts to improve the conditions for the Russian-speaking Estonians in Ida-Virumaa. 
206 “Катри Райк. Это женщина абсолютно эстонская. Но которая искренне и всем сердцем любит именно 
Нарву и сделала здесь очень большую работу. Это как в свое время в Средневековье, когда куда-то 
приходила церковь, она несла за собой свет и просвещение. Точно так же и Катри Райк.” (Interviewee #5, 
P4, Q12) 
207 (Interviewee #5, P4, Q7) 
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Internal Identity Orientation 
As discussed earlier, using the four leading models in psychological identity formation, 
the Russian-speaking Estonians self-perceived identity lies somewhere between the individual 
“me” and collective “we”. Commonalities and characteristics tended to favor Estonians on a 
personal level but Russians on a collective level (particularly when the roles in which they are 
functioning are influenced by Russian family). Based on their relationship with Estonia, the 
interviewees described themselves as being proactive and orderly-focused as well as having a 
strong sense of individual responsibility to meet or exceed defined goals, thus suggesting that 
Russian-speaking Estonians may seek to change their environment or correct social injustices 
by taking an individual approach. Meanwhile, the collective “we” characteristics seen as being 
inherited from their relationship with Russia, were described as being more chaotic, creative, 
reactive (act, then think) and passive, particularly with regards to the soviet mentality where 
citizens would wait for the government to provide rather than act (reference interviewee #5’s 
comments on Russian mentality during section 2.3, “Opportunity and Individual 
Responsibility”208). The descriptions of these collective characteristics suggest that when 
Russian-speaking Estonians do operate as a group, their efforts, cooperation and approach will 
exhibit a more chaotic, unorganized and reactive nature, resembling a soviet-era community in 
need of top-down and external guidance to achieve collective goals. Perhaps for this reason, 
leadership from individuals outside the community like Katri Raik or Kristina Kallas have been 
successful. Moreover, since we have concluded that the interviewees demonstrated a greater 
belongingness to Estonia, and that the social distance between ethic Estonians is continuously 
decreasing among younger Russian-speaking Estonians and ethnic Estonians, we can conclude 
that the actions of Russian-speaking Estonians will likely continue to focus on the individual 
level or the “I”/ “Me” level, with a lesser emphasis on collective orientation or unification.  
Group Conflict Orientation 
Using Tajfel’s Social Identity theory, we can also suggest a second explanation for this 
lack of community mobilization. When discussing Tajfel’s theory we determined that the 
interviewees isolation from both Estonians and Russians as a result of discrimination and 
restricted social interaction causes the interviewees to view themselves as a unique ingroup, in 
opposition to the outgroups (ethnic Estonians and ethnic Russians). Tajfel’s theory claims that 
this orientation often leads to conflict between the ingroup and outgroup, particularly when 
these outgroups are regarded as higher-status groups (Ashmore and Jussim 1997, 115). As we 
                                                             
208 (Interviewee #5, Additional Comments, Lines 331-335) 
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have shown however, there is little mobilization from the Russian-speaking Estonians to 
compete against or challenge the outgroups. We would expect the Russian-speaking Estonians 
to challenge the higher-status group of Estonians in particular given the large amount of 
exclusion and injustice attributed to this outgroup discovered during the interviews. Ashmore 
and Jussim suggest however, that this group-level conflict orientation may not always result in 
a full community mobilization because individuals in the lower-group “who perceive 
differential group evaluations as legitimate and group boundaries as permeable may try to move 
into the higher-status group” (Ibid., 115). In this case, the theorists explain that community 
mobilization is avoided when two conditions are met. Firstly, members of the in-group 
(Russian-speaking Estonians) must agree that the division between them and the out-group is 
a legitimate one. In this research, interviewees expressed complete agreement that they were 
different from ethnic Estonians for a number of undeniable and natural reasons, most notably 
language and ethnicity. Secondly, the boundary between the ingroup and outgroup must be 
permeable, meaning the individual can transition from one group to another through self-
adaptation. Interviewees highlighted that on an individual level, when Russian-speaking 
Estonians choose to learn Estonian and integrate, then they are accepted (albeit slowly at times) 
into the larger Estonian society. Reviewing the many examples provided in this research, we 
can conclude that the focus on individual responsibility to meet the requirements for better 
integration highlights this approach as the most prevalent among the interviewees and likely 
among many of the Russian-Speaking Estonians of Ida-Virumaa.  
Ashmore and Jussim thus suggest that we can only expect to observe a community level 
mobilization among the Russian-speaking Estonians when group boundaries are perceived as 
illegitimate and impermeable. They argue that in this case,  
collective strategies come into play, with group members jointly seeking (1) to 
change the evaluation of the comparison criterion, (2) to make a different 
positive and distinctive criterion salient, or (3) to shift comparisons to a 
different out-group (Ibid., 115). 
 
Within Ida-Virumaa, the group boundaries of economic opportunities, job-market equality, and 
equal education opportunities in ones’ own native language were perceived as illegitimate 
boundaries between the Russian-speaking Estonians and ethnic Estonians. Here again however, 
the interviewees indicated that the boundaries were not impermeable: the harder an individual 
worked to improve their Estonian language, the more equal their wages and opportunities in 
higher education. Therefore, the perception given by the interviewees is that individual actions 
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can overcome the unjust boundaries separating Russian-speaking Estonians from ethnic 
Estonians, therefore there is again no need to mobilize on a community level.  
Interviewees descriptions of change within the community, particularly from the 
younger generation, however indicate that there may also be an associated change to group 
mobilization occurring. The interviews suggested that the generational change within the 
community is yielding members that are more focused on embracing their duality and defining 
themselves and the community as being in a position of opportunity to serve as a mediator 
between Russia and Estonia. It is here we find support for Ashmore and Jussim’s final corollary 
on group mobilization which occurs “when boundaries appear to be illegitimate but 
changeable” at which point, the Russian-speaking Estonians could mobilize to “challenge the 
hierarchical structure itself, initiating direct social competition with the higher-status group” 
(Ibid., 115). In essence, through embracing their duality, they can raise the importance and 
value of their ingroup to challenge the inequalities previously encountered as a “non-integrated 
Russian-speaking Estonian from Ida-Virumaa”. Quoting Thoits and Virshup, Ashmore and 
Jussim explain that,  
[E]ach individual usually adds their own unique style and flourishes to 
societally prescribed roles and to their identifications with collectivities. When 
enough people change how they enact a role, the personal can change the social 
structure. For example, the dramatic increase in the number of working women 
over the last 30 years has fundamentally changed how many Americans think 
about women's roles, even though whether to work is primarily an individual-
level, personal decision (1997, 224). 
 
Therefore, the future of community mobilization for the Russian-speaking Estonians seems to 
be one of opportunity and hope. If Russian-speaking Estonians continue to embrace their 
duality and the community focuses on capitalizing on their uniqueness as a “bridge” between 
two societies and cultures we can expect to see a community that may no longer need external 
leadership to generate change in the face of social exclusion and discrimination.  
 
4.2. Other Means to Identify Self-perception, Belongingness and Mobilization 
Researcher and ethnographer Henry Mainsah suggests that the virtual world of social 
media and the Internet, may offer communities that are negotiating between two cultures a 
space to address the conflict between in and out groups. Indeed, statistical research completed 
by different organizations indicates that the use of the Internet and social media continues to 
rise worldwide, particularly within Europe and the United States (Perrin 2015, Kotzeva 2017), 
adding validity to the increased role and importance of virtual space.  
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This aspect of virtual space however, only briefly surfaced during the interviews in 
response to Part 4, Question 9, “Do you feel that there are appropriate channels through which 
you can voice unique concerns to the Estonian government about matters that pertain to your 
quality of life?”. Interviewee #2 stated,  
“We have only one app. And we can … report on the problems such as, ‘Here 
we have a hole in the asphalt.’ ‘Here we have garbage can knocked over.’ And 
that's all. We cannot talk about life. […it is an] app [called] ‘Let me know’. 
You do not have this? We have it. That is, we go online and say - there is a hole. 
And they can fix this hole.”209 
 
The increased importance that the internet and social media play within society today may be 
the reason that the Estonian government created the web-based application “Let me Know” 
(Anna Teada in Estonian), in an effort to offer a modern way for individuals to identify issues 
and express dissatisfaction directly to the Estonian government. According to the description 
found on the Google Play website where the application can be downloaded, this app “enables 
you to notify municipalities of problems that you have found, such as a garbage heap, an open 
well, a streetlamp out of order, a hole in the street etc.” (2018, 1). As Interviewee #2 stated, it 
only handles concrete issues and does not serve as a place of discourse about life. The lack of 
reference to the site coupled with the skepticism of the site’s usefulness for resolving societal 
issues, we can conclude that this virtual space is relatively ineffective as a place to discuss the 
social issues identified by the community in this research. Mainsah’s research argues that it is 
not just any space that contributes to community unity and self-exploration, rather it is the 
virtual space created by the minority community itself that plays a vital role in identity 
formation and belongingness.  
The Article “Young African Norwegian women and diaspora: Negotiating identity and 
community through digital social networks” by Henry Mainsah describes research conducted 
to analyze how the virtual space, and its intersection with the physical space, may serve as a 
new medium through which minority communities can unite to express their uniqueness as 
individuals who live between two cultures. Henry Mainsah’s study provides some of the initial 
research into how the current environment of mass migration, changing political borders, and 
increased globalization have created the conditions for minority communities to come together 
online to interact:  
                                                             
209 “We have only one app. And we can … сообщить о проблемах таких. Вот здесь у нас яма в асфальте. 
Здесь у нас мусор может быть разбросан. И все. О жизни мы не можем. […это] app. «Дай знать». У вас 
такого нет? А у нас есть. То есть мы заходим в интернет и говорим – тут яма. И они могут это ну как бы 




Digital and online media such as social network sites, blogs, online 
communities, role-playing games and media sharing sites – where people can 
create, publish and share media content – have increasingly become part of the 
media ecology of our societies. These media are altering the landscape of 
representation by providing new spaces and new tools for users to produce a 
public presence and by providing opportunities for public communication 
(2014, 106). 
 
Citing previous researchers (Daniels 2013; Nakamura and Chow-White 2011; Parker and Song 
2009), Mainsah argues that, “The prevailing view among scholars is that the Internet is a site 
for identity construction and community formation around racial and ethnic identity” (2014, 
107). With this hypothesis, Mainsah uses two in-depth interviews with Madi and Naima to 
discuss how members of the African community living in Norway navigate between identity 
and belongingness associated with their country of residence, Norway and their location of 
ethnic origin, Africa (specifically Congo and Nigeria). Mainsah’s research concluded that the 
online space allowed the interviewees to feel comfortable and safe in expressing their 
uniqueness, offered an ability to interact with the larger minority community despite physical 
separation and allowed the community to challenge the validity of discourses generated by the 
larger society. Similar to the experiences of Madi and Naima, members of the Russian-speaking 
community of Narva are likely able to capitalize on the virtual space social media and the 
Internet afford a community searching to express itself, particularly regarding the uniqueness 
of existing between two cultures.  
Mainsah’s first interviewee, Madi, explained that the use of Facebook created “a safe 
black space […] to find a place where we could share black thought, love, life, sharing 
experiences [and] to witness” (Mainsah 2014, 111). Russian-speaking Estonians provided 
multiple examples where their surrounding environment was one that promoted exclusion 
(places within Estonia outside of Ida-Virumaa) and discomfort (travels within Russia). An 
online community offers Russian-speaking Estonians the ability to converse in their native 
tongue with other Russian-speakers in other areas of Estonia, without activating sentiments of 
discrimination or exclusion from ethnic Estonians. Similarly, the community would be able to 
interact with ethnic Russians in Russia without incurring the described feelings of 
uncomfortableness discussed in Section 3.2. “Place Belongingness” when physically traveling 
to Russia.  
 Social media was also described in Mainsah’s study as a place “for connecting with a 
wider global network of communities of affect and interest” (Mainsah 2014, 111). The 
opportunity to connect with a wider network in the case of the Russian-speaking Estonians is 
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twofold: increased interaction with other Russian-speakers within Estonia and interaction with 
other Russian-speaking communities living outside of Russia. While Section 2.2 of this 
research (“Institutional Connections”) showed that the interviewees exhibited limited feelings 
of similarity with the Russian-speaking community in Georgia, Mainsah suggests that online 
spaces may allow differing communities to connect and develop a relationship in accordance 
with Gajjala’s (2010) concept of ‘contact zone’: a social space in which ‘peoples 
geographically and historically separated come into contact with each other and establish 
ongoing relations’ (Pratt 1992: 6 as cited in Mainsah 2014, 112). The extension of the 
community network to other Russian-speakers outside of Estonia may encourage unity based 
on cognitive alignment between the Russian-speaking Estonians and the larger Russian-
speaking community to which they ascribe -Turner’s Social Identity theory - (Ashmore and 
Jussim 1997, 118) based on the commonality of duality discovered by Kallas (2016) and 
Cheskin (2013) in Estonia and Latvia respectively.  
The virtual spaces created by Russian-speaking Estonians also allows ethnic Estonians 
and ethnic Russians to engage in the discourses they promote or support. Drawing a comparison 
to discourses surrounding black identity, Mainsah explains how the internet opens the discourse 
to those who do not necessarily consider themselves a member of the minority community, but 
their interaction facilitates the process of identity formation and belongingness:  
the Internet functions as a kind of space that encourages intimate discursive 
interaction, similar to the way Black barber shops and beauty salons in the US 
allowed spaces for identity discourses between Black men and women, and also 
opens these formerly private spaces to non-Blacks who contribute to the 
articulation of black identity online (Mainsah 2014, 107). 
 
The extension of the discourses about the Russian-speakers’ self-perception and belongingness 
to the virtual space gives voice to these discourses within the larger Estonian and Russian 
societies. This not only offers the Russian-speaking community a position of strength from 
which to express themselves, but it also encourages interaction between the societies which 
can serve to remove misconceptions and stereotypes.  
 Finally, Mainsah’s ethnography suggests that online spaces offer the opportunity to 
question majority-generated discourses. He provides an anecdote from Naima’s experiences of 
posting comments that challenged the mainstream “anti-racist discourses” within Norwegian 
society. Mainsah suggests that “[t]he quotes, videos and other images on Naima’s profiles on 
Facebook and on Tumblr form a sort of bricolage of cultural signs that in this context become 
useful as ‘diasporic resources’ (Brown 1998) for making statements about identity” (Mainsah 
2014, 115). As Russian-speaking Estonians search for ways to increase the value of their 
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duality and counter the afore mentioned stereotypes – Ida-Virumaa is unsafe or Russian-
speaking Estonians are unwilling to learn Estonian – online discourses can be shaped to support 
these efforts and counter exclusionary discourses.  
While Mainsah’s study concludes that online space can unite a community, give it voice 
and perhaps help the community mobilize, the study also indicates that the ability to transcend 
physical and political borders through online communities could introduce exposure to more 
radical minority communities around the world: “[Madi’s] ‘routings’ stretched to include not 
just peoples of African ancestry but also racialized minorities around the world” (Mainsah 
2014, 112). The introduction of other influences on the Russian-speaking community of Ida-
Virumaa aside from the Russian and Estonian societies analyzed during this study has the 
potential to significantly alter the self-perception of the Russian-speaking Estonians and their 
sense of belongingness, perhaps changing the dynamics of the community’s approach to 
mobilization. The combination of the rising trend in internet use and the generational 
preference among Russian-speaking Estonians to seek to embrace their duality and raise the 
value of Russian-speaking Estonians vis-à-vis Estonia and Russia suggest that future studies 
aimed at identifying how, in what way and through what means the Russian-speaking Etonian 
community may be mobilizing should seriously consider analyzing the digital aspects of the 
community members’ lives. 
 
4.3. How Might Estonia and Russia Interpret this Research?  
This research deliberately focuses on the Russian-speaking Estonian’s perspective in 
an effort to provide greater understanding to a perspective that has received little attention until 
recently. The primary intent of this research is to offer perceptions and conclusions that can be 
used to better understand the greater environment within which the Russian-speaking Estonians 
exist, that is, Estonian and Russian relations. Both countries have harbored concerns about how 
the community perceives their environment and enacted policies based on broad assumptions 
or economic-focused statistics which do not capture Russian-speaking Estonians’ perceptions, 
desires and allegiances. But this research has shed light on some of these fears and revealed 
that perhaps both countries should reevaluate their understanding of the Russian-speaking 
Estonians. Equipped with a better understanding of the community’s perspectives and self-
assessments, the discoveries of this research provide a new starting point for evaluating how 
the two countries might analyze and alter their roles in influencing the community’s self-
identification and sense of belongingness. This would be particularly advantageous at the 
national level since, as noted at the beginning of this research, both countries have recognized 
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the validity of the complex interdependence theory and consequently the role that the Russian-
speaking Estonian community plays in countries’ larger national objectives.  
Key Take-away Points for Russia and Estonia 
Among the many topics presented by the interviewees, education is one that offers 
opportunities for both countries. Interviewees indicated a desire to continue advanced level 
education where the primary language of instruction is Russian. Although Estonia continues to 
strengthen the position of the Estonian language in an effort to protect a language and a 
population that are significantly smaller in relation to its Russian neighbor, there is an 
advantage to establishing and offering a higher education university taught in Russian. Estonia 
has the necessary linguistic infrastructure, cultural knowledge, and demand for such an 
endeavor. Most importantly, such a venture would place Estonia on the world map as the 
leading Russian-language university in Europe, based on a European structure and with the 
corresponding European accreditation system. In other words, this university would be an 
attractive destination for other Russian-language focused students worldwide searching to 
deepen their knowledge and use of the Russian language but cannot, will not or prefer not to 
travel to Russia for a multitude of reasons including unfamiliarity with the country or home-
country restrictions. Tying entry requirements into such a Russian University program to 
proficiency in a second language based on citizenship could help combat Estonian fears of 
reverting back to an either Russian or Estonian approach to education within its society 
(Estonian citizens must demonstrate a high proficiency in the Estonian language while 
international students must have a high proficiency in English for example).  
Likewise, higher education in the Russian language provides an opportunity for Russia 
to not only strengthen relations with Russian-speaking Estonians but also address a separate 
“brain-drain” dilemma within Russia.210 Offering advanced degree opportunities in Russia for 
Russian-speaking Estonians (or all Russian-speakers that are citizens of former soviet states) 
could introduce young talent into Russia and establish a means by which these Russian-
speakers become familiar with Russia and its people, dispelling the fears and unfamiliarity that 
many of the interviewees in this research cited as discomforting when traveling to Russia. 
Moreover, if efforts are made to make the study program advantageous (less red tape, cost 
efficient student visas, scholarships based on high-priority fields of employment) Russia has 
the opportunity to tie such an education initiative in Russia with its repatriation policy.  With 
                                                             
210 For more on the Russian “brain-drain” issue, see Timmothy Heleniak’s “Migration Dilemmas Haunt Post-
Soviet Russia”. The Online Journal of the Migration Policy Institute. 2002 and The International Organization 
for Migration’s Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: 2001-2002 Review.  
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this approach, Russia could begin to address its well-known negative demographic dilemma 
within society and the labor force – an original objective of the repatriation policy, which 
ultimately failed because it was unable to attract former soviet citizens and their families away 
from a prospective future in Europe.211 If Russian-speaking Estonians become familiar with 
the Russian education system, live in Russia during their studies, and perhaps even find 
employment opportunities upon graduation within Russia, this policy could generate renewed 
interest in repatriation to Russia. As cited in this research, this type of exchange between Russia 
and Russian-speaking Estonians would also meet many other concerns referenced by the 
interviewees:  better cross-border relations, increased interaction with ethnic Russians and 
more opportunities to use their native tongue for future job employment.  
Culture is another avenue by which Russia and Estonia can address the Russian-
speaking Estonians’ desire for greater inclusion through entertainment and activities within 
Ida-Virumaa. For Estonia, some of the interviewees indicated that this is already in the 
beginning stages with the introduction of marathons or the arrangement of concerts and 
functions at the Narva College, thereby introducing Estonians from other regions to Ida-
Virumaa, dispelling stereotypes about who the Russian-speaking Estonians are and increasing 
the interaction between ethnic Estonians and Russian-speaking Estonians212. Russia’s Russkiy 
Mir program however, is also positioned to capitalize on the community’s cultural needs. 
Money allocated from Russia in support of these cultural outreach programs could seek to 
encourage sponsoring and hosting events that attract those that are not of Russian ethnicity 
within Estonia to the Ida-Virumaa region to promote the exchange of culture and understanding 
between Russians and Estonians. Russia could also seek to bring cultural entertainment from 
Russia to Estonia that resonates with Russian-speaking Estonians, particularly those in the 
younger generations or create cultural visas that are economically smart to encourage those 
from Ida-Virumaa to travel to Russia for cultural events in neighboring towns and cities. These 
efforts would bolster the interaction between ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Estonians, 
particularly among those who have had little to no personal contact with Russia directly.  
                                                             
211 For more on Russia’s negative demographics issue, see “Russia Beckons, But Diaspora Wary”. The Online 
Journal of the Migration Policy Institute (2002) by Timmothy Heleniak; The International Organization for 
Migration’s Migration Trends in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: 2001-2002 Review; “Population mobility in 
the Commonwealth of independent states: Whither common migration policy?”  CARIM-East research report, 
CMR Working Papers, No. 74/132 (2014) and “Russia: A Migration System with Soviet Roots.” The Online 
Journal of the Migration Policy Institute (2017) by Olga Chudinovskikh and Mikhail Denisenko; and “The State 
Program for Assistance to the Voluntary Resettlement of Compatriots Living Abroad to the Russian Federation” 
(2006) at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/16483. 
212 (Interviewee #9 answering P4, Q7 and Interviewee #3 answering P4, Q7) 
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As a final recommendation, both countries should be sensitive to the uniqueness and 
duality of the Russian-speaking Estonians. The terms “Russian” and “Compatriot” have 
multiple connotations and are not received by all of the Russian-speaking Estonian community 
in a way that promotes cohesiveness or inclusion. Whether in national policies, media 
broadcasts, or cultural outreaches, both countries should be aware of the discourse that 
surrounds the terms used to describe this community. Given the low resonance with the 
interviewees in this research and the lack of inter-identification between the various Russian-
speaking communities in the PSS, Russia in particular should consider addressing the 
uniqueness of each community within the broader compatriot policy. Without this specification 
and compounded by the weakening of ties caused by cross-border restrictions, dying family 
members in Russia, and a strengthening of belongingness with a host country, Russia can only 
expect the term “compatriot” to become less and less effective.  
The solutions available to both countries require a change to their current approaches. 
Both countries must first understand what the Russian-speaking community wants and how it 
perceives inclusion and exclusion before these opportunities become available. Despite present 
perspectives on social distance and belongingness, the country which seeks to understand the 
community better will be better positioned to positively influence the community and shape 
future perceptions and relations.  
Is the Minority a Threat?  
In addition to spotting opportunities for both governments, this research also challenges 
popular perceptions about the Russian-speaking community used in Estonian and Russian 
national discourse: 1) claims that Russian-speaking Estonians identify as compatriots of Russia 
who desire support from Russia to protect them from Estonian discrimination and 2) claims 
that Russian-speaking Estonians pose a threat to Estonia’s internal security because those 
concentrated along the border with Russia would be agreeable to rejoining Russia. As a clear 
counter to these claims, the interviewees indicated that any blanket categorizing term to 
encompass the community did not account for their uniqueness and complexity and failed to 
accurately describe how the interviewees viewed themselves and the larger Russian-speaking 
community in Estonia. This applied to the term “соотечественников” (used primarily from 
the Russian perspective) as well as the stand-alone descriptor of “Russian” (used by Ethnic 
Estonians to describe all Russian-speakers in Estonia regardless of their ethnic origins). As 
Kristina Kallas explained during the Deep Baltic panel discussion, the use of all-encompassing 
terms is likely a result of former soviet practices where the Soviet Union, composed of 
numerous sub-ethnicities and cultures, had to find a way to unite the population. “It’s easier to 
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put it [ethnicity] into one picture than seventeen different pictures” (2017, 21). In addition to 
being too broad and non-descriptive, the term compatriot specifically evoked no real sense of 
connection from the interviewees. This disassociation made it difficult for the interviewees to 
relate to the actions done by the Russian government for said “соотечественников”. On a 
separate note, even if the interviewees had felt that the term compatriot referred to them, their 
perception about how to handle Estonian discrimination did not reference greater support from 
Russia. Instead, the interviewees stressed how the Russian-speaking community or the 
Estonian government could improve the situation, not Russia. This significantly weakens 
claims that Russia can act in defense of the Russian-speaking community when said community 
does not seek, desire or consider necessary Russia’s help.  
As far as fears for Estonia’s internal security, there were only two references to the 
compatriot act and its associated repatriation policy. Interviewee #12 said: “Now it is said that 
they want to offer citizenship or a residence permit to all those who were born in Russia. But 
even if something is done, it is rare. But maybe it's just that I'm not informed”213 and 
interviewee #14 said: “I know that there are special programs, programs to support 
compatriots. And there are different integration courses there. But how, to make it affect my 
life, I do not know, I find it difficult to answer.”214 If the lack of references is not enough to 
highlight this disassociation, interviewees #12 and #14 also support their mention of the 
policies with comments underlining their inapplicability. The weak connection with these 
policies suggest one or a combination of the following reasons: a lack of information reaching 
the audience, lack of its applicability to the Russian-speakers of Narva, or a complete 
disinterest in the subject - meaning perhaps that it is not seen as any sort of improvement in 
their life. In all of these cases, Estonia’s fear that Russian-speaking Estonians seek to rejoin 
Russia seems to be no longer valid. The interviewees make it clear that although there is still 
an appreciation for Russia’s efforts to protect their language, culture and history from 
persecution, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the community collectively desires to 
return to Russia. This conclusion supports Kristina Kallas’ findings discussed in her article 
published in Volume 15 of the Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe in which 
                                                             
213 “Сейчас говорится о том, что хотят предложить гражданство или вид на жительство всем, кто 
родился в России. Но даже если что-то делается, то редко. Но возможно, это потому просто, что я не 
информирована.” (Interviewee #12, P3, Q1c) 
214 “я знаю, что есть специальные программы, программы поддержки соотечественников. И разные там 
интеграционные курсы. Но как, чтобы оно повлияло именно на жизнь, я не знаю, я затрудняюсь 
ответить.” (Interviewee #14, P3, Q1c) 
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she referenced a statement made by the leader of the Russian-language media in Estonia during 
an interview on August 25, 2015: 
The younger generation has developed strong territorial and partially political 
identification with Estonia and ‘their [more positive] attitude and trust towards 
the Estonian state determines how they see the compatriot movement [as 
something not for them]’ (2016, 10).  
 
In a separate discussion, Kallas also stated that, “Identification with the body of 
compatriots is ambiguous due to the low resonance that Russia’s compatriot policy has among 
Estonian Russians” (2016, 17). Perhaps this is best summarized by interviewee #5 when 
commenting on how residents of Narva and Ida-Virumaa might react if they woke up and found 
themselves under the government of Russia: “I don’t believe that people here really want to 
be added, I don’t believe that…. Because we already know how it is to live in Europe. To have 
European basics.”215  
How Can Governments Affect Belongingness? 
If this research has revealed that both Estonia and Russia lack a full understanding of 
the Russian-speaking Estonians’ perceptions and consequently have created policies that do 
not motivate the community in the way intended or are missing opportunities to maximize the 
community’s potential, then it would be advantageous for the governments to assess how to fix 
these shortcomings. Specifically, the governments should compare the perceptions presented 
by the interviewees in this research with the perceptions upon which their national policies 
were based and determine how well they align. If there are large discrepancies, how might they 
reevaluate their policies and identify where they can make corrections to terminology, focus or 
intent to more effectively relate with the Russian-speaking community?   
One recommendation is to use the material and conclusions presented in this research 
coupled with the application of Baumeister and Leary’s theory of belongingness to analyze the 
effectiveness of current strategies and policies aimed at the Russian-speaking Estonians. 
Baumeister and Leary’s theory of belongingness is described as consisting of two parts: 
First, people need frequent personal contacts or interactions with the other 
person. Ideally, these interactions would be affectively positive or pleasant, but 
it is mainly important that the majority be free from conflict and negative affect. 
Second, people need to perceive that there is an interpersonal bond or 
relationship marked by stability, affective concern, and continuation into the 
foreseeable future. This aspect provides a relational context to one's interactions 
with the other person, and so the perception of the bond is essential for 
satisfying the need to belong…. To satisfy the need to belong, the person must 
                                                             
215 (Interviewee #5, Additional Comments, Lines 400-402) 
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believe that the other cares about his or her welfare and likes (or loves) him or 
her (1995, 500). 
 
Future research should extend Baumeister and Leary’s theory of individual belongingness to a 
social level – evaluating the Russian-speaking community as a whole – and then evaluate 
whether Russia or Estonia offers the community a promising stable future relationship. In this 
research, we concluded that Russian-speaking Estonians have a “frequent and personal” 
relationship with both Estonia (physically, socially, mentally) and Russia (culturally, 
historically, linguistically), and that despite certain areas of isolation from Estonia (caused by 
discrimination, native language, and economic conditions) and from Russia (caused by 
physical separation and cross border restrictions) Russian-speaking Estonians maintain a 
constant interaction with both countries that they described as generally positive, particularly 
with regards to the opportunities their unique in-between status offers. Thus, this research has 
already determined that Russian-speaking Estonians meet the first criteria in Baumeister and 
Leary’s “Need to Belong” theory.  
Using Marco Antonsich’s criteria for belongingness, we identified three primary 
discourses used among the interviewees when discussing their perception of socio-spatial 
inclusion: 1) Education, particularly with regards to the Estonian and Russian languages, 2) the 
environment of Ida-Virumaa and 3) the physical exposure to ethnic Estonians and ethnic 
Russians. We determined that the frequency with which these topics were referenced and their 
criticality in determining inclusion or exclusion also made them the most valuable discourses 
in understanding the Russian-speaking Estonians’ self-perceptions and sense of belongingness. 
Using this research as a reference, one can evaluate the nationally generated discourses on 
belongingness within Russia and Estonia and analyze 1) if the national discourses address one 
of the three primary areas presented by the interviewees and 2) if the focus and intent of the 
national discourses promote greater inclusion or exclusion. When mutuality between the 
discourses of one of the countries and the Russian-speaking community exists, then according 
to Baumeister and Leary’s theory one can claim that the reciprocal feeling of care about the 
community’s welfare will foster a greater sense of belongingness within the Russian-speaking 
community. It is through such a discourse analysis that the governments can assess if the goals 
and objectives set forth in their national strategies and policies will successfully resonate with 
the Russian-speaking Estonian community. For Estonia’s Integrating Estonia 2020 Strategy, 
the desired end-state is “that Estonian society is integrated and socially cohesive; people with 
different linguistic and cultural backgrounds actively participate in society and share 
democratic values” (2014, 14). If the discourses within this national strategy do not align with 
 101 
 
the Russian-speaking Estonians discourses however, Estonia may continue to face significant 
issues with integration. Similarly, Russia should reevaluate if the compatriot policy or the three 
pillars of the “original ideological construct of Russkiy Mir […] Russian language; common 
historical memory that strongly focuses on Soviet victory over Nazism in WWII; and the 
Russian Orthodox Church” as summarized by Kristina Kallas, still resonate with the intended 
audience (2016, 7). If not, the Russian government should align the discourses within these 
documents (and strongly consider better defining what a “compatriot” means today), in order 
to better influence the Russian-speaking Estonian community. These future studies would 
allow researchers to determine what aspects of Russia and Estonia’s national policies are 
influencing the social distance between their society and the Russian-Speaking Estonians, and 
consequently better shape and influence their socio-spatial inclusion.  
Military Applicability 
As a final recommendation, it is important to emphasize that although this nature was 
one of research and academically based, the discoveries and conclusions have an impact on not 
only the political but also military understanding of the border environments and intercultural 
encounters. One could argue that the claim of a mobilizing minority community (whether in 
support of Estonia or Russia) is enough to create the perception of a threat or contribute to a 
fear, upon which both countries generate policy in defense of such a fear. This research, 
however is intended to demonstrate that an active and in-depth research into the self-perception 
of the community and an understanding of their true desires, goals and sense of belongingness 
may reveal previously unconsidered solutions to border conflicts and foreign policy and reduce 
international tensions between two countries.  
Absent within the large amounts of military publication discussing options to confront 
what is perceived as increased levels of Russian aggression towards NATO, Europe and the 
collective West is a focus on the human dimension. The closest reference to this area of 
influence is unconventional warfare and the use of “nontraditional” military means to achieve 
an objective. This research on Russian-speaking Estonians reveals, that there is a powerful 
potential within a country that has a large Russian-speaking minority that should be better 
understood to help not only calculate a country’s subversive potential but also to perhaps 
counter the mobilization of said minority in support of unconventional Russian military efforts. 
This research has shown that a Russian-speaking community can be a supportive effort for the 
non-Russian nation when that country can develop and encourage inclusion. This community, 
when supporting the “host nation” can counter unconventional methods such as the deployment 
of “little green men” if these clandestine (or covert?) Russians cannot use the community to 
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blend in or raise support within the community because the community does not support their 
efforts. Conversely, Russia or another nation similarly interested in mobilizing a community 
outside its borders, can convert this “desire to belong” into military potential to widen the social 
distance between the minority community and the host country. Currently, it appears that if 
militarily these are the perspectives of Russia and Estonia, that Estonia has the upper hand. 
However, this research has also shown that these perceptions and sense of belongingness are 
constantly in flux and both countries have the opportunity to alter their military advantage 
through a better understanding of the Russian-speaking minority.  
Most importantly, this research also underlines the growing importance on the Russian-
speaking Estonian community and their recognition of their importance with regards to their 
duality. Returning to the concept of complex interdependence, the populations greater sense of 
belongingness to Estonia allows the diaspora a sense of independence from Russia. Conversely, 
Russia’s need for the use of the diaspora as a means to exert dominance within its perceived 
spheres of influence actually places a considerable amount of power in the hands of the 
diaspora. PhD Scholar Waheeda Rana quotes Keohane and Nye (1977), explaining that “It is 
asymmetries in dependence that are most likely to provide sources of influence for actors in 
their dealings with one another. Less dependent actors can often use the interdependence 
relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue and perhaps to affect other issues.” 
(Rana 2015, 291). The role of the Russian-speaking Estonian does not depend only on the 
discourses formed by Estonia or Russia – with time, perhaps the bridge that the Russian-
speaking Estonians are creating will also be controlled by the Russian-speaking Estonians who 
will be the primary influencers on how communication flows between Estonia and Russia.  
However, if nothing else is taken from this research, then both governments should at 
least value the self-recognized duality of the Russian-speaking Estonian. The opportunities that 
this uniquely qualified community possess as a result of their combination of Estonian and 
Russian influences is advantageous to all three interested parties. As the interviewees stated, 
they can be the bridge between the two countries moving forward to help provide clearer 
communication, as well as offering solutions that are mutually beneficial since both sides of 
the border are of value to the Russian-speaking Estonians. Choosing to ignore such a unique 
talent that has taken 26 years to develop would be a disadvantage to all. Estonia is often 
regarded as the shining example of a Post-Soviet country transitioning to a market economy 
and joining the European Union as a quickly recovered and advancing nation. Once again, the 
country is positioned to stand apart from others and demonstrate a refined way of capitalizing 
on the nuances of intercultural encounters to improve border relations and successfully 
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integrate a diverse and complex society. In an environment where large-scale migration is 
becoming commonplace, other countries could benefit from having a role model like Estonia.  
 
Section 5. Conclusion 
 
 Referencing Estonia or the Russian-speaking community as a role model is not the only 
application of this research to a broader context. The various discoveries on cross-cultural 
identity formation, duality, belongingness and mobilization are a few of the many issues 
discussed that are present in other areas of the world where two cultures have come into contact 
and changed individuals’ self-perception and their perspective on the surrounding 
environment. Of course, not all aspects will apply in other situations. In fact, extending the 
conclusions of this research to the broader PSS revealed that the interviewees did not identify 
with other Russian-speaking communities, suggesting that context plays a critical role in their 
self-perceptions and perspectives.  
 
5.1 Can this be Applied to a Larger Context?  
During this research, we compared conclusions and discoveries with previous studies 
in Estonia and Latvia and identified some similarities between separate and distinct Russian-
speaking communities. Most notably, the communities exhibited some level of duality and 
complexity in relation to their host country and Russia. But determining the scale of 
belongingness or the most critical discourses on socio-spatial inclusion for the other 
communities could not be deduced from this research. Applying Tajfel’s theory one could 
make the argument that the similarities between the various Russian-speaking communities 
(loss of their Soviet identity, combatting ethnic discrimination, bilingualism) would unite the 
greater Russian-speaking community as one large ingroup in opposition to the various 
surrounding outgroups (Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Kazakhstan etc.). However, the interviewees 
indicated that there is little perceived connection between the Russian-speaking Estonians and 
other Russian-speaking communities in the PSS, let alone a unified ingroup-mobilization of 
Russian-speakers. Pal Kolsto, from the University of Oslo, references leading researcher of 
Russian-speaking communities, Igor Zevelev, to explain that Estonia is not a unique case. “[A] 
characteristic trait of the Russian diasporas is their fragmentation and weak mobilization. There 
are no noticeable horizontal links between them…. They do not have a common enemy or 
common dreams for the future” (Zevelev, 2008, p.6 as cited in Kolsto 2011, 157). The 
interviewees’ low connection with other Russian-speaking communities in the PSS was most 
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evident when responding to Question 2, Part 3 concerning the transaction between Russia and 
Georgia. Their responses suggested that their affiliation with the Russian-speaking Georgians 
is based on factual reasoning – what they observed in news reports of the incident - not 
affiliation with a social group based on linguistic or historic similarities. (see Section 2.2 
“Institutional Connections”) This unwillingness to relate to other Russian-speaking 
communities outside of Russia was interesting given the explicit descriptions of unity, 
familiarity, and connection attributed to the larger Russian-speaking community through 
language (Section 2.2 “Cultural Roots”). It appears, however that the uniqueness of the 
Estonian environment and the associated Estonian characteristics, history and culture cause the 
Russian-speaking Estonians to define their ingroup more narrowly, thus inhibiting a connection 
or cooperation between other Russian-speaking communities.  
This conclusion offers an answer to one of the initial questions at the beginning of this 
research. Assuming that the mobilization observed within Crimea in 2014 accurately reflected 
desires of the Ukrainian-based Russian-speaking community, we asked if other countries with 
a Russian-speaking community should expect similar mobilization? This research has shown 
that at least as far as Estonia is concerned, there is a low correlation between other Russian-
speaking communities and the Estonian one. Adding the numerous contextually influential 
factors, we can conclude that each Russian-speaking community not only has a unique self-
perception and sense of belongingness, but the motivating factors to mobilize will also be 
unique. Although this declaration seems rather benign and logical, it is important to underline 
this conclusion in light of the recent concern that somehow these dispersed communities within 
the PSS (and at times even those located in countries that were never a part of the Soviet Union) 
are uniting and offering Russia a community willing to overthrow their host nations to (re)join 
Russia. As the Asymmetric Operations Working Group (AOWG) explained, the Baltic States 
are not Northeast European Versions of Crimea:  
[I]t must be recognized from the outset that each of the Baltic States stands in a 
different position than Crimea prior to its annexation.…Baltic territory does not 
hold similar historical, cultural, or spiritual importance as Crimea specifically, 
or Ukraine generally. Those interviewed in the Baltic States emphasized that 
Russians have always viewed Crimea as part of Russia, but they have not 
viewed the Baltic States in the same way. Additionally, as Figure 1 
[Comparison of GDP Per Capita PPP of the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine] 
illustrates, residents of Ukraine increased their standard of living by joining 
Russia, whereas residents of the Baltic States do not stand to gain in living 
standard or services by becoming part of Russia. As a number of formal and 
informal interviewees communicated, unlike in Crimea, Russians living in the 
Baltic States enjoy the best of both worlds: they can embrace their Russian 
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culture and enjoy the government services of an EU member country (AOWG 
2015, 4-5). 
 
The context, environment, role of the host nation and the community’s own self-
perception must be accounted for when questioning the mobilization of the community.  
In a similar effort to draw correlations to other Russian-speaking communities, 
researchers, military experts and politicians have even questioned if the Russian-speaking 
community within Finland possesses similar potential to mobilize in favor of Russia. Again, 
we are faced with different circumstances. Although Finland was ruled by Imperial Russia 100 
years ago, Finland was never a part of the Soviet Union, so Russian-speakers who lived in 
Finland when the Soviet Union collapsed did not experience the overnight majority to minority 
shift described earlier as having a significant effect on the Russian-speakers’ self-perception. 
Secondly, the movement of Russian-speakers into Finland did not result in large, industrial 
towns along Finland’s border, which significantly affected the ratio of Russian-speakers to 
Ethnic Finns. It is difficult to find a comparable city within Finland that has such a high 
percentage of Russian-speakers to ethnic Finns, drastically contrasting to the dynamics of 
inclusion/exclusion observed in Estonia. In short, while concepts of identity, belongingness 
and mobilization from this research are transferable, the context must be taken into 
consideration whether it concerns Russian-speaking communities within the PSS or other 
ethnic minorities residing within the borders of a dissimilar society.  
This research offers a method to discover the potential for mobilization and the 
motivations for such a mobilization, but conclusions about the Russian-speaking Estonians’ 
potential to mobilize should not be used as indicative of other communities’ potential. This 
means that countries should also not extrapolate the political actions of border and minority 
communities to develop their own country specific policies without thoroughly analyzing their 
specific minority and border communities.  
 
5.2 Transnationalism 
Similar to the above question concerning the use of this study to understand the PSS, 
is the question of whether this situation can help understand similar cross-cultural interactions 
and border conflicts around the world. Although it is more traditional to only consider the 
national powers, particularly when it comes to large countries such as Russia given the size of 
the country and its military apparatus, this research of the Russian-speaking Estonians aims to 
impress upon the reader the growing importance of the complex-interdependence theory (Rana 
2015) and the role that non-state actors such as a community of Russian-speaking Estonians 
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can play on an international or global stage. While they can be viewed as a liability to national 
unity, this research has shown that they can also be a bridging force, linking two different 
cultures and fostering integration and inclusion when they are understood. While the 
conclusions specific to the Russian-speaking Estonians may not be applicable world-wide, this 
method for understanding and interpreting a community that is as complex as the Russian-
speaking Estonians can yield similar understanding in other intercultural relations and provide 
solutions to cross-border conflicts and intercultural misunderstandings. Therefore, in 
conclusion, this research aims to bring more attention to the need for studying transnationalism.  
The term transnationalism was initially brought into use in the late 1990s/early 2000s, 
but the concepts and fields of study from which transnationalism developed are not new. In the 
book Diaspora and Transnationalism: Concepts, Theories and Methods editor Rainer Bauböck 
explains that:  
[T]ransnationalism has had a strong career as a concept in quite disparate fields 
of academic study. Probably the three most important ones are the following: 
first, international relations, where the concept began to be used as early as the 
1970s to refer to the growing importance of non-state actors, such as 
multinational corporations and international NGOs, in the international arena 
(e.g. Keohane & Nye 1972); second, social movement studies, which were 
interested in political mobilisation across borders (e.g. Smith, Chatfield & 
Pagnucco 1997); and third, migration studies (e.g. Basch, Glick Schiller & 
Szanton Blanc 1994) (Bauböck and Faist 2010, 296). 
 
Similar to the conclusions drawn in Diaspora and Transnationalism, this research has 
concluded that the study of the Russian-speaking community transcends all of the above-
mentioned fields of study and requires the incorporation of all of them to fully understand the 
potential the community possesses. This research has demonstrated the overlap of immigration, 
cross-border relations, cross-cultural encounters and cultural identification which all have an 
impact on how a community forms and develops. In the concluding chapter of the book, editor 
Rainer Bauböck states: 
Although these are quite different fields, there was a common underlying 
perception that transnationalism was about ‘globalisation from below’ 
(Guarnizo & Smith 1998; Della Porta, Andretta, Mosca & Reiter 2006). 
Transnational relations were accordingly distinguished from international ones 
by insisting that at least one of the actors involved in the former be a non-state 
entity (Risse-Kappen 1995; Portes, Guarniz & Landolt 1999). Much of the 
empirical research on transnationalism has accordingly focused on individual 
and group agency across international borders (Bauböck and Faist 2010, 296). 
 
Referencing the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization’s website 
dedicated to International Migration, “the concept of trans-nationalism refers to multiple ties 
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and interactions linking people and institutions across the borders of nation-states” (“Trans-
nationalism” 2017).  Transnationalism has even begun to significantly influence the field of 
international law as the book Critical International Law: Postrealism, Postcolonialism, and 
Transnationalism, explains in the abstract: “transnationalism sees international law not as 
interstate law, or only as states as the primary subject of law, but appreciates the tremendous 
power of private actors, NGOs, and non-state actors that reshape the doctrine and function of 
international law” (Singh and Mayer 2014, i). However, there is still little research into the 
many aspects of transnationalism. Indeed, in the introduction to the book, Ties to the 
Homeland: Second Generation Transnationalism, which contains a collection of studies on 
transnationalism, editor Helen Lee states: 
However, little research has investigated the intergenerational reproduction of 
such ties— the connections that migrants’ children maintain with their parents’ 
homelands. This volume draws together some of this research on second 
generation transnationalism and presents case studies from a number of migrant 
groups (Lee 2008, vii). 
 
Using the above quotation as an example, the research on Russian-speaking Estonians clearly 
highlighted a need for further study on the importance and influence of family, generational 
aspects of culture and their impact on self-perception. Another example of the lack of research 
devoted to transnationalism is seen in the lack of results when conducting a search for academic 
journals dedicated to this study. A search of journals focused on transnationalism available at 
the Helsinki University online library only returned three results; one of which focused 
specifically on south-east Asia and another on women of color in transnational roles.216 There 
is need of more current and focused research in this area if there is hope for policy makers to 
have an academic basis from which to assess and evaluate the dynamic and increasingly 
important field transnationalism.  
For this reason, the primary objective of this research is focusing on the people and 
community in question. By researching how the community perceives its physical 
surroundings and the social interactions that occur between the surrounding societies, this 
research provides a better understanding of who the people consider themselves to be and 
offers an understanding of how this community may shape international relations. However, 
this research is only partly revealing with regards to transnationalism. Future studies of 
transnationalism should also take into consideration the study of the virtual space which is 
                                                             
216 The three journals found were: Meridians: feminism, race, transnationalism, TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -
National Studies of Southeast Asia and Portal. 
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increasingly functioning like the physical space.  As authors Kathrin Kissau and Uwe Hunger 
state in chapter 13 of Diaspora and Transnationalism:  
‘Diasporic communities have always relied on networks, which expanded from 
the immediate local to the transnational and global’ (Georgiou 2002: 3). The 
internet is now the central framework for such networks, so that observing 
online structures can provide insights into diasporic community characteristics 
(Bauböck and Faist 2010, 246). 
 
Mainsah’s earlier referenced study of the virtual space and its role in identity formation and 
assigning belongingness for Africans in Norway further supports a focus on transnationalism 
and its impacts in the virtual space. Studying only the virtual aspects however, will fall short 
of providing a complete understanding of the communities in question. Mainsah himself, 
discourages a complete shift to analyzing only the virtual space:  
However, these spaces are not the same as those encountered by moving 
physical bodies. Thus although digital diasporas produced through online 
encounters of global environments can affectively simulate diasporic life and 
even actually change everyday practices of offline bodies the experience is not 
fully that of those in the diaspora (2014, 107). 
 
Similarly, UNESCO states that “the notion of trans-national community puts the emphasis on 
human agency” (“Trans-nationalism” 2017). If the focus is on the people, then a purely virtual 
research of transnational communities will not be fully revealing. Authors Kissau and Hunger 
suggest that it is the combination of virtual and physical that must be achieved when studying 
transnationalism:  
One should not make the mistake, however, of studying all these activities 
solely by analysing the internet. Though online spheres are the extension of 
offline worlds, they alone do not suffice for a thorough analysis. Field studies 
of offline realms cannot be replaced, but the internet can add to an overview of 
different migrant communities’ characteristics. Online and offline worlds 
interact and are not independent of one another, so that analysing online 
behaviour allows us to draw conclusions about overall, general interests (also 
offline) (Bauböck and Faist 2010, 248). 
 
While this specific research focused on the physical aspects of transnationalism, it nevertheless 
contributed to the larger understanding of transnationalism and its importance and impacts 
across multiple domains. Future studies of transnationalism, encompassing cross-border 
relations, majority/minority dynamics and the associated questions of identity and 
belongingness, should consider how the virtual spaces intersect with the physical aspects of 
integration and interaction discussed in this research to better understand intercultural 
encounters that shape and influence identity, belongingness and mobilization. Understanding 
transnationalism and those who operate in the roles of transnationals such as the interviewees 
 109 
 
of this research is a critical step in understanding the increasing importance and long-term 
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